EU social and labour rights and EU internal market law by Dirección General de Políticas Interiores de la Unión (Parlamento Europeo) et al.
Economic and Monetary Affairs 
Employment and Social Affairs 
Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
Industry, Research and Energy
Internal Market and Consumer Protection 
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES
POLICY DEPARTMENT
ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC POLICYA
Employment and Social Affair  
2015
EU Social and Labour 
Rights and EU Internal 
Market Law










































   
 
 
DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES 
POLICY DEPARTMENT A: ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC POLICY 
 
 
EU Social and Labour Rights and EU 




EU Social and Labour Rights have developed incrementally, originally through a 
set of legislative initiatives creating selective employment rights, followed by a 
non-binding Charter of Social Rights. Only in 2009, social and labour rights 
became legally binding through the Charter of Fundamental Rights for the 
European Union (CFREU). By contrast, the EU Internal Market - an area without 
frontiers where goods, persons, services and capital can circulate freely – has 
been enshrined in legally enforceable Treaty provisions from 1958. These 
comprise the economic freedoms guaranteeing said free circulation and a 
system ensuring that competition is not distorted within the Internal Market 
(Protocol 27 to the Treaty of Lisbon). Tensions between Internal Market law and 
social and labour rights have been observed in analyses of EU case law and 
legislation. This report, provided by Policy Department A to the Committee on 
Employment and Social Affairs, explores responses by socio-economic and 
political actors at national and EU levels to such tensions. On the basis of the 
current Treaties and the CFREU, the constitutionally conditioned Internal Market 
emerges as a way to overcome the perception that social and labour rights limit 
Internal Market law. On this basis, alternative responses to perceived tensions 
are proposed, focused on posting of workers, furthering fair employment 
conditions through public procurement and enabling effective collective 
bargaining and industrial action in the Internal Market.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Background 
This research study aims to illustrate the relationship between EU social and labour rights and 
the law of the EU Internal Market, give a systematic overview of how any conflicts have been 
reconciled and suggest policy recommendations to the most relevant actors, including the Eu-
ropean Parliament. Presently, new economic governance is the focus of academic and public 
debates on EU employment and social affairs, in particular considering the impact of instru-
ments such as Country Specific Recommendations (CSR) and Memoranda of Understanding 
(MoU) on life in Member States. Nevertheless, the potential tension between the hard law of 
the EU single market and labour and social rights at national and EU levels remains relevant 
for shaping future policy in employment and social affairs. Such tension had become a symbol 
of the EU’s alleged neo-liberalism even before the global economic crisis of 2008. More im-
portantly, exaggeration of the tension seems to stall the options for politically shaping em-
ployment and social policy. It is this dilemma which this research study addresses.  
Aim 
 Illustrate how the relationship of EU social and labour rights and Internal Market law 
has been structured by the interplay of CJEU case law, EU Directives and national law 
and practice 
 Identify conceptual frictions between social and labour rights and Internal Market law 
and investigate whether these are experienced as problematic at national and EU levels 
 Identify responses to disruptions as they are perceived at national and EU levels 
 Offering new ways of interpreting Internal Market law as constitutionally conditioned, as 
a guide for future case law and legislation, aiming to realign social and labour rights 
and Internal Market law 
 Identifying options for addressing some of these frictions by a range of actions at EU 
and national levels 
Main findings 
The research report finds that the traditional interpretation of EU Internal Market law 
causes a number of frictions for protection and promotion of social and labour rights. 
These restrictions are felt by social and institutional actors at national and EU levels. The spe-
cific experience at national levels varies in relation to the levels of outward and inward flow of 
workers and service provision as well as in relation to the prevalent industrial relations model.  
Trans-border movement of workers in the EU has come under critical scrutiny in many Member 
States. The original concept of the Internal Market envisaged that workers move for improving 
their situation under the condition of equal treatment in the state where they work. The inter-
pretation and specification of the economic freedoms by EU legislators and the Court of 
Justice has created avenues for subjecting workers moving abroad to precarious em-
ployment practices. Because posted workers enjoy no right to be treated equally with work-
ers in the host state, they frequently find themselves in low-waged work, in particular when 
moving as posted agency workers. These precarious employment practices are concentrated in 
certain occupations and sectors, rather than spread throughout the economy. As a result, even 
relatively small numbers of incoming precarious workers may disrupt employment con-
ditions locally. Voluntary industrial relations models, and those based on collective agree-
ments as private contracts, are more vulnerable to the negative effects of precarious move-
ment of workers than those where employment conditions are regulated by statute, or where 
industrial relations structures were weak before the Internal Market had any impact. Social 
actors react by re-configuring their industrial relations systems. This may indicate a 
trend of EU industrial relation systems converging on the model of state-centred industrial re-
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
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lations relying on the extension of collective agreements by administrative order on the basis 
of legislation.  
At the same time, those employment relations systems which combine statutory protection 
with strong industrial relations systems prove more resilient in integrating free moving workers 
on the basis of equal treatment. Equal treatment of citizens who move to work is a fun-
damental precondition for mobilising positive potential of guaranteeing free move-
ment of workers. Guaranteeing free movement of workers (and other persons) on the basis 
of equal treatment is a unique feature of the European Union as a regional integration entity, 
and precondition for the continued existence of its socio-economic model. Disrupting employ-
ment relation models which have been successful in guaranteeing this equal treatment in prac-
tice not only fails in the task to promote social and labour rights, but also fails the EU integra-
tion model. 
These results of a series of expert interviews led to revisiting the image of tension as the 
main guide of perceiving the relationship of EU social and labour rights and Internal 
Market law. On the basis of the legally binding Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Europe-
an Union, it is suggested to conceptualise the Internal Market as a constitutionally conditioned 
market. This means that Internal Market law (economic freedoms and competition law) is to be 
infused with social and labour rights instead of being juxtaposed to them. This demands a 
new appreciation of conflicts, and a change in future case law, allowing more coura-
geous legislation and autonomous rule-making for promoting social and labour rights. 
The report thus recommends three types of activities: One, activities that promote the 
concept of a constitutionally embedded Internal Market and provide a knowledge base for its 
implementation. Second, legislative activities at EU levels that correct such legislation that 
responded to case law based on the old concept of tensions between Internal Market law and 
social and labour rights. Third, activities by social actors, notably trade unions and employer 
associations, that specify EU level regulation for certain particularly vulnerable sectors, and by 
trade unions that combine forces transnationally to effectively enforce these and other rules. 
Examples developed focus around the issue of ensuring equal treatment of people moving 
for work (including posted workers and posted agency workers), furthering fair employ-
ment conditions through public procurement and enabling effective collective bargaining 
and collective industrial action in the Internal Market. 
Legislative proposals include suggestions for the intended reform of the Posted Work-
ers Directive, basing this instrument on the principle of equal treatment of workers instead of 
equal treatment of business, as well as proposals for adaptations of regulations coordinating 
social security and ensuring equal treatment of free moving workers, and legislation in the field 
of competition law.  
Proposals for activities by social actors include responding to specific conditions of posting 
in certain sectors, in particular in relation to occupational social security schemes, through col-
lective agreements, establishing procedures for informing citizens who move to work of their 
rights, and to integrate them in collective representation structures, as well as creating trans-
national bargaining structures for setting employment conditions in sectors that are so trans-
national that national collective bargaining becomes dysfunctional.  
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1. A GROWING TENSION? 
KEY FINDINGS 
The Treaty of Lisbon has elevated EU social and labour rights to the same normative level as 
the established law of the Internal Market. If these fields of law are perceived as juxtaposed 
to each other, the potential for tensions between those two bodies of law seems endless. Ap-
proaching social and labour rights on the one hand and Internal Market law on the other 
hand not as irreconcilable antonyms, but rather as equally valid elements of the EU socio-
economic model may pave the way for rebalancing and reinterpreting their interrelation. 
1.1. Introduction  
EU level guarantees of social and labour rights on the one hand and EU Internal Market law on 
the other hand are frequently perceived as fundamentally opposed. However, the original mis-
sion of the EEC, and its development into the aims and objectives of today’s EU contest 
this perception of conflict. The aim of creating a market common to all the Member States and 
their peoples was always meant to serve wider aims, including social aims. Accordingly, 
the EU socio-economic model does not juxtapose social and labour rights on the one hand and 
Internal Market law on the other hand. This report sets out to identify innovative ways at EU, 
national and subnational level to respect, protect and promote social and labour rights 
while safeguarding Internal Market law.1 This chapter scopes the preconditions to achieve 
this aim and sets out the stages and method of the investigation undertaken. It starts with a 
recapitulation of how the EU’s socio-economic model and underlying values have developed 
(1.2), clarifies the position which EU social and labour rights have achieved following the last 
Treaty revision (1.3), summarises the legal frame of the Internal Market (1.4) and a reflects 
on potential tensions between EU social and labour rights and Internal Market law (1.5). Finally 
it outlines how this study has been conducted, and how the report is structured (1.6). 
1.2. The EU’s socio-economic model from Rome to Lisbon and beyond  
The EEC’s founding Treaty, the Treaty of Rome, was based on the principle of embedded lib-
eralism: it focused on economic integration, while leaving social policy to its Member States. 
The social dimension of European integration was not simply ignored. Article 2 EEC Treaty 
specified that establishing a common market was only an instrument to fulfil the Community’s 
tasks, which included the promotion of an accelerated raising of the standard of living, 
while Article 117 EEC demanded improvement of working conditions and standards of living for 
workers, “so as to make possible their harmonization while the improvement is being main-
tained”.  
However, while the Treaty contained a detailed legal framework for establishing the Com-
mon Market, the framework for the social dimension was much more flexible. Thus, the 
Treaty provided for hard law to achieve the creation of the Common Market, in particular 
through abolishing custom duties and quantitative restrictions on free movement of goods, 
services and persons, while postponing the free movement of capital, and establishing an EU 
level competition law regime. By contrast, the legal frame for “social policy” bordered on 
the arbitrary. The relevant Treaty chapter specifically guaranteed equal pay for women and 
men and the equivalence of annual leave provisions, but did not contain any dedicated legal 
base for creating secondary law. Today’s Article 48 TFEU, a competence to coordinate Member 
States’ social insurance systems and legislate to facilitate the free movement of workers, was 
                                           
1  (Schiek, 2011); (Ashiagbor, 2013) pursues a similar approach, though from a more sceptical position as to whether 
the EU can achieve this. 
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located in the chapter on the Common Market. It provided a base for market-annexed social 
policy.2 A comprehensive social policy at the European level was seen as superfluous. Instead, 
the Treaty fathers expected that the accelerated rising of living standards would flow naturally 
from introducing the Common Market.  
In the late 1960s, economic recession and related social unrest all over Europe forced the EEC 
and its Member States to recognise that such automatism was misconceived. Moreover, it ap-
peared that economic liberalisation would disrupt the Member States’ ability to hold up the so-
cial side of the EEC’s implicit integration model.3 The EEC’s reaction in the 1970s was to legis-
late for a floor of employment rights in the fields of transfers of undertakings, collective 
redundancies and employers’ insolvencies,4 which emerged in the wake of the crisis and were 
also accredited to the Common Market, as well as through directives securing the equal treat-
ment of women and men in employment5 and social security.6 In the 1980s and 90s, this was 
followed by legislation on health and safety7 and information and consultation of workers in a 
variety of circumstances.8 Progressive Treaty reforms created and subsequently expanded ex-
plicit competences to legislate in the social policy field.  
In the early 1990s, the Treaty of Maastricht created Union citizenship. Following the de-
velopment of case law on the free movement of workers, this became a transmission belt for 
the judicial creation of social rights flowing from the European Community,9 as the EEC 
would be named after the Treaty of Maastricht.  
The gradual expansion of the Common Market’s social dimension was paralleled by a consoli-
dation of its core mission, economic integration. The 1985 “Single European Act”10 was dedi-
cated to complete the mission of erasing barriers of trading goods and services over borders 
alongside increasing the mobility of the EU population. The Single Market Programme consti-
tuted an impressive package of legislative proposals aiming to underpin the economic free-
doms, and to make them more effective. In 1993, the Treaty of Maastricht established an 
Economic and Monetary Union. The asymmetric nature11 of the EMU meant that a bind-
ing legal framework for the common currency, including disputed benchmarks12 such as 
                                           
2   (Schiek, 2013a, p. 41). 
3   (Ashiagbor, 2013, p. 308). 
4   Council Directive 77/187/EEC of 14 February 1977 (protecting acquired rights of employees on transfer of under-
takings) [1977] OJ L61/26 (later consolidated in Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 [2001] OJ 
L82/16); Council Directive 75/129/EEC of 17 February 1975 (protecting employees’ rights to be consulted in the 
event of collective redundancies) [1975] OJ L48/29 (later amended and consolidated in Council Directive 98/59/EC 
of 20 July 1998 [1998] OJ L225/16–21); Council Directive 80/987/EEC of 20 October 1980 (protecting employees’ 
rights in the event of an employer’s insolvency) [1980] OJ L283/23 (subsequently amended and later consolidated 
in Directive 2008/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 [2008] OJ L283/36). 
5  Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 (equal pay directive) [1975] OJ L45/19; Council Directive 
76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 (equal treatment directive) [1976] OJ L39/40 (each recast by Directive 
2006/54/EC (equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupa-
tion) [2006] OJ L204/23). 
6   Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 (equal treatment of men and women in matters of social securi-
ty) [1979] OJ L6/24. 
7   Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 (safety and health of workers at work) [1989] OJ L183/1 (subse-
quently amended);  Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 (working time) [1993] OJ L307/18 (subse-
quently amended and later consolidated in Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
4 November 2003 [2003] OJ L299/9); Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 (safety and health at work 
of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth) [1992] OJ L348/1 (subsequently amended); 
Council Directive 94/33/EC of 22 June 1994 (protection of young people at work) [1994] OJ L216/12 (subsequently 
amended).  
8   Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994 (European Works Councils) [1994] OJ L254/64 (subsequently 
amended and later consolidated in Directive 2009/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 
2009 [2009] OJ L122/28); Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 (employee involvement in the Europe-
an company) [2001] OJ L294/22; Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2002 (general framework of informing and consulting employees) [2002] OJ L80/29. 
9   (Lenaerts, 2011). 
10   Single European Act, 17 February 1986, OJ 1987 L 169/1. 
11 (Verdun, 2013). 
12  For a macroeconomic critique see (Sawyers, et al., 2013). 
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limits on government debt and commitments to budget stability at national levels, was accom-
panied by a mere coordination of economic policy, which remains the responsibility of 
Member States. The coordination of economic policy introduced new processes, initially based 
on the exclusive interaction of the Council and the Commission with national governments. 
Broad economic policy guidelines were adopted by the Council based on an initial Commission 
recommendation and information by national governments, with subsequent monitoring by the 
Commission. The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced similar, although less engaging principles 
for employment policy (1997).  
This initiated the development of “new governance” processes.13 In response to the global 
economic and resultant euro area crisis, the EU added “new economic governance”.14 These 
processes are based on goals that are not legally binding, but instead enforced through an 
elaborated surveillance process, which also impacted upon social and labour rights at national 
levels. While this study focuses on the legal branch of EU integration, and the directly effective 
law of the Internal Market, it is important to remember that the coercive force of these 
formally soft-law mechanisms may well outperform the law of the Internal Market.15 Never-
theless, the legal frame of the Internal Market remains decisive for actively protecting and 
promoting social and labour rights, as will be shown throughout the report. 
Overall, the EU’s socio-economic model16 is a mixed one: it is based on a market economy, 
but the economic integration of the regional market is undertaken for the purpose to improve 
working and living conditions of all citizens. Accordingly, economic and social integration 
are invariably linked. This is most apparent in the interaction between establishing economic 
policy guidelines and coordinating employment and other branches of social policy. However, 
the law of the Internal Market is also imbued with social purposes, and indeed values.  
1.3. EU social and labour rights after the Treaty of Lisbon 
The Treaty of Lisbon, in force from 2009, achieved a considerable consolidation of the EU´s 
socio-economic model, while also establishing a legally binding catalogue of fundamental rights 
for the European Union. Its elaborated catalogue of the Union’s values and objectives 
(Articles 2, 3 TEU) stresses the Union’s social commitments to a degree hitherto unknown, 
while the Charter of Fundamental Rights for the European Union (CFREU) strengthens these 
commitments through explicit guarantees of social and labour rights.  
1.3.1. Values underpinning social and labour rights 
According to Article 2 TEU, the Union is founded on an impressive set of values: respect for 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, 
including the rights of persons belonging to a minority. Its second sentence states that “these 
values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”. It is suggested 
that this does not allocate a second-order rank to values such as solidarity.17 Instead, the EU’s 
objectives, especially the socio-economic ones, clarify that solidarity is actually at the heart 
of the EU’s raison d’être.  
These objectives are now assembled in the 3rd and 4th paragraphs of Article 3 TEU, which, for 
the first time in the EU’s history, elevates the establishment of the Internal Market and 
an economic and monetary union to free standing aims, strengthening the economic 
                                           
13  It is impossible to reference all the literature on new governance. The notion of reflexive governance was developed 
by a number of authors with different viewpoints, including (Barcevicius, et al., 2014; Sabel & Zeitlin, 2010; 
Schutter & Lenoble, 2010); critical approaches include (Armstrong, 2010; 2012; Daly, 2012) 
14 (De Sadeleer, 2014; Schiek, 2013a, pp. 10-11). 
15  (Schiek, 2013b). 
16  For more detail see (Schiek, 2013a). 
17  For more references see (Schiek, 2012a, pp. 219-220). 
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mission. Alongside this, the EU aims at sustainable development, based on a highly competi-
tive social market economy, full employment and social progress. Next to aims which are 
familiar from predecessor Treaties (combatting social exclusion and discrimination and promot-
ing gender equality), Article 3 (3) adds social justice, social protection and solidarity be-
tween the generations as new Treaty aims. In particular, the EU’s commitment to social 
justice clarifies that the EU itself pursues solidarity within its EU level social dimension.   
The non-economic values of Article 2 and corresponding objectives of Article 3 feed into hori-
zontal clauses of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The horizontal 
social clause in Article 9 TFEU is particularly relevant, since it commits the EU to main-
streaming the objectives of social protection, social inclusion and of high levels of em-
ployment, education, training and human health into all other policy areas.  
All this indicates that the Treaty of Lisbon, by strengthening social elements of the Treaties’ 
values and the EU’s objectives, related the EU’s economic and social aims to each other. This is 
underlined by the TFEU: the Union’s objectives have to be pursued in accordance with the 
principles of an open market economy and free competition (Article 119 TFEU) as well as by 
the 1961 ESC, the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 1989 and the 
improvement of working and living conditions under the goal of upward harmonisation (Article 
151 TFEU). The EU is now premised on an integrated approach to economic and social 
politics, and pursues socio-economic integration as a holistic aim. 
1.3.2. Social and labour rights in the Charter of Fundamental Rights  
Finally, social and labour rights are included in the Charter of Fundamental Rights for 
the European Union (CFREU), which – from December 2009 - is legally binding and has the 
same value as the Treaties (Article 6 TEU). Social and labour rights are mainly located in 
its chapter IV, headed “solidarity”, and chapter III, headed “equality”. Chapter II, headed 
“Freedoms”, also contains some rights of relevance to modern working life, such as the right to 
data protection (Article 8), freedom of assembly and association (Article 12) and the freedom 
to choose an occupation and the right to engage in work (Article 15). The inclusion of social 
and labour rights in the CFREU underlines their heightened relevance in EU law. It also is a de-
cisive step for guaranteeing different categories of human rights alongside each other. 
Among the different approaches of categorising human rights, those approaches based on the 
historical development of human rights have had the most appeal.18 The first human rights to 
emerge served to protect liberty and property from state intrusion and pre-date democracy. 
These liberal human rights can be summarised as “the right to be left alone”, and today also 
comprise data protection and other privacy rights. Human rights that arrived with democracy 
establish a public sphere in which citizens can discuss, publish, convene and protest in order to 
influence democratic life - these include freedom of assembly, freedom of speech and also the 
right to vote (democratic human rights). The expansion of the scope of democracy necessi-
tated another set of human rights: giving the right to vote to paupers and other non-
possessing classes can easily become a sham if they are unable to actually participate in dem-
ocratic life due to the need to work for a living. Social human rights comprise the right to 
decent housing and protection from starvation, but they also permeate and change liberal and 
democratic human rights as well. For example, enabling public space by funding a free press 
and impartial broadcasting institutions, teaching literary skills in free schools, and holding 
votes on days where no-one has to work are ways to develop democratic rights, as are the 
protection of liberal rights such as rights to privacy and not being injured in private spheres 
such as the workplace and the family. 
                                           
18  This draws on (Schiek, 2012a, pp. 53-60; Schiek, 2015, pp. 3-4). 
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As analysed in more detail below (4.2.2), the Charter abandons artificial divisions between lib-
eral, democratic and social rights. It thus constitutes a modern human rights catalogue: be-
yond only formally granting rights, it also aims at making rights effective for all.  
1.3.3. Social and labour rights included in this study 
For this study, collective labour rights (Article 12, 28 CFREU), rights to fair working 
conditions (Article 31 CFREU) and rights to social security and social assistance (Ar-
ticle 34 CFREU) have been chosen for further investigation. This choice rests on the as-
sumption that these rights collectively constitute central elements of Member States social 
state arrangements19 and indeed frame the working life of many citizens.  
The rights to collective bargaining, establishing collective agreements and taking collective 
action to underpin the collective bargaining process can be considered as constitutive of Eu-
ropean labour models.20 In relation to this right it is important to acknowledge that it actual-
ly straddles different categories of human rights. On the one hand, the freedom of as-
sembly and association (Article 12 CFREU) is a liberal democratic right. On the other 
hand, once this right includes the formation of trade unions, it becomes a social democratic 
right. Further, Article 28 CFREU, by guaranteeing a right to collective bargaining and 
industrial action, makes this democratic right more efficient. The right to threaten and exe-
cute collective industrial action can be utilised to achieve collective labour agreements offering 
better employment conditions than workers could achieve individually. Collective labour 
agreements remedy the structural imbalance of labour markets, which has also been referred 
to as the fallacy of labour markets: 21 because most workers do not have any alternative to 
earning their main income on the labour market, they will not withhold their labour once wages 
fall below a certain level. Instead, they will expand its supply, for example by taking on a sec-
ond occupation or overtime. Thus, on labour markets the mechanism by which supply and de-
mand establish an ideal price is dysfunctional, as long as workers do not bargain as a collec-
tive. Accordingly, even market economy ideologues support a system of collective bargain-
ing.22 Additional justifications rest on the conviction that securing humane working conditions 
through the self-determination of workers is to be preferred to protective state legislation, 
such as statutory minimum wages. Relating to self-determination, the right to collective 
bargaining and industrial action also guarantees a process: workers are empowered to 
negotiate from a position of substantive equality, instead of becoming passive recipients of 
statutory protection. Accordingly, the right to collective bargaining is infringed in its essence if 
the parties negotiating a collective agreement are subjected to a detailed control of the pro-
cess, or if the content of the demands they may make is prescribed.  
All this underlines the fact that the liberal democratic right (guaranteed in Article 12 
CFREU) and the social democratic right (Article 28 CFREU) are only functional in their in-
teraction. The right to found a trade union would be of little value if this trade union would not 
be able to effectively act for workers. The right to bargain for collective agreements under-
pinned by credible industrial action again is decisive for such effective action. 
The right to fair and just working conditions in Article 31 explicitly highlights working 
time and annual leave provision, though its substantive scope is all-encompassing: fair and 
just working conditions are to respect human dignity. The implied right to a decent working life 
ensures that those who cannot live off their wealth retain their health and their dignity, ena-
bling them to remain citizens although subjected to the vicissitudes of working life. This does 
not only demand efficient health and safety rules, as suggested by the provision’s text, but al-
                                           
19   See (Schiek, 2001), paragraphs 56-76; (Schiek, 2012a, pp. 31-38). 
20   (Dukes, 2014). 
21   While these ideas have been around for a long time (Stützel, 1982), they can still be tested in current scenarios 
(see e.g. (Hickel, 2007) on minimum wages in Germany). 
22   (Kaufmann, 1989), with references to Adam Smith, Marshall and Pigou.  
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so adequate wages and a working environment allowing persons to exercise their own judg-
ment as far as suitable, to name just two examples. The guarantee of fair and just working 
conditions is the purpose of the majority of norms governing employment relationships, 
whether these are established by legislation or collective agreements. As with the right to col-
lective bargaining and industrial action, the right to fair and just employment conditions is 
mainly directed at employers as the other side of the employment market.  
Rights to social security and social assistance (Article 34 CFREU) embrace two different 
policy fields.23 Their inclusion in one Charter article illustrates that both serve a common aim. 
This aim consists of providing sufficient and reliable income to citizens who are unable 
to secure sufficient resources for themselves. Resources by which citizens can secure that 
they have sufficient means to maintain themselves can stem either from inherited wealth, their 
accumulated possessions or their labour. In post-industrial societies, none of those resources 
is ever secure, though market-dependent income derived from employed or self-employed la-
bour is subjected to particularly severe risks. The multiplication of risks in post-modern so-
cieties as well as the wide diversity of national traditions in protecting and including citizens 
results in fluid boundaries between social security and social assistance on the one hand and 
the provision of social services and public goods on the other hand.24 Through social security 
and social assistance states and the EU, in cooperation with private actors, ensure coherent 
and prosperous societies and the social inclusion of all.  
Social security and social assistance are distinguished by the methods applied and the specific 
functions they serve: In short,25 social security aims at protecting against specific risks 
through specific contributions, while social assistance aims more widely to provide the pre-
conditions for including all into society, drawing on the general tax base.  
The classical risks from which workers and self-employed persons are protected by social se-
curity comprise illness, old age or lack of employment opportunities; more recently acknowl-
edged risks include pregnancy, the need to provide care to children, the elderly or the disabled 
and the need to be educated at different stages in life. Health care systems, pensions and 
unemployment benefits, pregnancy benefits, care benefits and services providing place-
ment, education or care are meant to secure against those classical risks. In many Member 
States, social security is provided on a contributory basis, frequently through social insur-
ance institutions which are independent from the general state budget and rely on contribu-
tions by employees and employers. Insurance against work place accidents and illnesses are 
often funded by employers only, since it insures them against the risk of liability in tort or con-
tract. Other Member States provide social security independently from the employment mar-
ket. Such general systems may also be funded through national insurance payments, which 
are not protected against being absorbed by the general state budget.  
Social assistance, by contrast, is funded through the general tax base in all Member States, 
though private funding (through charity or religious communities) may complement state 
funded social assistance. Tax funding may play a role in providing social security as well. It 
may be used to complement social insurance for specific purposes, or to temporarily top up 
ailing branches of social insurance. Thus, there is a sphere of overlap between social secu-
rity and social assistance.  
Rights to social security and social assistance are inextricably linked to a market economy, 
though their provision is frequently seen as a task for states. This is particularly true for so-
cial assistance. Insurance-based social security is frequently, by contrast, offered in the 
                                           
23  More detail on the distinction of those fields is provided under 2.4.1. 
24   See also (White, 2014, p. 929), marginal number 34:03, who declares that the differentiation between social secu-
rity and social assistance is “far from clear”.  
25  For a more complete coverage of the complex field see (Cantillon, et al., 2012; Maydell, et al., 2006; Pennings, 
2015). 
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framework of the employment relationship. Accordingly, in many EU Member States social se-
curity institutions are established through collective labour agreements concluded be-
tween management and labour.  
1.3.4. Relevance of legally binding social and labour rights 
Guaranteeing social and labour rights in a legally binding way is an important step for the 
European Union. It offers the potential of civilising the Internal Market through constitu-
tional embedding. Presently, the CFREU’s practical role remains ambiguous.26  
The Court has already referred to Article 28 CFREU, which guarantees a right to collective bar-
gaining and collective action27 in its case law.28 It has stressed that Article 28 is only guaran-
teed within the limits of EU law, though it also suggested that it can be used to justify re-
strictions of economic freedoms.29 The Court has not yet related Article 28 and Article 12 
CFREU, which guarantees freedom of association,30 to each other, though both constitute a 
source of the right to bargain collectively and threaten collective industrial action.31  
The Court has cited Article 31 CFREU, which guarantees fair and just working conditions,32 on 
several occasions in order to underpin rights to paid annual leave.33 Article 34 CFREU on rights 
to social assistance and social security34 is labelled as a mere principle in the Explanatory 
Notes,35 and categorised accordingly in academic writing.36 The CJEU has not yet relied on Ar-
ticle 34 CFREU either.37 To date, the effects of the enhanced values and objectives of the 
EU on the interpretation of the rest of the Treaties are equally unclear.38  
It remains to be seen whether the guarantee of EU social and labour rights and the enhanced 
social values and objectives of the EU will lead to a re-interpretation of the law of the Internal 
Market. Chapter 4 develops a normative frame for a constitutionally conditioned Internal Mar-
ket as a guide for such re-interpretation in future case law and legislation.   
                                           
26   The CJEU’s president perceives as its main achievement the enhanced “transparency to fundamental rights protec-
tion” (Skouris, 2014), while others hope that it may grow into a “counterweight to the neo-liberal orientation of the 
Treaties”. (Barnard, 2012, p. 33).  
27  See above page 17 - 18. 
28  Case C-271/08 COM v Germany [2010] E.C.R. I-7087, paragraph 38. There is some more recent case law referring to 
Article 28 Charter, but not in relation to non-discriminatory restrictions of economic freedoms. Instead, these cases con-
cern bans on discrimination resulting from directives (e.g. Case C-447/09 Prigge et al [2011] ECR I-8003, paragraph 47) 
or free movement of workers (e.g Case C-172/11 Erny ECLI:EU:C:2012:399, paragraph 50). 
29   Case C-271/08, as in footnote 27.  
30  See above page 18. 
31   For a more detailed critique of this, see below under 4.2.3. 
32  See above page 18. 
33  Case C-229/11 Heimann & Toltschin ECLI:EU:C:2012:693; Case C-536/12 Lock ECLI:EU:C:2014:351; paragraph 
14; Case C-396/13 Sähköalojen ammattiliitto ry [Elektrobudowa] ECLI:EU:C:2015:86, paragraph 64-67. In the 
Fenoll case, the Court did not find it necessary to rely on the horizontal effect of Article 31 in order to establish that 
a person in an institution offering occupations for mentally disabled persons is a worker for the purposes of the 
Working Time Directive (Case C-316/13 Fenoll ECLI:EU:C:2015:200, paragraphs 43-47). 
34  See above page 18. 
35   Explanations (*) Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ 2007 C 303/02: 27. 
36   See (White, 2014, pp. 936-937), 34.39, (Reynolds, 2015). 
37  So far, the Court did not find it necessary to refer to Article 34 Charter (Case C-647/13 Melchior 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:54, following AG Mengozzi’s opinion - ECLI:EU:C:2014:2301, Rn 56-58, on eligibility for unem-
ployment benefit on the basis of employment with the European Commission). A further reference question on Ar-
ticle 3 (4) TEU in conjunction with Article 34 CFREU on accounting for periods of employment with the EU institu-
tions for national pensions is pending before the Court (Case C-408/14 Aliny Wojciechowski v ONEM, referred by 
the Brussels Labour Tribunal). AG Mengozzi’s opinion of 10 June 2015 (ECLI:EU:C:2015:339) rejects the unequal 
treatment relying on Article 45 TFEU in conjunction with Article 3 (4) TEU, instead of relying on Article 34 CFREU. 
38  Again, whether these can have any effects is disputed. For example, Larik doubts whether this can be the case 
(Larik, 2014), while Schiek bases the demand on the EU to accept societal governance on these new values 
(Schiek, 2012a, pp. 215-243; Schiek, 2013b) and Hendrickx views these values as the adequate basis for a “labour 
law for the United States of Europe” (Hendrickx, 2013). 
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1.4. EU Internal Market law: economic freedoms and competition rules 
1.4.1. A holistic concept of the Internal Market 
The EU Internal Market, originally known as Common Market, has been at the heart of EU 
integration for a long time – though never for its own sake, but always with the aim of approx-
imating working and living conditions while simultaneously improving them (Article 117 EEC, 
151 TFEU). Article 26 paragraph 2 TFEU defines the Internal Market as an area without fron-
tiers where goods, persons, services and capital circulate freely, highlighting the central posi-
tion of the four economic freedoms for realising the Internal Market.  
As regards EU competition law, Protocol No 27 to the Treaty of Lisbon clarifies that “the Inter-
nal Market as set out in Article 3 (TEU) includes a system ensuring that competition is not dis-
torted”. This phrasing leaves no doubt that the EU competition rules are of a “vital nature” 
for the establishment of an Internal Market.39  
1.4.2. Economic freedoms 
The economic freedoms comprise free trade (free movement of goods and services) as well 
as factor mobility (free movement of persons, comprising workers and self-employed per-
sons as well as service recipients, and capital). The provisions with the highest degree of prac-
tical relevance are the bans on restrictions of imports and exports of goods (mainly Articles 34-
35 TFEU), of the free movement of workers abroad and back (Articles 45 seq TFEU), of the es-
tablishment of self-employed natural persons or companies abroad (Articles 49 seq TFEU) and 
of the provision or the acquisition of a service across a border (Article 56 TFEU seq). Re-
strictions on the free movement of capital, including shares of companies, (Articles 49 and 54, 
63 TFEU seq), have been less relevant in recent years. 
The economic freedoms have mainly been developed by the case law of the Court of Justice. 
In the 1960s, the Court developed the principles of direct effect and primacy of EU law in 
cases based on the free movement of goods, expanding these to all economic freedoms. They 
were thus transformed into a set of “individual liberties for transnational economic ac-
tors”.40 Any transnational actor (whether economic or not) can rely on these Treaty norms in 
order to challenge national policy or also EU policy. Further, the economic freedoms were in-
terpreted in the widest possible way: they not only ban discrimination, but also demand unlim-
ited market access for all who can demonstrate transnational activity. They became prohibi-
tions to restrict cross-border trade with foreign goods and services and cross-border 
movement of foreign persons, including foreign companies. Any national rule can be chal-
lenged if it has the potential to adversely affect intra-Union trade or make cross-border ser-
vices or movement less attractive than inner-national economic activity.  
Such a challenge can be rebutted by the Member States, who are under a duty to justify 
any rules hindering market access. Discriminatory rules can only be justified with reference to 
explicit Treaty norms. However, non-discriminatory restrictions can be justified by refer-
ence to any goal supported by a general interest, provided the national rule is proportionate.41 
This also means that the Member States are competent to safeguard the general values of the 
European Union, including EU Social and Labour Rights. Thus as long as the EU has not 
                                           
39  Case C-469/09 COM v Italy [2011] E.C.R I-11483, paragraph 60. Before the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 3 (1) c EC 
made a “system ensuring that competition in the Internal Market is not distorted” one of the Communities policies. 
The relegation of the same principle, in stronger wording, to a Protocol – which has the same value of the Treaty 
according to Article 52 TEU, could not reduce the strength of the acclamation. 
40  (Schiek, 2012a, p. 81). 
41  For a slightly longer summary see (Schiek, 2012a, pp. 83-86), full coverage can be found in any textbook on EU 
law. 
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legislated, Member States must be given sufficient scope to fill their role as guardian of these 
rights.42  
The Court has further extended the reach of the economic freedoms by acknowledging 
their horizontal effect, with the exception of the free movement of goods.43 Mainly, 
such horizontal effect only affects associations and other regulators, which also must avoid 
non-discriminatory restrictions. As states can rely on a wide range of imperative mandates 
to justify non-discriminatory restrictions, those associations and regulators bound by eco-
nomic freedoms, but without being state entities, have been allowed to refer to a similarly 
wide range of justifications. For example in the Bosman case the Court has acknowledged that 
sports associations can use the general interest of enabling the training of young players.44 A 
similarly wide scope for justifying restrictions should also apply, for example, to partners of 
collective bargaining agreements. As regards individual actors, the Court has so far only 
ever acknowledged the horizontal effect of the ban on discrimination.45 In those instances both 
states and individual actors can only rely on Treaty provisions anyway. However, if bound by 
economic freedoms individual actors should be able to invoke public security, public health and 
public policy in the same way that state actors can.  
1.4.3. Specifically: free movement of workers and equal treatment  
The guarantee of free movement of persons distinguishes the EU concept of regional 
economic integration from other similar endeavours around the globe. Other regional 
agreements, the WTO and the EU’s agreements with other economic blocs do not include fac-
tor mobility next to free trade. As a consequence, free movement of persons is only provided 
for as an annex to free movement of services. Granting persons an independent right to 
move freely creates an inextricable link between the Internal Market and societies, 
or, as the Court puts it, promotes the ‘economic and social interpenetration’ of the European 
Union.46 Guaranteeing free movement of persons independently from any employer provid-
ing a service, the EU allows its citizens to counter the negative effects of free trade. Free 
trade serves to integrate product markets, which again will lead to moving production sites to 
those locations with the best competitive advantage. For example, economic actors producing 
goods and services requiring a highly capitalised and technologically advanced economy will 
move to regions where such conditions prevail. Economic actors producing goods requiring a 
sunny climate will move to such regions, and those requiring large labour forces will move 
where there is an overflow of labour. Those dynamics will lead to industries and service sectors 
closing down in regions which do not offer ideal conditions, and to expansion in other regions. 
In guaranteeing the free movement of persons, in particular workers, the EU allows those af-
fected by consequent unemployment to react independently. The fact that only a minority of 
the population uses this opportunity47 does not diminish its conceptual relevance. 
                                           
42  More detail on this in (Schiek, 2008, pp. 45-49). 
43  Case 36/74 Walrave [1974] E.C.R 1405, paragraph 18; Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] E.C.R I-4921 Paragraphs 
82-84. This position was modified by the Fra.bo case (C-171/11 ECLI:EU:C:2012:453), where the Court held that a 
private law body in Germany which established technical standards in the field of drinking water was bound by Ar-
ticle 34. However, the standard setting powers had been vested in the private law body by state legislation, and 
could thus be attributed to the state (paragraphs 31-34). Accordingly, Article 34 TFEU still has no horizontal effect, 
but it applies to private actors which Member States entrust with the standardization of technical equipment (van 
Gestel & Micklitz, 2013, pp. 158-159). 
44  Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] E.C.R. I-04921.  
45  Case C-281/98 Angonese [2000] E.C.R I-4139, for free movement of workers. 
46  The Manpower case, relating to the social security regulation (now: Regulation 883/2004) and its relevance for 
workers hired out across a border, first used this phrase in connection to free movement of workers (Case C-35/70 
Manpower [1970] E.C.R. 1251, paragraph 10). 
47  See more details on migration statistics in chapter 5.2.1, and Annex I. 
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Free movement of workers consists of two elements: the guarantee of movement as such,48 
but also the right to equal treatment at the place of work and in relation to social advantages 
and taxes in the state where migrant workers move to. While the migration rights are fre-
quently the focus of discussions of free movement of workers, equal treatment rights are 
more relevant for protecting social and labour rights, both of the free movers them-
selves and those who remain in their state of origin. Without the right to equal treatment, mi-
grant labour and self-employed individuals will often have to compete by price. Given the par-
adoxes of the labour market specified above,49 a downward spiral of wage levels and other so-
cial conditions would be a likely consequence of free movement unprotected by equal treat-
ment.50 Thus, the right to access labour markets under the condition of equal treat-
ment and its effective enforcement is fundamental for maintaining the EU socio-economic 
model, which places citizens and the improvement of their working and living condi-
tions at its centre.  
Nevertheless, workers’ equal treatment rights are not appreciated unequivocally. Mag-
nette has argued that the equal treatment principle, applied to the labour market, deprives 
Member States of the opportunity to shed their superfluous labour.51 More recently, Kukovec 
and Leczykiewicz emphasise that the insistence on equal treatment of free moving workers de-
prives workers from post 2004 Member States of the advantages of the EU Internal Market.52 
Their main argument is that without downward pressure on wages, labour markets in the West 
will not be sufficiently elastic to offer those workers any realistic chance to move.  
These arguments chime with supply-side led approaches to macro-economics: in this 
view, the success of an economy depends on the best conditions for those who supply goods 
and services; and lowering the price of labour is the answer to unemployment (orthodox ap-
proaches). These teachings are contradicted by researchers who find that the success 
of an economy depends on demand, i.e. the capacity to sell goods and services: if those 
who supply goods and services cannot sell, their business will decline. From this perspective, 
the demand or purchase power in any economy is the main factor for its success (heterodox 
approaches, connected to the teachings of Sir Maynard Keynes). Both approaches come to 
different conclusions in relation to the interface of free trade, factor mobility and social condi-
tions. While the space of this study does not allow anything close to full coverage, it is instruc-
tive to sketch the main arguments.53  
Supply-side led economic policy is based on the belief that free trade will not initiate a down-
ward spiral of social conditions, based on the theory of comparative advantage, established 
in the 17th and 18th century. According to this theory, different levels of wages and employ-
ment conditions in different countries are based on the different levels of efficiency of the work 
force: in highly capitalised economies with well educated workers, labour productivity is higher 
                                           
48  Consisting of the right to leave one’s own country, enter another country and remain there in order to find work 
and to engage in work, and to leave that other country in order to return to one’s own country. 
49  See text at footnote 21. 
50  See for an economic explanation, from traditional perspectives, (Ruhs, 2014). 
51  “To equalise the salaries and the social rights of all workers meant depriving migrant workers from their main eco-
nomic advantage, their lower cost.”, referring to granting free movement rights to Italian workers in 1958 as a way 
to allow Italy “to export its surplus labour” (Magnette, 2007, p. 672).  
52  (Kukovec, 2014) suggests that on the one hand producers from former capitalist states rid themselves from worth-
less products, while the trade unions of the same Member States only pursue the objective of barring workers from 
other Member States from the Western meat troughs, while (Leczykiewicz, 2014) goes as far as demanding that 
Member States must be allowed to undercut each other’s labour standards, as this is “by no means the only weap-
on in this battle”, and highlights the advantages of Western countries in terms of access to technology, capital or 
resources. As a consequence she believes that only “free movement rights of employers” will translate “into bene-
fits for workers”. While the exact phrasing seems to overlook that in a market economy labour standards are not 
usually set by the state, but by labour markets instead, it is safe to assume that she too demands that workers 
from Eastern Member States should be safeguarded in their desire to undercut wages which have been collectively 
agreed on the basis of long and arduous labour disputes in Western Member States. 
53  Orthodoxy is represented by (Flanagan, 2006) heterodoxy by (Vercherand, 2014). 
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than in countries with less capital and less qualified labour. The higher wages in the first group 
of countries mirror this higher level of efficiency. Free trade is then expected to push the pro-
duction of goods and services requiring much unskilled labour to less developed economies, 
while complex goods and services requiring highly capitalised companies and highly skilled 
workforces will be produced in highly developed economies. The theory expects that 
the wages will decline, especially for unskilled labour. This is not perceived as a problem,54 
because for this line of research the hypothetical long-term effects are all that matters. They 
are immune to falsification by empirically proven short term developments.  
Heterodoxy, on which demand-side led economic policy is based, stresses the need to 
maintain demand for what is produced. Since increasing wages is a precondition for the 
demand to develop, these researchers suggest that free trade will only be beneficial under 
certain conditions. While not promoting uncritical protectionism, heterodox labour market the-
ory demands that opening markets for trade in goods and services must be accompanied by 
politics supporting high levels of wages and healthy labour conditions as well as 
monetary politics to ensure the adequate distribution of income. Under these assump-
tions, basing an Internal Market on undercutting wages and labour conditions by having free 
moving workers treated unequally is a way to destroy economic success. Heterodoxy can 
support the EU’s model of regional integration, which is based on the free movement 
of labour on the basis of equal treatment. Also the goal of progressively improving work-
ing and living conditions chimes with demand-led economic policy. Further on, heterodox theo-
ry provides the tools for embedding the EU socio-economic model into a successful global 
model. 
Putting equal treatment at the centre of the free movement of workers thus not only 
corresponds to the Treaty’s demands, but also helps prevent the downward spirals of 
wages and employment conditions which may lead to contraction of Europe’s economies. 
Assuming that workers will usually move to better pastures, equal treatment rights afford 
them a higher levels of wages and better employment conditions. Equal treatment does not, 
however, establish a safeguard against being exposed to unsatisfactory employment conditions 
if these prevail in host countries. 
Accordingly, off-the-cuff claims that free moving workers must be allowed (if not re-
quired) to undercut collectively agreed wages is economically ill informed. Such strat-
egies may well lead to a general decline in wages, with resulting contraction of the European 
economy. At the very least, they will create the same hotbed for xenophobia which emerged in 
pre World-War 2 Europe – one of the purposes of founding the EEC was to avoid its reoccur-
rence.  
Workers using their rights to free movement can also claim equal treatment beyond the em-
ployment relationship, in particular as regards social security and social assistance. This di-
mension of equal treatment ensures that migrants cannot be abused in order to challenge the 
accepted social minimum in their host country: if they were excluded from social advantages, 
they would be more liable to accept less advantageous employment conditions than the popu-
lation in the host state in order to get by. Equal treatment of migrants in relation to social 
security and social assistance is thus necessary in order to avoid pressure on existing 
levels of social security and social assistance provision, as well as on wages. 
If a sizeable proportion of migrants working in high wage Member States is not fully 
protected by the equal treatment principle, downward pressure on working and liv-
ing conditions in those countries may well occur. This danger is not only created by EU free 
movers. Actually, the percentage of non EU migrants in most of the high wage Member States 
                                           
54 (Flanagan, 2006, p. 62). 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
 
 24 PE 563.457 
is higher than that of EU migrants – with Ireland constituting a notable exception.55 Thus, 
equal treatment of non-EU migrant in relation to employment and social advantages is equally 
important - though not the subject of this report. Migrants, whether free movers or not, 
who cannot rely on the same level of social security and social assistance as the res-
ident population are more easily pushed into employment that is low – waged or 
precarious in other ways. These factors add to the vulnerability of some migrants stemming 
from lack of familiarity with the host country as well as language barriers, thus undermining 
the conditions for the resident population as well as the socio-economic terms of free 
movement.  
In spite of all this, some governments consider equal treatment of EU free movers in the 
fields of social security and social assistance as too demanding. They feel under pres-
sure by anti-immigration politicians to appear tough on alleged “welfare tourism”, and demand 
restrictions of equal treatment rights which free moving workers undoubtedly have under EU 
law. Recent case law by the Court of Justice may be interpreted as supporting such demands.56 
Such ambiguous case law, which discontinues the support for equal treatment of free movers 
provided by former constellations of the Court, obviously has serious drawbacks. It legitimises 
national policies limiting migrant workers’ equal access to social advantages in their host coun-
tries, and clashes with established principles of free movement law. If these policies prevail, 
they may deprive legislative efforts such as the recent Directive on enforcing free movement of 
workers of their positive effects.  
1.4.4. Competition rules 
The competition rules comprise principled prohibition of cartels (Article 101 TFEU), 
abuse of dominant market positions (Article 102 TFEU) and state aid (Article 107). Just as 
the economic freedoms can only be relied upon by those engaging in transnational activity, the 
competition rules only apply to actions which have an effect on competition in the Internal 
Market. In addition, the prohibition of cartels and state aid are further limited by express dero-
gations (Article 101 (3) and Articles 107, 108). These derogations are limited to specific as-
pects: Under Article 101 (3) efficiency gains which also benefit consumers may justify cartels. 
This poses the question of how far economic actors can rely on EU social and labour rights in 
order to defend themselves against the allegation of engaging in a cartel or the abuse of a 
dominant market position. As regards Member States’ actions, Article 106 TFEU57 restricts the 
scope of application of the Treaty to public undertakings and undertakings entrusted 
with the operation of services of general interest. It thus offers Member States a justifi-
cation for not applying competition law if this compromises the service of general interest. 
Again, it is not apparent whether Member States may also take other actions which may be 
interpreted as conflicting with the competition rules in order to promote social and labour 
rights. While the competition rules explicitly bind private actors only, the Court has expanded 
their scope by holding Member States bound by those rules via a combination of what are to-
day Article 4 (3) TEU and Articles 101, 102 TFEU.58 
1.4.5. Approximation of economic freedoms and competition rules 
As construed in the Court’s case law, the scope of the application of competition rules 
and economic freedoms overlap: while economic freedoms were originally addressed to 
states only, they may also bind private associations, and while competition rules were original-
ly addressed to private actors (undertakings and their associations) only, they also bind Mem-
                                           
55 See Annex 1.  
56 This case law is related in more detail under 2.4.4 and 2.4.5 (pages 54 - 59).  
57 This provision nominally applies to all Treaty rules, although its practical relevance is limited to competition rules. 
58 First held in Case C-311/85 Vlaamse Reisbureaus [1987] E.C.R 3801, paragraph 3, confirmed in Case C-96/94 Cen-
tro Serviczi Spediporto [1995] E.C.R I-2883, paragraph 20.  
EU Social and Labour Rights and EU Internal Market Law   
 
PE 563.457 25  
ber States. The justification regime for the economic freedoms is adapted to justifications 
typical for democratic legislators, and the justification regime included in the competition rules, 
in particular Article 101 (3), is traditionally interpreted as prioritising market efficiency.  
If these justification regimes had remained as they originally were, a strict division between 
competition law and free movement would have to be maintained: competition law would only 
bind market actors, and free movement rules would only bind state actors.59 If the effet utile 
of both the economic freedoms and the competition rules is to be enhanced by apply-
ing the former to private economic and social actors and the latter to states, the jus-
tification regime must also move. It must allow market and societal actors to rely on what 
used to be called “public policy justification” both for restricting economic freedoms and to 
conclude agreements or take other actions that may impact on liberal notions of competition. 
Moreover, just as Member States are granted a margin of appreciation if they restrict economic 
freedoms in order to safeguard human rights, social actors should also be granted a margin of 
appreciation in assessing the proportionality of their actions if they can rely on human rights 
for their activities and thus promote human rights.  
1.5. EU social and labour rights and Internal Market Law 
1.5.1. Contradictory interrelations  
Social and labour rights and the law of the Internal Market are not always mutually 
exclusive. The guarantee of free movement of workers, as mentioned, includes the 
equal treatment of those workers who move in their host state. For the (prospective) em-
ployer, free moving workers can demand equal access to vacancies and promotions as well as 
equal working conditions, including in relation to occupational social benefits. They can also 
claim equal treatment from their host state as regards social and tax advantages. Equal 
treatment does not, in itself, guarantee a sufficient level of entitlements: treating 
workers equally badly is sufficient to comply with the principle. Only in so far as people 
move for the better, does the free movement of workers reinforce social and labour 
rights, and is in turn reinforced by social and labour rights.  
Freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment, on the other hand, constitute 
rights for those conducting a business. The notion of “rights” may be confusing in this re-
gard, since most businesses are not owned by natural persons, but by corporations and other 
legal entities. Often the day-to-day business is run by employed managers, while the legal 
ownership is distributed across a multitude of share-holders. Depending on the volume of their 
share ownership, share-holders may only have a factional interest in the business. Granting 
rights to corporations will thus not empower individuals. However, freedom of estab-
lishment and freedom to provide services may also be used by small-scale entrepreneurs, 
whose situation does not fundamentally differ from that of workers. In order not to overly 
complicate this report, this specific category of entrepreneurs is not addressed specifically. In-
stead, we shall refer to the rights of business subsequently if we refer to the freedom to pro-
vide services and the freedom of establishment by companies.  
Competition rules, while partly characterised as the “purest element of the free market ideolo-
gy”,60 are actually a double-edged sword for business. The prohibition on abusing a dominant 
market position aims at hindering large corporate actors from crushing smaller entrepreneurs. 
The prohibition of cartels, by promoting the reign of anonymous market powers, limits the 
scope for the conscious structuring of markets for large corporations. However, it also restricts 
                                           
59  This is the main argument of (Baquero Cruz, 2002) for maintaining brighter lines between free movement rights 
(applied to states) and competition rules (applied to private actors) as a precondition to maintain compatibility of 
the Internal Market with national democracies. 
60   (Ward, 2009, p. 129). 
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economic entities mainly motivated by aims other than profit maximisation in any endeavour 
to civilise or even socialise markets.61  
There are also potential conflicts of interests between entrepreneurs and their employees. This 
implies that there will also be tensions between rights of business derived from the Internal 
Market and rights of employees derived from the Internal Market. As this report will expose, 
employers’ freedom to provide services and to change their place of establishment frequently 
are construed in such a way that they conflict with equal treatment rights of workers moving 
to other Member States, as well as with rights to fair and just working conditions for all work-
ers.  
Figure 1: EU Social and Labour Rights and Internal Market Law 
 
1.5.2. Economic freedoms for business and social and labour rights 
From 200062 and increasingly from 2007, after the so-called “Laval quartet”,
63
 academic cri-
tique has focused on the tensions between social and labour rights on the one hand and eco-
nomic freedoms and competition rules on the other hand.64 As developed above,65 Member 
States are the guardians of EU social and labour rights in the absence of EU legislation. Ac-
cordingly, tensions between social and labour rights and Internal Market law frequently appear 
as tensions between national policies and EU law. This has led many authors to demand 
that Member States should have more scope for protecting social and labour rights by re-
stricting economic freedoms. Such demands are made from different conceptual angels. For 
example, Majone argues that the EU should refrain from any redistributive social policies and 
                                           
61  It may even affect efficiency enhancing co-operations, which is the reason why it is not unconditional (Article 101 
(3) TFEU). 
62   Some examples of early warning voices include (Scharpf, 2002; Streeck, 1997).  
63  The term ‘Laval quartet’ refers to four rulings of the Court which related to posted workers and protection of wages 
under national collective agreements and/or legislation (Case C-341/05 Laval [2007] E.C.R I-11767; Case C-
438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking 
Line Eesti (referred to as Viking subsequently) [2007] E.C.R I-10779, Case C-346/06 Rüffert [2008] E.C.R I-01989 
and Case C-319/06 Commission v. Luxembourg [2008] E.C.R I-04323). The expansive academic debate of these 
rulings is beyond any single footnote. It continues in academic journals (Barnard & Deakin, 2011; Daly, 2012; 
Rönnmar, 2010; Supiot, 2013) and has given rise to some dedicated edited collections, including (Bücker & 
Warneck, 2010; Freedland & Prassl, 2015). 
64   For an attempt to develop ways for reconciling economic and social constitutionalism see (Schiek, et al., 2011); for 
an argumentation in favour of more interpenetration of labour law and competition law at EU levels see (Driguez, 
2006). 
65   See page 22. 
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instead focus on promoting free markets, based on the conviction that social policy can be 
maintained by Member States against regulatory competition, which will never lead to a race 
to the bottom,66 while Everson and Joerges promote national autonomy in social policy through 
giving up the direct effect of economic freedoms and related regulatory competition.67 
This limited perspective attracts a two-pronged critique. On the one hand, “reverse ordo-
liberalism”68 must be rejected because relegating social policy to Member States and 
the promotion of markets to the EU does not work. In particular, Member States whose 
economies are not export-oriented, rarely amass sufficient funds to maintain redistributive so-
cial policies sufficiently generous to counter the impact of market integration.69 On the other 
hand, this limited concept neglects the potential of EU level regulation as well as the neg-
ative impact on the EU legislator resulting from restrictive case law on economic freedoms and 
competition law.  
1.5.3. Relevance of tensions for regulatory actors (EU and national level) 
The importance of reflecting on potential tensions between business rights guaranteed by In-
ternal Market law and social and labour rights is underlined by those considerations. The legal 
responses to those tensions are decisive for the scope left for regulative actors at EU 
and national levels to bring social and labour rights to life. These regulatory actors in-
clude legislators at national and EU levels as well as non-state actors. Among those non-state 
actors, management and labour as well as social insurance institutions are of specific rele-
vance. Management and labour create collective agreements, which may determine employ-
ment conditions and also create social insurance institutions. Social insurance institutions, in 
most Member States, have some regulatory capacity for creating byelaws. These may lay 
down details on how benefits are distributed, or contain more fundamental rules, establishing 
policies on how to promote health or bring unemployed people into work, for example.  
In practice, EU Internal Market Law is most frequently used in order to challenge na-
tional (social) policy,70 including autonomous rules, occasionally also in order to challenge 
transnational trade union action.71 National legislation is frequently classified as hindering 
market access due to the fact that business finds it difficult to cope with 28 different sets of 
rules. The creation of harmonising legislation, as far as the EU is competent, has the potential 
to overcome this. EU level rules can thus go further in protecting and promoting social and la-
bour rights than national level rules. The EU legislator frequently creates common EU level 
standards for such social and labour rights which have been accepted as justified re-
strictions of economic freedoms by national legislation.  
The Court’s adjudication of these directives will frequently bring the Treaty freedoms 
back in. For example, a directive may not cover a certain aspect, because the EU legislator 
considered that the matter should remain within the Member States’ regulatory autonomy. The 
Court will state that Member States remain bound by the relevant economic freedom, using 
loopholes in legislation as a basis for judiciary guidelines for future legislation.72 Legislation in 
the social policy fields frequently only sets minimum standards, corresponding to the need to 
                                           
66  (Majone, 2014). 
67  (Everson & Joerges, 2012). 
68  A term coined by Stefano Giubboni (2010, p. 254). 
69  Giubboni, ibid, and (Schiek, 2012a, pp. 230-233). 
70  For a numerical analysis of Grand Chamber judgments from 2004-2012 see (Schiek, 2012a, pp. 113-214). 
71  E.g. in the widely debated cases Case C-341/05 Laval and Case C-483/05 Viking (above footnote 63). 
72  See for an example from the field of public procurement (Caranta, 2015, pp. 409-414), using the illustrative phrase 
of a “pro-integration duo performing magic” in describing the collusion between the Court and the Commission. Of 
course, as Caranta acknowledges, the Court may also collude with the European Parliament or indeed European so-
cieties in convincing the Commission that the Internal Market is not an aim in itself (p 414-415, headed “institu-
tional drama or of where the ECJ nurtured sustainable procurement, helping the Parliament (…) break the re-
sistance of the Commission”).  
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allow gradual implementation, and generally gives scope for upwardly spiralling improvements 
to social conditions. While this is allured to in Article 153 (2) (b) TFEU, the social progress 
clause already contained in the Treaty (Article 9 TFEU) requires that the principle is applied 
more widely. If a directive leaves room for manoeuvre, the Court of Justice will con-
sider that the economic freedoms at the base of the legislation apply in addition to 
the directives. This harbours the danger that legislative innovation is rendered inef-
fective, should the Court announce that Member States or social partners may not use the 
scope left by the legislator to improve social conditions.   
The Posted Workers Directive,73 obliging Member States to guarantee some basic employment 
rights to posted workers, and the directives on public procurement,74 which have recently been 
revised in favour of a wider range of social criteria, both constitute examples of balancing the 
freedom to provide services with social justice in this way. They allow Member States to go 
over and above what is required, and open up space to further social justice beyond the letter 
of the directive.  
Such legislation is particularly relevant to the subject of this study in that it contributes to 
respecting, protecting and promoting EU social and labour rights. Recent case law 
gives rise to concern if it limits the EU legislator’s regulatory autonomy through judicial 
re-interpretation of directives relying on the economic freedoms. In chapter 2, reinterpre-
tations of the Posted Workers Directive and of the former Public Procurement Directives will be 
considered as an additional layer of limitation of EU social and labour rights. The responses of 
EU level and national actors, related in chapter 3 underline that the case law will often frus-
trate the original social aims of the legislation. This demonstrates the need to interpret EU In-
ternal Market law as constitutionally conditioned by social and labour rights, as developed in 
chapter 4. Such an interpretation will be a condition for future rule-making at EU and national 
level to contribute to protecting and promoting EU social and labour rights in the Internal Mar-
ket.  
1.6. How the investigation has been conducted and how the report is structured 
This research report pursues three aims:  
First, it aims to illustrate how the interrelation of social and labour rights and EU Internal Mar-
ket law is structured, establishing where there are conflicts and where social and labour rights 
reinforce Internal Market law.  
Second, the report aims to establish how societal and political actors respond to the dynamic 
interaction between social and labour rights and Internal Market law through a comparative 
study of four Member States and the EU level.  
Finally, the report aims to identify ways in which the EU Treaties’ normative demands to re-
spect, protect and promote EU social and labour rights can be reconciled with the traditional, 
and potentially outdated, views of EU Internal Market law.  
The study’s aims are thus normative and analytical at the same time. They are achieved 
through an interdisciplinary methodology, based on the cooperation of legal scholars and in-
                                           
73  Directive 96/71 was arguably based on a dual motive. On the one hand, the Court had accepted in a series of cases 
that Member States could require service providers who employ workers demand that they work on the territory of 
another Member State to comply with some provisions protecting those workers (for example Case C-272/94 Guiot 
[1996] E.C.R I-1905, no requirement to pay into two different social insurances protecting builders against the risk 
to remain unemployed in Summe.369/ and 379/96 Arblade et al [1999] E.C.R. Further, the directive was created 
on the eve of Eastern Enlargement, and possibly already influenced by the perceived threat on local markets 
(Davies, 1997). 
74  Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement 
and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, [2014] OJ L94/65, Directive 2014/25 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal ser-
vices sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC [2014] OJ L94/243. 
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dustrial relations experts. The second chapter of the study is guided by an analysis of case 
law from the Court of Justice, exposing how a traditional view of the interrelation between In-
ternal Market law and social and labour rights highlights tensions between rights for business 
and social and labour rights. The third chapter presents the findings of 44 expert interviews 
exploring the question of how trade unions, employer associations and governmental actors in 
four Member States and at EU level perceive of and react to those tensions. Chapter four de-
velops a normative perspective based on the elevated position of social and labour rights. 
Chapter five synthesises the findings of chapter three and the normative model developed in 
chapter four, identifying potential responses at different levels.  
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2. SELECTED SOCIAL AND LABOUR RIGHTS AND EU INTER-
NAL MARKET LAW  
 
KEY FINDINGS 
There are a number of perceived tensions between the law of the Internal Market and social 
and labour rights, which have been hotly disputed in recent years. From 2007, restrictions on 
collective bargaining and supporting industrial action emanating from economic freedoms and 
competition law have been at the centre of discussions in northern and western EU Member 
States. More recently, alleged conflicts between the free movement of workers and national 
systems of social security and social assistance are being aired by politicians from a number 
of Member States. The last two points demonstrate that there are not only tensions between 
social and labour rights on the one hand and economic freedoms and competition rules on 
the other, but that tensions also exist between different economic freedoms. This is based on 
the fact that the free movement of workers as an economic freedom reinforces social and la-
bour rights in so far as it demands the equal treatment of free moving workers in the host 
state. 
2.1. Introduction 
As has become apparent, the interrelation between EU Internal Market law and social and la-
bour rights is complex. However, the perception of this interrelation is less complex: the main 
perception is one of conflict, spurred by partly spectacular cases before the Court of Justice 
concerning perceived tensions between the freedom to provide services and a number 
of social and labour rights. Trade unions engaging in collective bargaining and threatening 
collective action have been challenged under recourse to the freedom to provide services and 
the freedom of establishment in conflicts with a trans-border dimension. Member States at-
tempting to promote social justice in public procurements have been challenged under the 
freedom to provide services as well, and national legislation promoting occupational social se-
curity through collectively agreed arrangements has been challenged by recourse to EU com-
petition law and the freedom to provide services again. Collective labour agreements protect-
ing marginal self-employed workers have also been challenged by reference to EU competition 
rules. Finally, some Member States have recently voiced concerns about the equal treatment 
of workers who move to another Member State. These concerns have been reflected in recent 
case law of the CJEU which seems to limit equal treatment in accessing social security and so-
cial assistance for some free movers. This chapter evaluates judicial challenges of social 
and labour rights and their reflection in academic writing, specifically focussing on the rela-
tionships between Internal Market law and the right to collective bargaining and collective ac-
tion, the right to fair working conditions and the respect for social security and social assis-
tance.  
2.2. Rights to collective bargaining & industrial action 
2.2.1. Introductory remarks 
While the rights to collective bargaining and industrial action are now guaranteed in the Char-
ter, the EU has limited legislative competence in this field. In particular, regulating wages, 
the rights of associations and the right to strike or imposed lock-outs are beyond the 
EU’s legislative competence (Article 153 (5) TFEU), while it may regulate in the field of 
the representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers 
(Article 153 (2) (f) TFEU). The limit on regulating pay corresponds to the prerogative that 
management and labour enjoy in this regard under a number of national constitutions. The EU 
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Treaty thus leaves regulatory space for management and labour.75 Rights to collective bargain-
ing and industrial action exist within the European Union in many different forms.76 In some 
Member States, these rights are more encompassing than in others, as mirrored in the experi-
ences of social actors at EU and national levels (below 3.2.). In Member States where a wider 
range of employment conditions are regulated by collective agreement than in others, a satis-
factory regulation of employment conditions depends on a functioning system of collective bar-
gaining. Given the structural imbalance of labour markets,77 effective collective industrial 
action is a precondition of a functioning system of collective bargaining. In Member 
States where most employment rules are fixed by legislation or state administrative acts, the 
scope for collective industrial action may be less decisive for basic rules of employment law. 
However, generally wage levels and levels of employment protection are more favourable for 
workers where trade union representation is effective,78 which again depends on the scope for 
collective industrial action.   
2.2.2. Freedom to provide services 
The freedom to provide services has come to be perceived as one of the main fields where ten-
sions between collective bargaining rights and the Internal Market prevail. Recent case law 
around collective bargaining and trade union activity in favour of posted workers and collective 
agreements restricting the use of temporary agency work illustrates this tension. The Court 
has classified collective bargaining processes underpinned by effective industrial ac-
tion and collective bargaining agreements as infringements of business’ freedom to 
provide services across a border. 
As mentioned,79 an infringement occurs if an economic freedom is restricted, and that re-
striction is not justified. For all business-related economic freedoms the Court defines a re-
striction as any measure that is “liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of funda-
mental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty”.80 Case law in the 1970s81 on the freedom to 
provide services established that collective agreements can constitute a restriction of 
today’s Article 56 TFEU, and in 1997 the Court held that the omission of a Member State 
to protect economic actors against violent protests targeting imports of goods from 
another Member State infringed today’s Article 34 TFEU.82 It was thus easy to see that the 
Court would not hesitate to limit collective bargaining processes and collective agreements if 
they restrict the rights of business to offer their services abroad without sufficient justifica-
tion.83  
This was confirmed by the 2007 Laval case:84 a Swedish company, L&P Baltic Bygg AB ('Bal-
tic'), which was owned by the Latvian company Laval, concluded a contract with a Swedish 
municipality for building a school in Sweden. Baltic requested that Laval hired out Latvian 
workers to them in order to deliver the work required under this contract. After short negotia-
tions with the relevant Swedish trade union, Byggnads, the Latvian parent of Baltic concluded 
a collective agreement with a Latvian trade union. This was the first time that this employer 
had concluded a collective agreement. Its timing has been branded as suggesting “preemptive 
recognition”,85 i.e. the recognition of one trade union the employer prefers in order to avoid 
                                           
75  On the extent to which this creates competences for EU level collective agreements see (Schiek, 2005; 2012b). 
76  On different conceptions of collective agreements and collective bargaining see (Jacobs, 2009). 
77  See above at 1.3.3, 17 and the text around footnote 21. 
78  (Bryson, 2007). 
79  Above 1.4.2, 21. 
80  Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] E.C.R I-4165, paragraph 37, more recently this is repeated, for example, in Case C-
515/08 Santos Palhota [2010] E.C.R I-9133, paragraph 29. 
81  Case 36/74 Walrave [1974] E.C.R 1405, paragraph 18. 
82  Case C-265/95 COM v France (Strawberries) [1997] E.C.R I-6959. 
83  (Orlandini, 2000). 
84  Above footnote 63, with further references to academic coverage.  
85  (Woolfson & Sommers, 2006, p. 54). 
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negotiating with another, more assertive trade union. Subsequently, Laval did not apply the 
relevant Swedish collective agreements to the Latvian workers. Byggnads staged successful 
collective action, demanding that the employer negotiate a collective agreement with them to 
cover the Latvian workers. The Court of Justice found Swedish legislation which considered 
such collective action as legal, while prohibiting collective action against an employer who con-
cluded a Swedish collective agreement, violated the Treaty because it discriminated against 
foreign employers. More importantly, it also held that any threat of collective industrial ac-
tion aiming to improve the working conditions for posted workers qualified as a re-
striction of the freedom to provide services.86 Thus, the industrial action would infringe 
Article 56 TFEU if it was not justified by a legitimate aim in the general interest and propor-
tionate. The Court accepted the improvement of working conditions as a legitimate 
aim, and held that the collective industrial action by Swedish trade union would only constitute 
a proportionate restriction of freedom to provide services if necessary to improve working con-
ditions. This test differed markedly from the proportionality test applied in the 
Schmidberger case,87 where free movement of goods clashed with the freedom of assembly 
unrelated to trade union activities. In this case the Court had not judged the purpose for which 
an environmental organization could block a street in assessing whether the Member States’ 
non-interference with this blockade constituted a proportionate restriction. Furthermore, it had 
acknowledged that Member States needed a margin of appreciation to ensure a balanc-
ing of human rights and economic freedom at the same level. No such margin was granted 
to trade unions or the Swedish legislator in the Laval case. Also, the Court based its 
finding of an unjustifiable restriction of Laval’s freedom to provide services on the fact 
that the company were unaware, prior to negotiating with the Swedish trade union, of 
the level of wages applicable after concluding a collective agreement.88 This demon-
strated a fundamental misunderstanding of the process of collective bargaining, or any negoti-
ation process: before entering into a serious negotiation about contractual terms, neither party 
can know what price they will agree with the other party.89  
The dimensions of this fundamental misunderstanding became apparent when Sweden im-
plemented legislation responding to the Court’s demand that trade unions disclose the wage 
which would form the breaking point of any negotiation. The reformed Posting of Workers 
Act requires trade unions to provide the liaison office of the Swedish Work Environment 
Agency with all collective agreements potentially applicable to posted workers.90 Thus, 
employers planning to post workers will not have to seriously negotiate with Swedish trade un-
ions, but can instead supply any managerial declaration91 stating that the minimum wages 
mentioned in this declaration will be paid to posted workers. The ILO Committee of Experts on 
the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) has expressed its concern that 
Swedish trade unions are barred from taking action in support of their members who work for 
employers posting them to Sweden.92 
The case arguably constituted a re-interpretation of Directive 96/71 on posted workers, 
whose wording attempts to accommodate different industrial relations systems. Article 
3 (1) of the Directive demands that host-state employment rules applied to posted work-
                                           
86  Laval case, above note 63, paragraphs 99-100.  
87  Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659. 
88  Paragraph 110. 
89  On the essential character of protecting the procedural elements of the right of collective bargaining see above 
page 18 (text after footnote 21). 
90  (Rönnmar, 2014), under III, see also 3.3.3 below. 
91   The act does not require that the employer posting workers to Sweden actually concludes a collective agreement 
with a local trade union. Laval only resorted to this strategy in order to expose the so-called “Lex Britannica”, ac-
cording to which the Swedish Co-Determination Act made action against a non-Swedish employer legal, even if this 
employer has concluded a collective agreement with a local trade union. “Lex Britannica” has since been repealed 
(Rönnmar, 2014).  
92   ILO CEAR, Report 2013, 178. 
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ers must be established by statute, legislation or administrative rules or by collective 
agreements or arbitration awards which have been declared universally applicable. This 
mirrors the approach to collective agreements prevalent in the French legal system: the regu-
latory function of collective agreements is not derived from the agreement between the trade 
union and the employer association (or the individual employer). Instead, it depends on 
state action, usually an administrative act declaring the collective agreement generally appli-
cable.93 However, Article 3 (8) allows space for other conceptions of collective agree-
ments, which do not allow for state intervention through a declaration of universal applicabil-
ity. If there is no provision for such declaration, the Member State (not the parties to the col-
lective agreements) has the choice to define as universally applicable two types of col-
lective agreements. These are agreements covering one profession or one industry in a cer-
tain geographical area (type 1) or agreements applied throughout the national territory 
after having been concluded between the most representative employers’ organisa-
tions and trade unions (type 2). This compromise presupposes a multi-employer agree-
ment, except in sectors where there is only one employer. Also, the choice of the relevant col-
lective agreement is not left to the parties concluding the agreement. Instead, the Member 
State has to make that choice. Such state interference contradicts a system such as the Swe-
dish one which classifies collective agreements as contracts under civil law. 
The Laval case was decided before the Charter of Fundamental Rights for the EU (CFREU) be-
came legally binding. However, the Court has as yet had no opportunity to revise this case law 
as far as collective industrial action is concerned. The decision whether to threaten a ser-
vice provider from another Member State with collective industrial action in order to 
achieve collective bargaining coverage for posted workers is thus a risky undertaking. 
This is particularly acutely felt in Member States where the system of regulating employment 
conditions rests on autonomous industrial relations or a private law conception of collective 
agreements. These are the Scandinavian countries, the Anglo-Irish countries94 and possibly 
also still Italy.95 Unsurprisingly, a Swedish case once again illustrated this tension: the 
Fonnship case was based on an employer’s claim for damages following a collective dispute 
concerning the transport sector aiming to convince the employer to sign a Swedish collective 
agreement. However, since the national court did not ask whether the collective action 
restricted economic freedoms, the Court did not have the opportunity to revisit Laval.96 
Since the Charter entered into force, the Court ruled on the tensions between collective bar-
gaining and the freedom to provide services in the field of public procurement. The Com-
mission raised an infringement procedure against Germany97 relating to a collectively 
agreed system of a “third pillar” pension scheme for public sector employees. These 
schemes require that employees commit part of their wages to build up additional old age pen-
sions. The collective agreement determined that the scheme should be administered 
by a public banking institute. Since this institute was co-governed by trade unions and pub-
lic employers, they trusted it to refrain from engaging in speculation on capital markets and 
risking the committed wages. In discussing whether the social partners were free to agree on 
such a rule, the Court considered the constitutional right to collective bargaining, rely-
ing on Article 28 CFREU, but disregarding Article 12 CFREU. AG Trstenjak proposed a dual 
application of the principle of proportionality. The Court should not only consider 
whether respecting human rights would impact disproportionally on economic free-
doms, but to ask also whether restricting human rights in the name of protecting eco-
                                           
93  For a very short overview on approaches to collective agreements in EU Member States see (Schiek, 2005), with 
references to the French/Roman model at pages 34-35. For industrial relations typologies see (Hoffmann & 
Hoffmann, 2009; Keune & Marginson, 2013), also expanded upon below (3.2). 
94  On the resulting BALPA conflict see below sub 2.2.3. 
95  On recent changes in the Italian tradition see (Sciarra, 2013).   
96  Case C-83/13 ECLI:EU:C:2014:201. 
97  Case C-271/08 COM v Germany [2010] E.C.R I-7087. 
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nomic freedoms would be a disproportionate restriction of human rights.98 However, AG 
Trstenjak disregarded the procedural dimension of the right to collective bargaining in stating 
that management and labour could be legally required to incorporate Directive 2004/18 into a 
collective agreement. Accordingly, they could be barred from using a partner they trusted for 
establishing a pension facility. The Court did thus not find it necessary to pursue her complex 
line of argument. The Court held that the parties to a collective agreement could be 
obliged to conduct a public procurement procedure as demanded by the relevant EU di-
rectives, following its AG in this regard. Again, this conveys a disregard for the procedural 
dimension of collective bargaining.  
The pending UNIS case99 is partly a sequel to this. Enterprises which despised the choice of 
health care insurance provider made in a generally applicable collective agree-
ment,100 challenged the validity of this agreement, relying on a transparency principle derived 
from Article 56 TFEU. The claimants claimed that more transparency would have allowed for 
their preferred provider to be nominated as sole provider. AG Jääskinen considered that the 
social partners could conduct their negotiations in such a way as to safeguard sufficient trans-
parency, mentioning Article 28 CFREU, but not Article 12 CFREU, in a footnote.101 However, in 
France legislation demands that social partners provide transparency when negotiating about 
the establishment of a social insurance system. Thus, such a demand does not add any re-
strictions that do not exist already. Also, the AG doubted that this case has any trans-border 
element.102 It remains to be seen whether the Court follows his advice to leave the final deci-
sion to the national court.  
The recent AKT ruling103 could have offered the Court the opportunity to address some criti-
cism of its Laval case law. It resulted from a Finnish reference concerning the use of agency 
workers. AKT, a trade union, sought a court order against Shell Aviation Finnland Oy on 
grounds of non-compliance with a collective agreement. The relevant clause limited the 
use of agency workers to situations where there was an urgent staffing need for a 
limited duration, for example on the grounds of a lack of skilled staff. The trade union found 
that Shell employed agency workers on a regular basis over a long time, and not only in those 
circumstances. The national court considered that this clause might conflict with Article 4 (1) of 
Directive 2008/104 on temporary agency work. That provision states that restrictions of tem-
porary agency work can only be justified on grounds of general interest, among others by the 
need to prevent abuses.  
Usually a directive, lacking horizontal effect, would not bind parties to a private agreement,104 
such as a collective labour agreement. In the Laval case, formally based on Directive 96/71, 
the Court investigated the legitimacy of industrial action under Article 56 TFEU,105 since it “rep-
resents a specific interpretation” of Article 56 TFEU.106 AG Szpunar, in his opinion in the AKT 
case, considered that Directive 2008/104 should bind the partners of collective labour agree-
ments, highlighting its close relation to the freedom to provide services107 and citing case law 
                                           
98   Paragraph 202-223 of her opinion. 
99   Joint cases Case C-25/14 UNIS and Case C-26/14 Beaudout Père & Fils SARL. 
100  One of the claimants, Beaudout Père & Fils SARL, had challenged the same collective agreement unsuccessfully, 
relying on competition rules (Case C- 437/09, discussed below under 2.2.2 (see footnote 133). 
101  Opinion in joint Cases C-25, 26/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:191, 77-79, footnote 44. 
102  Paragraph 75-81. 
Case C-533/13 AKT [Auto- ja Kuljetusalan Työntekijäliitto AKT ry v Öljytuote ry and Shell Aviation Finland Oy] 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:173. 
104  This doctrine was first established in the Case 152/84 Marshall [1986] E.C.R. 723, and can be counted as estab-
lished case law since Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori [1994] E.C.R. I-3325.  
105  Case C-341/05 [above footnote 63] paragraphs 86-92. 
106  Paragraph 145 of AG Mengozzi’s opinion. 
107  Paragraphs 68 and 70 of his opinion. 
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on anti-discrimination directives.108 The Court confined itself to the consideration  that Member 
States’ obligation under Article 4 (2), (3) Directive 2008/104 to revise any restrictions of agen-
cy work contrary to Article 4 (1) lies with the national legislator, and neither the national 
courts nor (implicitly) the national social partners. The Grand Chamber’s reluctance to relate 
to trade union rights might indicate an enhanced sensitivity of the Court in relation to these 
rights.  
A similar reluctance to deliver any ruling on the rights of trade unions was demonstrat-
ed in the recent Säjköalojen ammattillitto ry (SA ry) judgment.109 This case, among oth-
ers, concerned the right of the Finish trade union SA ry to claim before Finnish courts out-
standing wages of its Polish members, who had been posted to Finland. Although the referring 
court asked explicitly whether the principle of effective legal protection (Article 47 CFREU) 
must be interpreted in line with the freedom of trade union association (Article 12 CFREU), the 
Court did not provide any answer on whether trade union representation before the Courts is 
protected by Article 12 CFREU.   
2.2.3. Freedom of establishment  
Freedom of establishment has originally been conditioned upon the person or company 
moving to another Member States integrating into the legal and constitutional order of the host 
state.110 This principle corresponded to the temporality of service provision, which justified the 
Court’s demand that Member States were barred from subjecting service providers to all their 
legislation. However, the Court has expanded the concept of temporary provision, ac-
cepting for example that an economic activity over more than seven years still constitutes a 
cross-border service provision.111 In parallel, the Court has strengthened the opportunities of 
companies to choose the Member States where they want to establish or re-establish.112 Ac-
cordingly, companies are relatively free to choose the Member State with the most fa-
vourable legal order to establish, and can rely on the freedom to provide services across 
borders to other Member States even for long-term activities. The related opportunities are 
enhanced by technological developments which ease service provision over long distances.  
All this means that employers will find it increasingly easy to relocate within the EU. 
Ideally, business will use these opportunities to move to regions where they find better sub-
stantive conditions for production, e.g. higher capitalization, more availability of technolo-
gy or higher qualified workers. However, it is also possible to use relocation in order to 
offer lower pay, demand longer working hours or reduce health and safety protection 
at work. If employers only aspire to reduce labour costs, they frequently relocate virtual-
ly, by moving their corporate domicile without moving the actual economic activity. This ena-
bles them to profit from high level capitalization and industrial-technological infrastructure 
without having to pay equivalent wages.113 If employers want to reduce wages, they could also 
announce that they will no longer apply collective agreements to which they are bound. Trade 
                                           
108 The recent case law, after the Charter acquired legally binding effect, mainly relates to Directive 2000/78 [e.g. 
Case C-447/09 Prigge et al ECLI:EU:C:2011:573], though the court had first developed that principle in relation to 
sex equality. 
109  See footnote 33 above. 
110  CJEU Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] E.C.R I-4421. 
111  Case C-115/01 Schnitzer [2003] E.C.R I-14847, for a critique see also (O'Leary, 2011, p. 533).  
112  Initiated by the judgment in case C-212/97 CENTROS [1999] E.C.R I-1459, and further expanded by the judg-
ments in cases C-208/00 Überseering [2002] E.C.R I-9919 and C-167/01 Inspire Art [2003] E.C.R I-10155. While 
the judgment in case C-210/06 Cartesio [2008] E.C.R I-9641 seemed to re-establish the opportunity for a Member 
State to prevent a company registered under its national law from establishing abroad, this never had any impact 
on the opportunity for companies to establish branches in other Member States. Also, the same Member State is 
unable to prevent a foreign company from establishing in their national law (Case C-378/10 VALE 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:440). 
113 This phenomenon, known as off-shoring, is by no means specific to Europe. The principle corresponds best to the 
liberal model of capitalism typical for the United States and Australia, where it has a longer history (see, for exam-
ple, (Penfold, 2007) for Australia). 
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unions which signed these collective agreements would naturally resist such a move. Trade un-
ion resistance to a virtual move is not conceptually different. After all, a virtual relocation ren-
ders inapplicable not only collective agreements, but also national labour law. Depending on 
the prevalent industrial relations model, that resistance would include the threat of effective 
industrial action, and the initiation thereof. In a number of Member States, such industrial ac-
tion would be legal.114  
The contested Viking ruling115 concerned the industrial action of a Finnish trade union against 
a Finnish ship owner who wished to run a vessel under the Estonian flag, without changing its 
economic activity. The vessel operated as a ferry between Tallin and Helsinki, and ran at a 
loss. The owner had attempted several times to use Estonian jurisdiction in order to evade 
costly Finish wages.116 However, before Estonia became a member of the EU, the owner had 
always given in to the Finish Seafarer Union’s threats of industrial action. In 2004, it choose to 
rely on Internal Market law to gain support against the effective trade union. In response the 
Court established that the mere threat of collective action for that same purpose constitutes an 
unjustifiable restriction of the freedom of establishment. While in many national legal orders it 
is perfectly legal to stage industrial action in order to maintain representation after a change 
in ownership, the same activity shall become unjustifiable if a cross-border situation 
within the EU is involved. An employer who moves its corporate domicile to a non-EU juris-
diction would not be protected by Internal Market law. Similarly, an employer refusing to 
conclude a collective agreement with one national trade union, because they prefer 
another national trade union, can still be subjected to industrial action if national law 
allows for this. If the employer decides to move its corporate domicile (not its real opera-
tions) to another EU Member State, the corporation is protected by freedom of establishment. 
These contradictions alone suggest that the Court should revise its Viking case law.  
The Viking case as such has not had much impact on Finnish law.117 It arguably also 
missed its second target, an agreement of the International Transport Workers Federation 
(ITF) with its member trade unions around the flag of convenience policy, which supports a 
global agreement on minimum employment conditions at sea. ITF member organizations 
pledge not to engage in collective bargaining with a ship owner flying a flag of convenience, 
i.e. a flag of a jurisdiction with more convenient laws than the one in which the owner has its 
main economic assets.118 This case addresses off-shoring,119 a phenomenon which is particu-
larly widespread in the transport industry. The Court held that the ITF policy infringed freedom 
of establishment because it applies to any virtual relocation, irrespective of whether the flag of 
convenience would result in lower employment standards.120 A more precise wording of the ITF 
policy will easily escape that reasoning. However, the Viking case did have effects in the 
UK, from where it was referred to the Court of Justice. The British Air Line Pilots’ Association 
(BALPA) had threatened strike action when negotiations with British Airways (BA) around the 
launch of a Paris-based daughter airline failed. While the action was legal under UK law, BA 
threatened to apply for an injunction based on the Viking case, and during the ensuing 
court proceedings BALPA refrained from taking action.121 This affair resulted in a complaint by 
BALPA to the ILO’s CEAR (Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Rec-
                                           
114 For example, the collective action leading to the ECJ’s ruling concerning the Viking line (Case C-438/05 above foot-
note 63) was legal under Finnish law (cf opinion of AG Maduro, paragraph 6). Also, The German Federal Labour 
Court accepts as legitimate collective industrial action aiming at forcing an employer to adhere to a sector-wide col-
lective agreement although the employer has opted out of that agreement (10.12.2002 case 1 AZR 96/02, BAGE 
104, 155 = NZA 2003, 734). 
115  Case C-438/05, above footnote 63. 
116  The last of these conflicts is reported by AG Maduro in his opinion on the case (paragraphs 6-9). 
117 (Bruun, et al., 2011). 
118 (Blanpain & Dimitrova, 2010; Lillie, 2004). 
119  On this concept see above footnote 113. 
120  Case C-438/05, as above footnote 63, paragraph 88. 
121  See (Ewing & Hendy, 2010, p. 44). 
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ommendations). The Committee expressed “serious concern on the practical limitations on the 
effective exercise of the right to strike of the BALPA workers in this case”, thus implicitly criti-
cizing the Viking case law.122  
2.2.4. Competition rules 
Competition rules have likewise been interpreted in such a way that they may conflict with col-
lective bargaining rights, which include the right to conclude binding collective agreements. 
The whole process of collective bargaining is based on combining employees in order to allevi-
ate the pressure to undercut the price of each other’s labour.123 Collective agreements are 
thus correctly referred to as a wage cartel124 – but this is a cartel which is perfectly legit-
imate, if one accepts the necessity for employees to combine in order to overcome structural 
market imbalance. This does not necessarily mean that employment is exempted from any 
market logic.125 However, it does mean that market mechanisms in employment are only 
accepted if workers have the opportunity to combine in order to achieve a just bar-
gain. The same conclusion can be reached from an economic perspective, which qualifies the 
employment relationship as an internal affair of the company, similar to relations to agents, 
which are also not subject to competition law.126 If one goes even further and guarantees col-
lective bargaining as a right, this leads to the idea of the autonomy of collective bar-
gaining. The autonomy of collective bargaining does not allow subjecting the collective 
agreement to the control of competition authorities.127  
The Court has always accepted that workers or their associations, trade unions, are not 
undertakings under what is today Article 101, 102 TFEU.128 However, from a competition 
lawyer’s perspective this does not necessarily mean that collective agreements are immune 
from control by competition authorities. Multi-employer collective agreements also imply 
an agreement between the employers (or a decision by their association) on one of the 
central categories of competition, the price of labour. Accordingly, the question is how such 
agreements can be exempted from the scope of competition law. Accepting the autonomy of 
collective bargaining could be achieved under traditional competition law categories, following 
the argument outlined above. Collective bargaining agreements are necessary in order 
to allow workers to achieve acceptable working conditions in a self-organised way 
and must also encompass the correlative agreement between employers. In other 
words, “the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those 
objectives,” as the Court stated in the Wouters case, relating to a regulation by the Dutch Bar 
Association.129 While there is a considerable discussion among competition lawyers as to how 
this case law can be aligned with their traditional categories, such an approach would be the 
best and most elegant way to achieve the immunity of collective labour agreements 
from competition law. It would still enable the competition authorities to pursue an abusive 
circumvention of competition law by alleged collective agreements (e.g. if employers founded a 
trade union in order to agree on pricing policies).130  
                                           
122 ILO Session 2010, Report III Part I A, p 209 [http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_123424.pdf]. 
123  As explained in more detail above (see text between footnotes 20 and 21). 
124  For a summary of opinions that have developed from the 1920s see (Reichold, 2010). 
125  G. Monti, endorsing Polyani’s work, relies on this principle in order to exempt the protection of employees from the 
scope of competition law (Monti, 2013, p. 41). 
126 (Driguez, 2006, pp. 51-78). 
127 (Rubiano, 2013; Bruun & Helsten, 2001). 
128 Case C-22/98 Becu [1999] E.C.R. I-5682. 
129 Case C-309/99, Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577, paragraph 97; confirmed in Case C-C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina [2006] 
ECR I-6991, paragraph 45. 
130 More detail in (Schiek, 2012c). 
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In 1996, the Court was challenged to decide whether a Dutch collective agreement would fall with-
in the scope of application of Article 101 TFEU.131 The Court concluded that in this specific case Ar-
ticle 101 would not apply to the collective agreement. However, the Court did not follow its 
case law in Wouters and derive a general immunity of collective agreements from the field of 
application of EU competition law. Instead of conceding that the collective bargaining agreement is 
an admissible “cartel” of its labour members, the Court focused on the purpose of the 
agreement. Only such agreements which pursue certain acknowledged social aims will 
profit from what is now referred to as the “Albany exception”.132 This principle was con-
firmed in the AG2R case,133 which also concerned a collective agreement choosing a social secu-
rity provider. The “Albany exception” is based on the reference in the Treaties to collective bar-
gaining, for example in what is today Articles 152, 154 and 155 TFEU, and not on its human rights 
protection. Nevertheless, the Court was more accepting of collective bargaining than its Advocate 
General Jacobs, who would only exempt collective bargaining agreements regulating core em-
ployment conditions.134  
Another Dutch case, the FVN Kunsten case,135 concerned the question of whether a collec-
tive agreement may set minimum remuneration for self-employed workers competing 
with employees. AG Wahl proposed to leave the answer to the national court, which should con-
sider whether the protection of employees is the purpose of the clause. Only if the answer would 
be in the positive, would he accept that the collective agreement is not within the scope of applica-
tion of Article 101 TFEU, since the “Albany exception” would only cover employees. This 
statement seems to contradict the ILO commitments to which many Member States are bound in 
so far as ILO conventions cover all workers, also self-employed workers.136 The Court held that 
collective labour agreements could legitimately cover the working conditions of service 
providers whose situation is comparable to that of employees, pointing also to the wide 
notion of the term “worker” in its own case law.137 This ruling avoided an open clash be-
tween international social and labour rights and EU competition law. 
There are numerous fields in which multi-employer collective agreements can conflict with compe-
tition law under the restrictive approach preferred by the Court. For example, multi-employer 
agreements fixing working times in retail sectors may be considered as an agreement fixing 
central pillars of competition for customers. Under the approach proposed above, this effect would 
appear as a necessary consequence of a collective agreement on working time, which is a core el-
ement of working conditions usually fixed by collective agreement.138 Also collectively agreed 
anti-crisis measures avoiding collective redundancies might be considered. Collective 
agreements might provide for a temporary reduction of working time in order to prevent lay-offs139 
or establish a common institution of management and labour employing redundant workers with a 
view to retraining in specifically defined periods of crisis, possibly aided by public funding. Under 
the approach proposed above, any anti-competitive side effects of such agreements would be jus-
tified by their main purpose which clearly falls within the main purpose of collective bargaining. 
Traditional competition lawyers tend to have a more restrictive approach to so called crisis car-
tels, though.140 Such a narrow approach would conflict with a constitutional guarantee of col-
                                           
131 Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] E.C.R I-5751. 
132 AG Wahl, Opinion in case C-413/13 FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media, paragraph 16. 
133 Case C-437/09, AG2R Prévoyance v Beaudout Père et Fils SARL [2011] E.C.R I-973. 
134 For a critique of Jacob’s approach see AG Mengozzi, Opinion AG2R, as above, paragraph 43. 
135 Case C-413/13 FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media ECLI:EU:C:2014:2411. 
136 Rubiano (2013), see footnote 127 above. 
137 Paragraphs 30-38. 
138 Nevertheless, the 1990s saw some rulings at national levels, for example in Germany (KG 21/.2.1990 U 4357/89 
AP Nr 60 Art 9 GG). 
139 Examples are reported by (Bispinck & Dribbusch, 2011, pp. 44-49). 
140 See for example, (Wardhaugh, 2014; Witt, 2012). 
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lective bargaining. Presently such arrangements seem to have little practical application.141 
Thus, an elaborated coverage in this study is not attempted.  
2.3. Fair and just working conditions – economic freedoms  
In the field of fair and just working conditions (Article 31 CFREU), this study will focus on the po-
tential conflicts between primary law and EU social and labour rights, including such directives 
which aim at mitigating such conflicts. EU directives harmonising national employment laws such 
as directives on equal treatment of women and men, on establishing mechanisms for the infor-
mation and consultation of workers, on the protection of wages in cases on employers’ insolvency 
or on the protection of employment conditions in the cases of transfer of undertakings by contrast, 
are not the focus of this study. As far as competition rules are concerned, these have no immedi-
ate impact on fair and just working conditions. A restrictive approach to collective labour rights un-
der EU competition law may indirectly influence employment conditions in so far as employment 
conditions tend to be more favourable in sectors covered by collective labour agreements. Howev-
er, this impact is too remote to justify discussing competition rules in this section. This section, 
therefore, focuses on economic freedoms.  
2.3.1. Free movement of posted workers: workers versus services?  
Despite its fundamental relevance,142 the right to equal treatment with workers in the host state is 
withheld from posted workers. This is based on a perceived conflict between the workers’ 
rights to equal treatment and their employers’ rights to freely provide their services. 
If the timing of the Court’s case law is any indication, the phenomenon of transnational posting of 
workers is closely related to temporary restrictions of free movement of workers in the context of 
enlargement rounds. Such restrictions were based on fears of existing Member States that their 
labour markets would become imbalanced. Already after southern enlargement in the 1980s, the 
posting of workers developed into an alternative route of migration for employees in the construc-
tion sector. In the 1990s the Court established the principle that those workers could not rely on 
free movement of workers.143 Instead their posting was framed as an expression of the em-
ployers’ freedom to provide services. Any limitations on moving these workers from the em-
ployer’s country of establishment to the place where their work is needed have been qualified as 
restrictions of the freedom to provide services.144  
The Court first addressed requirements of immigration control,145 and subsequently clarified 
that demanding the equal treatment of workers on the same building site would also 
constitute a restriction of freedom to provide services. The Court frequently accepted jus-
tifications for granting posted workers some of the host state employment rights as 
based on the overriding public interest of protecting workers and/or to provide adequate social 
protection of workers in the construction industry.146 The requirement to pay a statutory minimum 
wage was accepted147 as well as demanding social security payments for wage continuation during 
work stoppage due to winter weather148 or to secure annual holiday pay149 and the requirement to 
provide surety for workers’ wages.150 Subsequently, the need to enforce national legislation pursu-
ing such aims became its own justification ground. However, workers moving as posted work-
                                           
141 See below section 3.6. 
142 See above section 1.4.3. 
143 Case C-43/93 Vander Elst [1994] E.C.R I-3803, paragraph 21-22. 
144 Case 113/89 Rush Portuguesa [1990] E.C.R I-1417 paragraph 15. 
145 Ibid. 
146 See the summary in one of the last cases to which Directive 96/71 did not yet apply: Case C-369/96 Arblade & 
Leloup [1999] E.C.R I-8453 [paragraph 33-36]. 
147 Case C-369/96 Arblade & Leloup [1999] ECR I-8453, Case C-164/99 Portuguaia Construcões E.C.R. [2002] I-787. 
148 Case C-272/94 Guiot [1996] E.C.R I-1905. 
149 Case C-490/04 COM v Germany [2007] E.C.R I-6095. 
150 Case C-60/03 Wolff & Müller [2004] E.C.R I-9553. 
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ers cannot claim equal treatment, by relying on their Treaty rights under what is now 
Article 45 TFEU. Instead, the host state may impose an obligation to grant certain employment 
rights on their employer.  
Formally, workers have a choice whether to move independently or approach an employer who will 
post them. However, the long periods for which free movement of workers was suspended around 
Eastern enlargement seem to have entrenched posting as the only way to move into West-
ern labour markets. At least as far as temporary stays are concerned, posting will be used if the 
legal environment allows companies to engender cost efficiency through posting.151 Such business 
practices are frequently labelled “social dumping”.152  
Under this case law, EU citizens who are posted cannot rely on any rights derived from free 
movement of workers. The Court prioritises the employers’ freedom to provide services. Accord-
ingly, the right to equal treatment with workers in the host state (Article 45 TFEU) is 
suspended while an EU worker is posted. The posted worker can only rely on equal treatment 
and other rights derived from free movement after the posting situation ends. This is acknowl-
edged in the recitals of Directive 2014/67, ensuring the enforcement of Directive 96/71, which 
states that: 
(2) The free movement of workers gives every citizen the right to move freely to another 
Member State to work and reside there for that purpose and protects them against dis-
crimination as regards employment, remuneration and other working conditions in com-
parison to nationals of that Member State. It needs to be distinguished from the freedom 
to provide services, which includes the right of undertakings to provide services in anoth-
er Member State, for which they may send (‘post’) their own workers temporarily to carry 
out the work necessary to provide these services there. 
2.3.2. Posted workers: secondary law and freedom to provide services  
Directive 96/71 thus constitutes a measure balancing competing rights.153 The Directive demands 
that Member States ensure that posted workers active on their territory can enjoy a certain mini-
mum catalogue of employment rights as provided for under national law (Article 3 (1)). Posted 
workers have no claim to equal pay, or equal treatment with workers in the host state.  
Box 1: Catalogue of national employment rights to be applied to posted workers 
Article 3 (1), letter a – g (summarised) 
 Working time (maximum periods and minimum rest periods, minimum paid annual 
leave). 
 Minimum rates of pay, including overtime, but excluding supplementary occupational 
retirement pensions. 
 Conditions of supplying temporary agency workers and other forms of hiring out work-
ers. 
 Health and safety law, maternity protection, protection for children and young workers. 
 Equality and non-discrimination. 
Directive 96/71 corresponds to the dynamic developed above (1.5.3): it reacts to case law 
where – although the Commission brought strategic cases – the Court has accepted national 
legislation as justified by the aim of protecting social rights. The Posted Workers Directive is 
                                           
151 (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014, pp. 59, 74), more information on the factual extent of posting is reported under 5.2.1 
and in Annex 1. 
152 (Countouris & Engblom, 2014). 
153 See also opinion by AG Cruz Villalón in case C-515/08 Santos Palhota et al, [2010] E.C.R I-9133, paragraph 38, 
where the AG identifies a conflict between the employer exercising freedom to provide services, the worker who is 
posted and the Member State hosting the worker and the employer. 
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atypical, though, because it does not harmonise employment conditions in Member States. In-
stead, it coordinates the use of different national rules concerning employment condi-
tions, by stipulating for which fields posted workers enjoy equal treatment with workers in the 
host state. Thus, the Directive does not establish a level playing field for service provid-
ers across the EU. Instead, it establishes minimum conditions binding on all service providers 
which are active on the territory of any one Member State. These minimum conditions vary in 
line with national employment law. Accordingly, Article 3 (8) uses the term “equality of 
treatment” in order to underline that all undertakings in a similar situation must be 
subject to the same obligations. This is the only reference to equal treatment in Directive 
96/71. In its regulatory concept, the principle of equal treatment between undertakings, 
the EU term for corporate economic actors, does not leave scope for equal treatment 
of posted workers with workers in the host state. In refusing to grant the right to equal 
treatment to workers who move through posting, the Directive is based on the Court’s case 
law.  
The rationale behind this regulatory approach derives from a certain interpretation of Internal 
Market law: employers should not have to comply with two employment regimes if they pro-
vide services across borders. Accordingly, the Court of Justice has qualified the Directive as a 
measure easing trans-border provision of services while ensuring fair competition between 
employers in the host state and those which operate transnationally, and granting posted 
workers minimum protection in line with some elements of the host state’s laws154 instead of 
equal treatment with workers in the host state.  
So far, the Laval case has been interpreted as stating that Member States using those 
provisions must not demand equal treatment for posted workers, but may only grant 
them minimum protection in those elements that Article 3 (1) Directive 96/71 requires.155 The 
recent Sähköalojen ammattiliitto ry (SA ry) case156 has offered more detail on this. Among 
others, the reference questions explored whether the following clauses were still encom-
passed by Article 3 (1) of Directive 96/71: a pay schedule providing for higher hourly 
rates for workers with more experience and/or higher levels of qualification, specified 
and differentiated rates for hourly and piece work, a daily allowance compensating 
for posting and also paid to workers posted within the Member State, and holiday pay. All 
these clauses were classed as falling under Article 3 (1), and could be imposed on employers 
posting workers. However, the posted workers were excluded from specific allowances 
relating to travel time and costs of accommodation, which workers in the host state 
received. This underlines that posted workers have no right to equal treatment. AG 
Wahl, in a more restrictive opinion, had defended the view that posted workers would only be 
entitled to the lowest wage on any pay scale.157 While the Court did not endorse this view, it 
reiterated the idea that posted workers are only entitled to minimum protection and not to 
equal treatment.158 
In finding that a full pay scale, it generally applicable by state act, constituted the relevant 
minimum pay under Article 3 (1) Directive 96/71, the Court did not openly acknowledge AG 
Cruz Villalón’s reasoning in the Santos Palhota case.159 According to this reasoning, fair em-
ployment conditions are now supported by Article 31 CFREU, as a consequence of which a re-
striction of freedom to provide services based on respect for fair employment conditions should 
no longer require justification under a strict standard of proportionality. However, this argu-
ment could support the Court’s shift in direction.  
                                           
154 Case C-401/05 Laval (above footnote 63) paragraphs 74 and 76. 
155 (Countouris & Engblom, 2014), with reference to the Case C-319/06 COM v Luxembourg case (see footnote 63). 
156 See footnote 33 above. 
157 Opinion of 18 September 2014, case C-396/13 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2236, paragraph 33-38. 
158 Case C-396/13, paragraph 30.  
159 Case C-515/08 Santos Palhota et al [2010] E.C.R I-9133, AG Cruz Villalón, paragraph 53. 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
 
 42 PE 563.457 
2.3.3. Hiring out workers (agency work) and posting in secondary law  
The business opportunities developed on the basis of this case law are particularly interesting 
when posting agency workers. This section only discusses the position of posted agency 
workers under EU Internal Market law. As mentioned, a comprehensive coverage of any indi-
vidual directive in the field of labour law is not the intention of this study. An analysis of regu-
latory options at EU, national and sectoral levels which may protect the employment rights of 
agency workers while supporting economic growth and flexibility through promoting works 
agencies was provided by a separate study commissioned by the EU.160   
An employment agency’s economic activity may comprise acting as an agent between 
prospective employees and employers (employment placement agency) as well as making 
available workers to third parties (temporary works agency).161 The term “employment 
agencies” alludes to the first type of activities, stressing the opportunities potentially offered 
by using agencies to place unemployed persons. These opportunities are, for example, used by 
public employment agencies in order to place long-term unemployed people. While many em-
ployment agencies combine the placing of employees and the provision of temporary agency 
work to user firms, the latter activity constitutes the basis on which workers may also 
be posted. This activity is more precisely referred to as hiring out of workers.   
Where the wider literature considers the hiring out of workers to be a precarious employment 
practice, 162 this is attributed to two of its central features. First, two entities together fulfil 
the employer function: the agency employs the worker and the user firm directs her work. 
However, there is no sharing of responsibility between the two employers. The agency remains 
the employer responsible for payment, compliance with health and safety legislation, and also 
with employment protection legislation. The agency can function as an external human re-
sources department, which requires very limited capital endowment. If the agency goes into 
liquidation, the capital of the user firm, which may have a substantive business, cannot be 
drawn upon to secure the employees’ outstanding wages. Secondly, agency workers may, 
in practice, be treated differently from workers with whom they work side by side, which is 
the reason for special EU level and national legislation demanding equal treatment. The specif-
ic risk of unequal treatment derives from the need to sustain two employers, the works agency 
and the user firm. To make agency work a viable business, there are in principle two op-
tions. On the one hand, the user firm may dedicate specific funds for the activities of the 
agency, on the other hand the agency workers may receive lower wages than comparable 
workers in the user firm in order to balance the fees paid to the temporary works agency. If 
agency work is based on the second business model, there is a clear risk of precariousness. 
Further, agency workers are perceived as being temporary, even if they stay in a certain 
firm or a company for a long time. As a consequence they frequently do not profit from addi-
tional benefits such as extra time for training and education, inclusion in occupational pension 
schemes, prolonged leave for health or family issues which are dependent on a “waiting peri-
od”. They are also at times excluded from using social facilities such as canteens, sport facili-
ties or employers child care institutions, as has been noted in recent UK studies, for exam-
ple.163 Inequality may even encompass the provision of vital health and safety equipment: it is 
usual that an employer (“user firm”) demands that agency workers bring their own security 
equipment (such as helmets, protective shoes), while regular employees are equipped with 
helmets.  
                                           
160 The European Parliament has issued a specific study on employment agencies (Eichhorst, et al., 2013), which fo-
cuses on the labour law perspective of temporary agency work. 
161 This terminological distinction is applied by (Eichhorst, et al., 2013, p. 17). 
162 On the status of agency work in the Internal Market see (Ahlberg, et al., 2008). 
163 (Forde & Slater, 2012; 2014).  
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In spite of all these risks, the Court has qualified the hiring out of workers as a service 
protected by Article 56 TFEU.164  
The EU directive on agency work, Directive 2008/104,165 issued 12 years after Directive 
96/71, thus pursues a dual aim. On the one hand, the directive demands that Member 
States review restrictions of agency work, which can only be upheld on grounds of the 
general interest (Article 4). As mentioned, the Court has clarified in the AKT case,166 that this 
obligation falls on the Member States, not the parties to collective agreements.  
On the other hand, the directive protects agency workers. They must be treated equally 
with workers at the user firm in relation to essential employment conditions (Article 5 
and 3) and access to internal vacancies (Article 6). They also have the right to be repre-
sented through bodies representing workers, either in the user firm or in the agency, or at 
both places (Article 7). The body of essential employment conditions in Directive 2008/104 is 
much larger than that for which Directive 96/71 provides minimum standards for posted work-
ers. In addition, Directive 2008/104 demands equal treatment. 
Box 2: Equal treatment of temporary agency workers in the user firm 
Article 5 (1) establishes the principle of equal treatment for basic working and employment 
conditions for agency workers with workers in the user firm for the duration of their as-
signment.  
Article 3 defines basic working and employment conditions including rules on working time, 
overtime, breaks, rest periods, night work, annual leave and public holidays as well as pay. 
In relation to pay, Article 5 paragraphs 2-4 empower Member States: 
 to establish exceptions for agency workers who are paid by the employment agency 
between assignments, 
 to empower the social partners to establish exceptions through collective agreements, 
in particular relating to a qualifying period, but also to other elements, and 
 to specify whether occupational social security schemes (e.g. pensions or health care), 
or financial participation schemes are included in the basic working conditions. 
The transnational hiring out of workers is also defined as posting under Directive 
96/71 (Article 1 paragraph 3 letter c). The facts of the Laval case167 constitute an example of 
the overlap of posting and hiring out workers: the Swedish company, who secured the public 
contract in the Laval case, already calculated their offer with the low wages of the workers to 
be hired out from their owner in mind. These workers were subsequently hired out to Laval. 
However, the Court did not consider applying the principle of equal treatment under Directive 
2008/104 to these agency workers.  
The question as to how those two directives can be aligned with each other has received some 
attention. A study for the European Commission suggests that workers hired out by agencies 
are covered by Article 45 TFEU, and concludes that Member States may require those workers, 
even if they are within the scope of application of Directive 96/71, to profit from the rights un-
der Article 5 Directive 2008/104.168 A study for the European Trade Union Institute concluded 
                                           
164 Case 279/80 Webb [1981] E.C.R 3305, Case C-307, 309/09 Vicoplus EU:C:2011:64, paragraph 22, Case C-91/13 
Essent EU:C:2014:2206, paragraph 37. 
165  Council Directive 2008/104/EC on temporary agency work [2008] OJ L 327/9. 
166  See footnote 103 above. 
167 See footnote 63 above. 
168 (Hoek & Houwerzijl, 2011, pp. 185-186), with reference to the Court’s ruling in Vicoplus (Case C-307/09 Vicoplus 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:64. This position has been confirmed in a more recent case (Case C-91/13 Essent 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2206), and a further one is still pending (Case C-586/13, Martin Meat, opinion of AG Sharpstone 
of 15/01/2015 ECLI:EU:C:2015:15). These cases concern the question of whether workers hired out by entrepre-
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that those agency workers should be treated as required under Directive 2008/104, but doubt-
ed whether this would impinge on Article 56 TFEU.169 These doubts are underpinned by the dif-
ferent legislative bases of the directives. 
Considering the question investigated in this study, the enhanced position of social and labour 
rights would suggest that both Directives must now be read in the light of the social clause 
contained in Article 9 TFEU, as well as in the light of the constitutionally guaranteed social and 
labour rights. This issue will be revisited in Chapter 5. 
2.3.4. Public procurement and fair and just working conditions  
The very detailed rules on public procurement also aim at protecting the freedom to provide 
services. The recent reform in this field has been assessed as a positive example of “the use of 
market mechanisms to incentivise good, socially responsible behaviour”.170 Directive 
2014/24 contains a number of clauses which aim to enable Member States to ensure 
compliance of providers with social concerns, including providing fair working condi-
tions (Article 18 (2)) and allows for award criteria to contain social conditions (Article 67 (2) 
a)) as well as for contract performance conditions which may include social or employment-
related considerations (Article 70). All this is based on previous case law of the Court of Jus-
tice, which developed in applying the predecessor to Article 56 TFEU and the predecessors to 
the public procurement directives to national practices aiming at “buying social justice”.171 Ac-
cordingly, this is another example of the interaction between EU legislation and CJEU 
case law: legislation responds to case law originating from restricting social policy in the 
name of the economic freedoms, that legislation is then interpreted restrictively by the Court, 
upon which the EU legislator re-introduced the option to promote social policy aims through 
public procurement. It is to be expected that the practical application of the new legis-
lation will be scrutinised by the Court on whether it is in compliance with Article 56 
TFEU, independent from the question of whether national practice complies with the 
directives.  
While it is too early to fully assess the impact of the new directives,172 there is already case 
law relating to two aspects of this field: the overlap between the posting of workers and public 
procurement, and the inclusion of contract clauses relating to minimum wages irrespective of 
posting.  
The overlap between the posting of workers and public procurement was the subject of 
the Rüffert judgment, one of the four rulings of the “Laval quartet”.173 This judgment con-
cerned legislation in Lower Saxony (a German state) which required that employers providing 
services to that state pay any posted workers in accordance with collective agreements usually 
applied in the sector. The legislation thus neither referred to statutory minimum wages nor to 
collective agreements extended to bind all employers by administrative decisions. The Court 
held that this was not covered by Directive 96/71 and violated Article 56 TFEU.174 This severely 
limits the scope for applying, for example, local rules on promoting a living wage.175 In 
response, a number of German states adopted legislation creating a specific statutory mini-
                                                                                                                                            
neurs established in Member States whose citizens had not yet profited from free movement of workers would re-
quire a work permit, which was answered in the positive. A similar position is taken by (Eichhorst, et al., 2013, p. 
46). 
169 (Schömann & Guedes, 2012, pp. 55-61). 
170 (Barnard, 2014b, pp. 233-234). 
171  See for a fundamental treatment (McCrudden, 2007). 
172  A first case addressed the question in how far Member States may prefer the not-for-profit sector in their public 
contracting under Article 74 Directive 2014/24 (Case C-113/13 Spezzino ECLI:EU:C:2014:2440).  
173  See footnote 63 above. 
174  Case C-346/06, footnote 63 above. 
175 (Koukiadaki, 2014). 
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mum wage applicable for services provided to public bodies.176 Presently, the Regio Post 
GmbH case is pending before the Court. The reference by the upper regional court in Ko-
blenz177 pursues the aim of declaring legislation of the Rhineland Palatinate on the matter as 
incompatible not only with Directive 96/71 and Article 56 TFEU, but also with Directive 
2004/18/EC (Article 26). In this case, the public tender concerned mail delivery in Rhineland 
Palatinate, i.e. the legislation aimed at saving public bodies from having to contract with pro-
viders undercutting local wages while posting workers from abroad to the region. The Court’s 
ruling will provide further clarity as to the extent to which regional minimum wages especially 
for public procurement will be compatible with Directive 96/71.  
Similar legislation from North Rhine Westphalia has been successfully challenged before the 
Court. The reference concerned the contracting out of data – processing to Poland through a 
Federal institution (Bundesdruckerei) by the City of Bonn. In line with state legislation, the city 
insisted that the Polish provider offering services from Poland paid the specified minimum 
wage, which was set to comply with living standards and prices in Germany.178 Since 
no posting was involved, Directive 96/71 did not apply. The Court thus decided on the basis 
of Directive 2004/18/EC, which states explicitly that special conditions relating to the perfor-
mance of a contract must comply with EU law. The Court held that the condition of paying a 
minimum wage was a restriction of Article 56 TFEU. It also accepted that this restriction could, 
in principle, be justified by reference to general interests, such as the objective to protect em-
ployees. Though the case differed fundamentally from a situation in which the service 
provider undercuts local wages by bringing workers into a high-wage country, the 
Court clarified that a sectoral rule for the public service could never be justified due to its 
sectoral character. Further, the Court stated that the German public body must not be con-
cerned by eventual negative repercussions of excessively low wages in Poland. In this regard 
the Court relied on the argument that any necessity for the workers to claim social assistance 
“would clearly not affect the German social security system”.179 This argument seems to imply 
that a German public authority would not be able to demand that service providers from 
abroad comply with local employment standards in their country of establishment. This seems 
to clash with the new public procurement directives’ aim to enhance the scope for “buying so-
cial justice”. Directive 2014/24180 explicitly allows for performance conditions to include social 
and employment related criteria (Article 70). Demanding that workers in a low wage country 
are paid in line with conditions in high wage countries may be dubious. Nevertheless, it is diffi-
cult to justify that public bodies should be required to contract with businesses not complying 
with local employment standards.  
2.3.5. Mobile business and low wage work 
Sectors where services are necessarily provided in a mobile way are particularly vulner-
able to exploiting workers through diverse techniques of applying a less favourable labour 
law regime. The transport by road sector constitutes a prime example: it is characterised by a 
high degree of competition and a weak market position of hauliers.181 Also, fuel and wages 
constitute the main factors on which competition is made.182 This leads to business models 
which allow employing low wage labour to become exceptionally attractive. The “cabotage 
rules”, laid down in EU legislation,183 were initially created in order to avoid long return jour-
neys of drivers without a load: a driver taking on board a load within a country other than the 
                                           
176  For a summary in English see (Sack, 2012). 
177  OLG Koblenz 1 Verg 8/13 NZBau 2014, 317, lodged with the CJEU as case C-115/14 Regio Post GmbH. 
178  Case C-549/13 Bundesdruckerei GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2235. 
179  Paragraph 35 of the ruling. 
180  Above footnote 74. 
181  For a comprehensive report on employment conditions in this sector see (Broughton, et al., 2015). 
182 (AECOM, 2014). 
183  Council Regulation 1072/2009/EC on common rules for access to the international road haulage market [2009] OJ 
L 300/72. 
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country where her employer is domiciled would be paid under home state (not host state) 
rules for this journey. These exceptions now form the basis of a business model which allows 
employing low wage labour on a permanent basis in high wage countries, under the pretence 
of only offering individual “cabotage” routes.184 Similar issues are reported for transport at 
sea,185 and are likely to be relevant in the rail transport sector as well.186 Exploitative employ-
ment practices in the airline sector have already received considerable attention.187 In all these 
sectors, the complexity of the legal framework is compounded by the occurrence of public ser-
vice obligations. The discharging of cargo on airports and in harbours is another field where 
competing employment law regimes have been subject to implicit regulation by (planned) EU 
legislation. Technical advances enable employees of the carriers (i.e. ship or aircraft 
owners) to provide discharging services which traditionally have been provided by 
employees of harbours and airports. These developments inspire economic competition 
around these services. The EU has encouraged public bodies such as harbours and airports to 
contract those services to private providers. The decision of which employees provide which 
services is heavily influenced by the question of which employment law regime delivers cheap-
er labour. If competition served to enhance the quality of services, other determinants should 
be decisive. In all these fields the question arises as to how working conditions and wages can 
be regulated under participation by workers (who are frequently self-employed) and in a so-
cially sustainable way. As in the field of posting of workers,188 the question arises which 
level and character of legislation or other regulation is most suitable to support the 
protection of workers’ rights, including equal treatment.  
The final fate of recent dossiers in the transport sector189 is as yet unknown. The revision of 
employment rules for the road transport sector is also not imminent. Overall, this seems a field 
where a separate investigation would seem necessary, taking into account the legal framework 
emanating from competition and state aid law, the cabotage rules, the exceptions in working 
time rules for the transport sector as well as general approaches to labour mobility and the po-
tential for supporting autonomous regulation by transnational representatives of management 
and labour. Accordingly, this sector has not been covered in the empirical work. 
2.4. Social security and social assistance  
2.4.1. Notions, EU competences and scope of study  
The terms “social assistance” and “social security” are reproduced in this study from the official 
heading of Article 34 Charter of Fundamental Rights, as specified under 1.3.3. Despite their 
common purpose, social assistance and social security are distinct concepts. For the purposes 
of this study it is useful to distinguish between social security for protecting against the 
risk of losing the capacity to earn one’s living, whether temporary or permanently, and 
social assistance as systems providing a basic level of combating poverty. 
This distinction is relevant with respect to the diversity of national traditions and models, 
as well as to the limits of EU legislative competences in this field, which is perceived as 
                                           
184 (Thörnquist, 2013, pp. 22-30). 
185  The European Commission’s detailed “interpretation” of the 1992 cabotage regulation expose extensive evasion 
strategies targeting in particular minimum wages and “manning rules” with all their implications on working time 
and health and safety of crew and passengers, (Communication from the Commission on the interpretation of 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 (…) COM (2014) 0232 final). 
186 (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2006). 
187 (Jorens, et al., 2015). 
188  Which is promoted as a model in the recent study cited in footnote 182. 
189  While the Commission work programme stresses the importance of the aviation sector (COM (2014) 910 final, p. 
7), the proposal for a regulation on ground handling services at airports (2011/0387/COD) has been withdrawn 
(COM (2014) 910 final Annex 2 No 72). The proposal for a regulation establishing a framework on market access to 
port services and financial transparency of ports (2013/0157/COD) is still pending. 
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being decisive for the bond between citizens and states.190 Nevertheless, social protection is 
inextricably linked with working lives in the EU. For this reason, EU legislation may coordinate 
national social security systems to serve the needs of free moving workers (Article 48 TFEU). It 
may also harmonise national laws more generally in the field of social security and social pro-
tection of workers (Article 153 (1) (c)), while such harmonisation is excluded in order to com-
bat social exclusion among the population as a whole (Article 153 (1) (k)). So far, EU legisla-
tion on social security and social assistance is mainly based on free movement rights.   
Coordination of social security for free moving workers originated in 1971191 and pro-
motes free movement, thus arguably going beyond equal treatment. The two regulations 
constitute a separate social security code for migrant workers, and are meant to prevent any 
negative impacts of having an occupation in different Member States on claims to social 
security.192 As mentioned, there is some overlap between social security and social assistance, 
where tax-funded benefits are extended to workers or those in receipt of social security bene-
fits who do not achieve the socially accepted minimum income.  
Beyond social security coordination, workers also have the right to be treated equally in 
relation to all social and tax advantages in the Member States (Article 45 (2), Regulation 
492/2011). The right to equal treatment is repeated implicitly in Directive 2004/38 (Article 
24). That Directive is not focussed on workers, but is instead known as the Citizens’ Rights 
Directive.193 It contains mainly rules on immigration, which are less generous for persons who 
are not economically active, than for those who are. It also grants equal treatment rights for 
economically inactive citizens, which are equally less generous. The mix of rules for free mov-
ing workers and self-employed persons has raised the concern that the rights of economically 
active free movers would be compromised and approximated to the lower levels of those mov-
ing without the aspiration to become economically active.194 This would, in turn, have negative 
consequences on the position of workers who do not move.195 
Further, and corresponding to the “spill-over effect” of Internal Market Law,196 the eco-
nomic freedoms and competition law also impact on national systems of social security and 
social assistance. As in the field of collective labour rights, the fact that the Member States re-
tain the main responsibility for social security and social assistance does not exclude the ap-
plicability of Internal Market Law. 
This study, being focused on Internal Market Law, does not deliver an encompassing coverage 
of EU citizens’ rights to social security and social assistance. It is only concerned with the im-
pact of Internal Market Law on the field, focusing on impact of EU competition rules, economic 
freedoms for business and free movement of workers. We will start with the spill over effects 
of the EU competition rules, and then address the confusing field of workers’ rights in social 
security and social assistance.  
2.4.2. Competition rules – impacting on social security 
As indicated, the competition rules can also be used adversely against collectively 
agreed social security in two respects. Firstly, the general question as to how far cartels 
should be exempt from the application of Article 101 TFEU is of relevance to those schemes. 
                                           
190 (Beaudonnet, 2015, p. 1). 
191  Today mainly contained in Regulation (EC) 883/2004 of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 
on the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L166/1 and Regulation 987/2009 of the European Parlia-
ment and the Council of 16 September 2009 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 
883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems [2009] OJ L284/1. 
192  On the differences between social security and social assistance see 1.3.3 above. 
193 (Guild, et al., 2014). 
194 (Wollenschläger, 2011). 
195 See above sub 1.4.3. 
196 (Lange, 2007, p. 259), for a recent confirmation see (Schimmelpfennig, 2014). 
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Secondly, in the cases AG2R and Albany, the schemes had been extended to apply throughout 
the sector, and at the same time preferred one pension or health care provider. This led the 
Court to investigate the question of whether there was an abuse of a dominant market position 
(Article 102 TFEU).  
In such procedings, two lines of reasoning are relevant, both relating to the question whether 
the company or organisation is qualified as an undertaking, which again is the precondition for 
both Article 101 and Article 102 TFEU to be applied. First, it needs to be established 
whether the company or organisation is an undertaking. Here the Court applies an 
objective or functional test, for which it is relevant whether the activity is also provided on the 
market, and whether the establishment of a dominant market position potentially distorts 
competition. A recent case unrelated to labour and social rights seems to indicate that the 
standards are becoming stricter here.197 Secondly, in relation to social security providers, the 
notion of solidarity has also been used to exempt a provider from the scope of 
application of competition law, as for example in the AG2R case.198 
The case law on this particular aspect, which is of central relevance to any social insurance 
scheme, is unfortunately contradictory. The Court has accepted that agreements between 
non-profit sickness funds which were also constituted as public bodies were not subject to EU 
competition law because the cooperation between these funds was based on “a solidarity 
mechanims according to which equalisation (of risks) is effected between sickness funds in or-
der to remedy the financial disparities resulting from differences in the degree of risk. 199 In the 
AGR2 case cited above, the Court stressed the fact that the premiums paid were unrelated to 
the risk of employees becoming ill.200 If a scheme does not display a sufficient degree of 
solidarity, it would be subject to competition law. For example, if Member States were to 
allow public insurers and private companies to provide certain services such as health care, 
elderly care or pension provision, the Court might find that all these entities were undertakings 
and subject to competition law.201 
2.4.3. Economic Freedoms as business rights and social security 
The free movement rights may also have an impact on social security and social assistance.  
First, the freedom to provide services may become utilised in order to challenge social security 
provision and social institutions at national levels. As already discussed in the section on col-
lective bargaining, the freedom to provide services, in combination with public procurement 
rules, has been used to challenge a third pillar pension system used by public employers.202 
The increasing overlap of economic freedoms and competition rules has invited another chal-
lenge of collectively agreed health insurance schemes, which are generally applicable to arti-
sanal bakeries and the insurance sector.203 In these cases there is no connection with public 
procurement – but nevertheless, the obligation to contract with a certain health care 
provider is interpreted as interfering with the freedom to receive services from a for-
eign provider. The opinion of AG Jääskinnen allows a cautiously positive assessment in rela-
tion to this specific case: he suggests that the national court considers carefully whether there 
is any transnational element in this case, and also suggests that even if Article 56 applies, the 
                                           
197  Case C-553/12 P, DEI, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2083, , [42]-[44]. 
198  Above footnote 133. 
199 In the case C-264/01  AOK Bundesverband et al [2004] E.C.R I-02493, the Court found that agreements between 
non-profit sickness funds which were also constituted as public bodies were not subject to EU competition law be-
cause the funds were not to be classed as undertakings. 
200  Paragraphs 50-52 
201  On this problem see (Gronden & Szyszczak, 2014, p. 242). 
202  Case C-271/08 COM v Germany [2010] E.C.R I-7087.  
203 Case C-26/14 Beaudout Père & Fils SARL; Case C-25/14 UNIS. Case C-26/14 revisits the insurance scheme as was 
already at stake in the AG2R case [see footnote 133].  
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transparency provided for by the collective bargaining procedure under national law might be 
sufficient to protect the rights of foreign service providers.   
Interestingly, the social security regulations address the position of posted workers, 
thus confirming their position as citizens who move for economic reasons. In line with the 
Posted Workers Directive, the social security status of posted workers remains mainly in the 
state where their employer is established (Article 12 Regulation 883/2004, Article 14 Regula-
tion 987/2009). There are some exceptions to this principle though. Also, the social security 
regulations are more restrictive in defining posting: an activity of more than 24 months is 
not privileged as posting (Article 12 Regulation 883/2004), and posting by compa-
nies without economic activities in the country of establishment does not exclude the 
workers from the social security regime in the host state (Article 14 (2) Regulation 
987/2009). Accordingly, case law on social security at times relates to Article 45 TFEU in pro-
tecting rights of posted workers.204 
2.4.4. Free movement of workers - established case law up to 2012  
The equal treatment principles inherent in the free movement of employed and self-employed 
workers (Articles 45, 48 TFEU and related secondary law)205 must also be complied with by 
Member States. This is of particular relevance in relation to the rights derived from Article 34 
CFREU on social security and social assistance. 
As far as equal treatment rights are derived from worker status, it is important to realize 
that the Court pursues a wide notion of workers,206 which includes fractional and marginal 
workers.207 The formal classification of those working under the direction of another 
for remuneration as self-employed under national law bears no relevance for workers’ 
status under EU law.208 If formally self-employed intermediaries, e.g. service station opera-
tors, are not sufficiently independent in relation to the commercial and financial risk under Ar-
ticle 101 TFEU,209 they can hardly be denied worker status under Article 45 TFEU. Furthermore, 
rights derived from the free movement of workers “do not necessarily depend on the actual or 
continuing existence of an employment relationship.”210 Accordingly, former workers,211 not-
yet workers (job-seekers)212 and prisoners213 can claim (some) equal treatment rights. An 
agency worker, who is classed as self-employed and thus deprived from employment protec-
tion under national law, thus being forced to give up work instead of enjoying maternity pro-
tection in the later stages of pregnancy, and commences work three months after giving birth, 
retains worker status throughout.214 Directive 2004/38 partly codifies these principles in 
Articles 7, 14 and 24, but not without clarifying that the case law on the free movement of 
workers remains unaffected (recital 9).  
                                           
204 Case C-404/98 Plum [2000] E.C.R. I-9386, paragraph 19; Case 611/10, Hudzinski, ELI:EU:C:2012:339, para-
graphs 79-80. 
205  EU legislation on coordination of social security systems also applies to self-employed persons, whose rights to free 
movement and equal treatment are protected by Article 49 TFEU. In so far the 2004 Directives are based on Article 
308 EC (now: 352 TFEU with slightly changed wording). 
206 Case C-46/12 N ECLI:EU:C:2013:97, paragraph 39; C-507/12 Jessy Saint Prix  ECLI:EU:C:2014:2007, paragraph 
33. 
207 Case C-413/01 Ninni-Orasche [2003] E.C.R. I-13217, paragraphs 23-27; Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] E.C.R. I-
7595, paragraph 15. 
208 Case C-94/07 Raccanelli [2008] E.C.R. I-5939, paragraph 33. 
209 Case C-217/0 Espanola de Empresarios de Estationes de Servicia ECLI:EU:C:2006:784, paragraph 44. 
210 Case C-507/12 Jessy Saint Prix (see footnote 206 above). 
211 Case C-291/05 Eind [2007] E.C.R. I-10719, paragraphs 35-45; Case C-39/86 Lair [1988] E.C.R. 3190, paragraphs 
31-36. 
212 Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] E.C.R. I-2733, paragraphs 26-31; Case C-292-89 Antonissen [1991] E.C.R. I-746, 
paragraphs 11-13. 
213 Case C-482/01 Orfanopulos and Olivieri, and 493/01 [2004] E.C.R. I-5257, paragraph 50. 
214 Case C-507/12 Jessy Saint Prix, above footnote 206. 
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As mentioned initially, EU legislation coordinates the national social security systems 
with a view to supporting the free movement of workers (now: Regulation 883/2004 and 
Regulation 987/2009). 
While Regulation 883/2004 repeats the principle of equal treatment (Article 4), its main 
purpose is to improve the standard of living and conditions of employment of free moving per-
sons (recital 1). This is mainly achieved by securing the exportability of certain benefits, 
as well as an uninterrupted social security career of moving workers (Articles 5-7), 
alongside the principle that only one national social security system applies to any person at 
the same time (Article 11). The regulation also covers tax-funded specific payments, which 
Member States provide in order to raise those with low claims to social security above the so-
cially accepted minimum. These are referred to as “special non-contributory benefits” 
(SNCB, Article 70), which are distinguished from social assistance. SNCB are not ex-
portable, because this would either give beneficiaries a level of income that is too high or too 
low for the conditions in the host state. To compensate for the loss of portability, the SCNB can 
be claimed in the host state.215 
In combination with the legislation sketched above, this results in a comprehensive coverage 
of those moving for an economic activity under equal treatment principles, while allowing their 
employers and other contract partners to choose the most favourable legal and economic envi-
ronment for their business, as illustrated in this figure: 
Figure 2: Free movement and social rights - established case law and legislation 
 
2.4.5. Reducing the compelling force of equal treatment rights?  
Recent case law on the rights to social security and social assistance confirms the concern that 
the mixing of rights for economically active and inactive citizens in one instrument may impact 
negatively on the rights of the former. By reclassifying special contributory benefits partly as 
social assistance under Directive 2004/38, and subsequently expanding the restrictions on 
those benefits for non-economically active citizens to persons which were formerly protected 
by the free movement of workers, the Court has effectively started to chip away at the 
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equal treatment principle which is so important for the EU’s socio-economic model. It 
has also given up the principle that all those who legally stay in a Member State should par-
take in the socio-economic minimum as defined in that Member State. This principle was ini-
tially developed in case law on free movement of workers and later confirmed and expanded in 
case law on EU citizenship.216 
This development started with two cases which concerned economically inactive movers, and 
are thus outside the scope of this study. However, they will have repercussions on the rights of 
workers and those partaking in worker status and shall thus be shortly considered. The Brey 
case217 concerned a married couple of pensioners who moved abroad after ceasing to work, 
taking their pensions, but not their social assistance claims, with them under Regulation 
883/2004. They were subsequently refused a special non-contributory benefit (SNCB), which 
was granted in their host state. The Court first reclassified the SNCB as social assistance under 
Directive 2004/38. It did not, however, divest the Breys from the benefit, although the reason-
ing is unclear in that respect. AG Wahl had been clearer, in stating that under Directive 
2004/38, as well as former case law on what are today Articles 18, 20 and 21 TFEU, Member 
States must provide equal treatment to those who are legally resident in their territory.218 Ac-
cordingly, the Breys were not deprived from the SNCB, and did not have to live in their host 
state at an income that was considered too low. As a result, all former workers will have to 
jump two hurdles in order to claim additional benefits: it is not sufficient to establish 
that these are SNCBs under Regulation 883/2004, they must additionally justify their 
equal treatment under Article 24 Directive 2004/38. This defies the purpose of Regula-
tion 883/2004 which can only be achieved if the coordination system is maintained as a sepa-
rate system.  
The equation of SNCBs under Regulation 883/2004 with social assistance under Directive 
2004/38 was repeated in the Dano ruling,219 concerning the claim of a very young mother 
from Romania who claimed “Basic Income Support for Job-seekers” (job-seeker allowance) 
under the German SGB II.
220
 This benefit, while paid from the general tax base, responds to 
the activation agenda: it is meant to reaffirm the self-responsibility of job-seekers and assist 
them in securing their livelihood through their own resources, predominantly through 
(re)integration into the labour market (§1 (2) SGB II, § 2), while also ensuring that they have 
sufficient resources to lead their life in dignity (§ 1 (1) SGB II).221 Nevertheless, any job-
seeker status of this young woman was never discussed. Following Brey, the Court classed this 
SCNB as social assistance at the same time. Following AG Wathelet, the Court also devel-
oped a new logic on citizenship rights for the economically inactive population. In-
stead of maintaining the established doctrine that citizen residing lawfully in a Member State 
on any basis222 could claim equal treatment with nationals of the host state, subject to specific 
exceptions in EU legislation; the Court restricted equal treatment rights to those residing on 
                                           
216  Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] E.C.R. I-2708 constitutes the first case bridging case law on free movement of 
workers and EU citizenship, the Troiani case (above footnote 207) confirms that Member States would have to ex-
pel citizens if they do not longer feel able to pay their benefits, to avoid treating them unequally in comparison with 
their own citizens (paragraph 45). 
217  Case C-140/12 Brey ECLI:EU:C:2013:565. 
218  AG Wahl, Opinion in Case C‑140/12 Brey ECLI:EU:C:2013:337, at paragraph 96: “To resume until a Member State 
has put an end to the lawful residence of a Union citizen by a decision that complies with the procedural guaran-
tees enshrined notably in articles 15, 30 and 31 of the Directive (…) a citizen (…) may invoke EU law for the dura-
tion of his lawful stay. Such a decision must be taken independently from the question whether the Union citizen 
fulfils the requirement of sufficient resources.” The Court has not been quite as clear, but nevertheless came to the 
same conclusion as AG Wahl (paragraphs 46-48 of the ruling).  
219 Case C-333-13 Dano ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358. 
220 Sozialgesetzbuch (SGB) Zweites Buch (II) - Grundsicherung für Arbeitsuchende - (Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 24. 
Dezember 2003, BGBl. I S. 2954), accessible at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/sgb_2/  
221 Case 22, 23/08 Vatsouras & Koupatantze [2009] E.C.R. I-04585, paragraph 45. 
222 Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] E.C.R. I-7595, paragraphs 40-44; Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] E.C.R. I-2708, 
paragraph 63. 
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the basis of Directive 2004/38. This allows the creation of a marginalised category of 
persons who cannot partake in the receptive solidarity223 extended to citizens, with 
the related danger of exerting downward pressure on social standards for all.  
The Court’s recent judgment in the Alimanovic case224 extended this restrictive approach to 
EU free movers who had worked: a family of Swedish citizens, who had lived in Berlin from 
1993-1999, returned to Berlin and received certificates of lawful residence in July 2010. Ms 
Alimanovic and her then 16 year old daughter worked in various temporary posts from June 
2010 to May 2011. Subsequently, they received Basic Income Support for Jobseekers. The 
Court qualified the job-seeker allowance as social assistance, relegating facilitation of 
access to the employment market to a secondary motive.
225
 It held that Member States 
can revoke job-seeker allowance for EU citizens who have moved to another Member 
State for work if they are not employed for at least one year before becoming unem-
ployed. This contradicted AG Wathelet’s opinion,
226
 who had supported equal treatment 
rights for this category of job seekers relying on the real link they established with their 
host state through former employment - – although he endorsed unequal treatment of 
economically inactive free movers in the Dano case.  
The tendency to restrict rights of access to benefits is thus not limited to the econom-
ically non-active. The Giersch case can be cited as another example for reducing the social 
rights of trans-border workers: their children will have to prove an existing link with the coun-
try in which their parents work specifically in order to gain equal access to higher education.227 
After the recent case law, a poor person having no access to the labour market will not 
be socially included in the host society via social benefits, even if she is granted a resi-
dence permit. Further, free moving citizens who used to be protected by equal treatment 
rights, such as job-seekers, frontier workers and former workers are increasingly fall-
ing between the cracks of a home state system which no longer supports them, and a 
host state system to which they are only granted access if establishing a stable so-
cio-economic link to the host state. Depending on the development of the case law, the in-
securities of free movers and their limited access to the accepted social minimum will de-
ter some of them from moving abroad and have a negative impact on the bargaining po-
sition of those who are not deterred from moving.  
                                           
223 On this notion in more detail (Schiek, 2015). 
224 Case C-67/14 Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln v Alimanovic, ECLI:EU:C:2015:597. The case has been referred by the 
German Federal Administrative Court (Farahat, 2014). 
225 While the Court did not state this expressly, the judgment thus overrules the Vatsouras & Koupatanze judgment, 
above footnote 221. 
226 ECLI:EU:C:2015:210, paragraphs 112-122 
227 Case C-20/12 Giersch, ECLI:EU:C:2013:411, (O'Leary, 2014). 
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Figure 3: Equal treatment for free movers after recent case law 
 
2.5. Chapter conclusion 
Given the interplay between the Court’s case law and EU legislation it is unsurprising that 
the dominant perception of EU social and labour rights in the Internal Market is one 
of tension.  
Up to 2012, the Court established little tolerance for collective bargaining underpinned 
by effective industrial action, and defended the rights of business derived from the freedom 
to provide services and the freedom of establishment against perceived intrusion by those 
making use of these rights. The more recent case law refrains from addressing these issues. 
This may be interpreted as indicating a phase of reflection, and reconsideration. While trade 
union density is declining in the EU, the pre-2012 case law may be seen to support a trend of 
discouraging the engagement of workers in this traditional form of self-governance. Given the 
diversity of industrial relations systems in the Member States, it is to be expected that this 
tendency impacts differently on the options of actors at national levels.  
As regards rights to fair working conditions, the interplay of the Court and the legisla-
tor has entrenched a new form of precarious work: posted workers. Although moving 
around the EU, they are deprived of equal treatment rights with workers in the host 
state. The Enforcement Directive228 addresses some of the more abusive emanations of post-
ing, while not adjusting the principle of unequal treatment in order to accommodate the desire 
of employers to make providing services more profitable through low-pay strategies. It is ex-
pected that this plays out differently in the Member States depending on the level of wages 
and employment conditions. Concurrently, weakening trade union representation and denying 
equal treatment may amplify the precarious position of posted workers. The predominant lib-
                                           
228 Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement of Di-
rective 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System ( 
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eral conception of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services also pro-
tects business models based on the choice of the place of establishment and long-term cross 
border posting of agency workers. The frictions between EU legislation on posting and agency 
work might give actors at national levels reason for concern too. 
In the field of social security and social assistance, there is no normative expectation of 
tensions between the Internal Market and social and labour rights. In principle, the equal 
treatment arm of the free movement of workers (and the individual self-employed persons) 
should reinforce claims of migrants to social security and social assistance. The compelling 
force of equal treatment in these fields is also of importance for supporting the position of local 
workers who do not move. Traditionally, the EU’s regulatory approach has been to provide 
comprehensive social security for free movers through the technique of coordination on the 
one hand and to guarantee equal treatment in the fields of social security and social assistance 
on the other hand. Both were derived from the Treaty’s free movement rights. Separate codifi-
cations of both principles have established a satisfactory system of coverage overall. Again, 
the position of posted workers is less secure, as they are not established in the social security 
systems of host states. However, in contrast to the employment legislation on posted workers, 
the social security legislation grants workers posted abusively or for more than 24 
months rights to equal treatment. In relation to marginal free moving workers (job-
seekers, former workers and frontier workers), recent case law provides cause for con-
cern in that it withdraws the promise of equal treatment for these vulnerable catego-
ries, reflecting a tendency in Member States to allow the emergence of a marginalised catego-
ry of legally resident, but socially deprived citizens without rights to claim social assistance or 
access social security. 
EU Social and Labour Rights and EU Internal Market Law   
 
PE 563.457 55  
3. POLICY RESPONSES AT NATIONAL AND EU LEVEL 
KEY FINDINGS 
The synthesis of 44 expert interviews with respondents at EU level and in Ireland, Poland, 
Spain and Sweden illustrates the experience of and responses to the demands of Internal 
Market law and social and labour rights. The chapter finds that EU level and national level 
actors experience the relation between the two as a tension when seeking to bring to life 
social and labour rights. Tensions experienced as prevalent evolve around posting of work-
ers and free movement of workers and associated rights to social protection and assis-
tance, while the enhanced opportunities of business to choose favourable legal environ-
ments and the demands of competition law were only experienced as problematic in two of 
the Member States and not mentioned at EU level. Responses to these tensions are shaped 
by a range of institutional and structural factors, and in some cases are constrained by cri-
sis measures introduced as a result of austerity. Overall, the findings raise questions not 
only about the substance of EU law but also its application and enforcement. 
3.1. Introduction 
The material in this chapter presents findings from interviews with EU level actors, and 
interviews with actors in the four Member States covered in this study: Ireland, Po-
land, Spain and Sweden. The aim of the chapter is to provide primary evidence on two is-
sues. Firstly, how do social actors perceive tensions between social and labour rights on 
the one hand and Internal Market law on the other? Secondly, what responses have these 
social actors developed to address these tensions? Details of the methodology adopted can 
be found in Annex 2, whilst Annex 3 and Annex 4 provide details of the generic interview 
schedule and the list of respondents. Section 3.2 provides an overview of the socio-economic 
and industrial relations systems in the four Member States and at EU level. Further details on 
the EU context, derived directly from the interviews, are provided in Annex 5. The remaining 
sections synthesise the expert interviews with a focus on those issues that were most preva-
lent (see also 3.2.6). 
3.2. Context of responses and debates at national and EU levels 
Potential tensions between Internal Market law and social and labour rights are likely to be 
experienced differently in different Member States and at the EU level. Initial expectations 
were that those differences would resonate with differences in socio-economic situations 
across Member States, as well as in relation to the prevailing industrial relations mod-
els, and involvement in European integration processes. The four Member States were 
chosen for this study because they differ in regards to their socio-economic situations as well 
as their industrial relations systems. They also have different experiences with European inte-
gration and encountered the global economic crisis differently; some are economically strong 
(Sweden) or unaffected by recent crisis management for other reasons (Poland), and others 
have only recently emerged from specific measures adapted to overcome the Eurozone eco-
nomic crisis (Spain and Ireland). 
This section offers some preliminary observations on those features in the four Member States 
as well as at EU level, highlighting the context of responses to tensions analysed.  
3.2.1. Ireland 
In Ireland, the economy initially profited immensely from EU integration, which is 
reflected in the ‘Celtic Tiger’ image or caricature. However, with the introduction of the euro 
currency the economy became increasingly dependent upon internal private credit, 
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which led to severe repercussions in the global crisis.229 In spite of these recent experiences 
with the crisis, this is a country with medium to high levels of labour and social standards 
within the EU.230 
The model of industrial relations in Ireland is voluntary, but with a strong underpinning 
of state-focused corporatist elements. Industrial relations are voluntary in so far as there 
is no obligation of employers to negotiate with any worker representatives or trade unions. 
Also, collective labour agreements are not, in themselves, legally binding on the parties to 
those agreements, and their effect on the individual employment relationship depends on 
individual incorporation. Accordingly, any practical effects of collective agreement would 
depend on implementation through collective bargaining and, if necessary, industrial 
action. If this implementation was not successful, the employee would fall back on statutory 
protection. The corporatist elements, first established by the Industrial Relations Act 1946, 
rested on the role of the Labour Court. Similar to Scandinavian labour courts and the British 
ACAS, the Irish Labour Court is an arbitration institution. The 1946 Act established that the 
registration of a collective agreement by parties representative of both sides of the 
industry with the Labour Court made this agreement legally binding for the whole sector. 
These Registered Employment Agreements (REAs)231 not only extended collective 
agreements to all employers of a sector, but they were also the basis for legal effects of 
those collective agreements generally. Joint Labour Committees (JLCs) determined wages 
and other employment conditions in certain sectors with weak collective bargaining 
structures by establishing Employment Regulation Orders (EROs). All of this established a 
system of generally binding collective agreements, which is unusual for voluntary 
industrial relation systems. Both institutions were challenged successfully before the Irish 
courts.232 Accordingly, from 2013, neither REAs nor EROs were applied, which removed the 
corporatist elements from the Irish voluntarist system. While legislation on minimum wages is 
still in place, collectively agreed wages now only apply due to industrial relations pressure.  
In May 2015, the government has tabled the Industrial Relations (Amendment Bill) 
2015,  aiming, among others, to replace the former REA system with a new mechanism. 
Employment conditions for a whole sector can be established by ministerial order, upon 
recommendation by the Labour Court following an application to review the pay, pension or 
sick pay system in a sector. The application can be made by a trade union, an employers’ 
association or jointly by trade unions or employers’ association.233 
3.2.2. Poland 
Poland is one of the EU Member States which has avoided EU imposed crisis manage-
ment measures for a long time,234 but has recently adopted some measures aimed at 
                                           
229 (Woods & O'Connel, 2012).  
230 On labour market regulation in Ireland see (European Commission, 2013a); on the unemployment insurance rate in 
Ireland see (European Commission, 2013b). 
231 REAs could be registered by individual employers and trade unions, but also be based on negotiations within Joint 
Industrial Councils, which were voluntary negotiation bodies aimed at engendering industry level bargaining. These 
were typical for the construction industry and other highly unionised sectors. 
232 The Industrial Relations Acts 2001 – 2004 allowed to bring an unresolved trade dispute before the Labour Court if 
employers refused to engage in collective bargaining. These were successfully challenged by Ryanair (Ryanair v 
The Labour Court [2007] IESC 6). The JLC system was invalidated by the Supreme Court in 2011 (John Grace Fried 
Chicken Ltd & Ars v Catering Joint Labour Council & Ors [2011] IEHC 277, on this see (Doherty, 2012), and the 
REA system was invalidated in 2013 by the same court (Doherty, 2013) with further references). 
233 An overview of the bill is available under http://www.djei.ie/press/2015/20150508.htm; the Bill can be accessed at 
http://www.oireachtas.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=28887&&CatID=59. 
234 In 2009, the Polish government tabled a vision for Poland 2030, based on a very optimistic assessment of the 
economy’s resilience in the face of the crisis (www.poland2030.pl). In 2012, there was still no sign of crisis 
measures (Rae, 2012); but from 2013 Poland has been subjected to an excessive deficit procedure (see COM 
(2014) 422).   
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reducing the budget deficit diagnosed by the European Commission. The labour market is still 
characterised by outward migration of Polish workers, both on the basis of the free 
movement of workers and on the basis of posting. Inward migration is less voluminous 
overall, and dominated by citizens from 3rd countries, especially Ukraine, Russia and 
Vietnam. Accordingly, there is less concern with incoming EU migrants than in some other 
Member States.    
The Polish industrial relations model has been characterised as mixing liberal elements 
(often attributed to US counsel and partly reflected in Polish academic opinion) with more tra-
ditional elements from the pre socialist and socialist past.235 Industrial relations based 
on freedom of associations only emerged after 1989, and are strongly conditioned by legis-
lation.236 For example, the Trade Union Act establishes a registration requirement, 
limits the rights of self-employed workers to join a trade union and implies a company-based 
structure of trade unions. It also gives trade unions representative functions for all workers at 
the work-place, regardless of membership. Collective agreements can be concluded at any 
level, and there may be a duty to enter into negotiations on collective agreements if 
employees are not yet covered by one or the collective agreement is about to expire. The Act 
on Collective Dispute Settlement closely regulates collective industrial action. Strikes and 
other forms of collective action are only legal as a last resort, subject to explict ballot 
requirements, and are excluded in certain sensitive sectors.237 Thus, the legal system still 
restricts the scope of effective collective bargaining. In practice, collective bargaining takes 
place at company level, and coverage of collective agreements is limited (16% of the 
workforce in 20 % of the companies238). 
As in most Visegrad countries,239 legislation is far more important for the regulation of 
employment and working conditions. However, the level of protection is relatively low, as 
is symbolised by the low statutory minimum wage.240 Statutory protection is also eroded by 
the option to contract with workers on the basis of civil law contracts, thus circumventing the 
protection of employment law.  
3.2.3. Spain 
Spain has been hit hard by the global economic crisis, which is sometimes related to the 
fact that – as in Ireland – private credit became easily available with the initiation of 
the euro currency. This, among others, created a serious “housing bubble” from the ear-
ly 2000s.241 After 2010, numerous legislative measures were taken in order to in-
crease economic competitiveness in the light of the need to apply for financial support 
from the EU and the IMF. Among these, the 2012 Law on Urgent Measures for Reforming 
the Labour Market (Law 3/2012) is of particular importance for the subject of the study.  
This Act, on the one hand, moved along the lines of similar initiatives from the mid-1990s in 
that it intensified labour market segmentation by creating more space for fixed term, agency 
and marginal part time work.242 In a new development, it considerably weakened the rela-
tively young system of constitutionally guaranteed collective bargaining in Spain.243 
                                           
235 (Meardi, 2002; Shields, 2007).  
236 (Unterschütz & Woźniewski, 2011). 
237 (Mitrus, 2014). 
238 (Unterschütz & Woźniewski, 2011, p. 167 with footnote 8). 
239 See (Hoffman, et al., 2009, p. 396). The Visegrad Countries comprise Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, 
ibid. 
240 A Council of Ministers regulation of 11 September 2014 has raised the minimum wage to as of 1 January 2015 to 
PLN 1,750 i.e. about 475 €. 
241 (Dellepiane, et al., 2013; Eichengreen, et al., 2013) 
242 See on this (López, et al., 2014; Rodriguez Contreras, 2007). 
243 Democratic industrial relations only emerged after 1975 in Spain (Aguilera, 2004 , p. 212). 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
 
 58 PE 563.457 
The constitutional guarantee was implemented with the Estatuto de Lavoradores (1980), which 
provided for the erga omnes effect of terms and conditions of collective agreements, as well as 
basing collective bargaining on representation of workers through trade unions as well as 
through works councils (a so called ‘dual channel’ system). In spite of a relatively low 
unionisation rate, trade unions used to have influence via the works councils on the majority of 
the firms. At the same time, the success of trade unions in works council elections could be 
used as an indicator of their representativeness. This led to the emergence of two dominant 
trade unions, and relative stability of the pluralist trade union system, which again 
encouraged strong sectoral level collective bargaining.244 The 2012 legislation, by 
contrast, gave absolute priority to company level collective agreements, which led to a 
decrease in sector level collective bargaining. 
Law 3/2012 also increased employer prerogative by introducing specific rights for employ-
ers to vary employment conditions unilaterally, and to demand abstention from trade un-
ions in exchange for a higher salary. Further, and independent of legislation, practices 
have been introduced to lower the level of wages awarded by collective agreement. 
This was achieved by following a strategy of decentralisation, leading to atomisation of com-
panies into multiple nominally independent entities which are linked to a network of 
contractors and subcontractors or temporary works agencies.245 This provided obstacles 
both for the right to collective bargaining as well as to the opportunities for social dialogue. 
The weak employment market also led to the outward migration, to a large degree based on 
the free movement of workers. This resulted in a weakening of the contribution base for social 
security systems in a time of crisis, which partly counteracted legislation aiming to stabilise the 
social security system.   
3.2.4. Sweden 
Sweden has a relatively strong economy, and has weathered the global economic crisis 
comparatively well. This is attributed to the Nordic or social-democratic welfare state 
model and a coordinated market economy supporting social equality.246 Standards in the 
labour market remain comparatively high: there is a high level of organisation in trade unions 
and employer organisations and a wide coverage of collective agreements. Wage decline 
during the crisis has been less pronounced than in other Member States; and the social 
security system was reconfigured well before the crisis.247 The increasing influx of service 
providers from Member States with lower wages and levels employment protection from 2004 
is perceived as a threat to these achievements.248  
The Swedish industrial relations system is focused on autonomous bargaining of 
central employment conditions between trade unions and employer associations. Although 
underpinned by state legislation,249 it allows for a high degree of autonomy for the parties to 
collective bargaining and gives them wide scope to engage in industrial conflict. There is 
a stable consensus in society that the state should not interfere in wage formation. According-
ly, wages are regulated only through collective agreements and individual employment con-
tracts. There is no statutory minimum wage, and no system for extending the binding 
force of collective agreements.  
                                           
244 (Fernández Rodríguez, et al., 2014) 
245 On temporary agency work in Spain see (Chacartegui Jávega, 2013) 
246 (Freeman, 2013). 
247 (Börklund & Freeman, 2010).   
248 (Ahlberg, 2013, pp. 312-313). 
249 The Act on Workers’ Participation (Medbestämmandelagen) has, from 1976, regulated central aspects of the indus-
trial relations model, which was originally conceived as a collective agreement (Basic agreement).  
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Collective agreements are subject to contract law, binding only on the signatories and their 
members. While only the unionised employees are bound by the agreements, the em-
ployers are under an obligation to apply collective agreements to non-unionised 
workers as well. This is an implied term of any collective agreement. This is the basis for the 
wide coverage by Swedish collective agreements of 90 % overall, and 84 % in the 
private sector.250 The monitoring and enforcement of collective agreements is a task for the 
parties to the agreements, not for any public body.251 In particular, trade unions are free to 
raise claims against employers, and if necessary to stage industrial action if they do 
not apply collective agreements to all their workers.252 Employers can be bound by collec-
tive agreements through affiliation to an employers’ organisation or by concluding an ‘applica-
tion agreement’253 directly with the trade union. In order to ensure sector-wide coverage, 
Swedish law sets very few limits for trade unions to convince an employer to become bound by 
a collective agreement. Industrial action, including sympathy action and blockades, are the 
usual means to achieve coverage for employers who are not unionised.254  
3.2.5. The EU level  
At the EU level, the absence of a general regulatory authority by the EU over employ-
ment conditions and social law is the key point regarding the interrelation of social and 
labour rights and Internal Market law. Social policy is an area of shared competence 
between the EU and the Member States (Article 4 2. (b) TFEU). Pay, the right of associa-
tion, the right to strike and the right to impose lock-outs are beyond EU competence 
(Article 153 (5) TFEU). The harmonisation of national laws in the areas of social exclusion and 
the modernisation of welfare protection systems are also beyond EU competence, though the 
EU may coordinate national laws (Article 153 (1) TFEU). Furthermore any EU legislation around 
employees’ protection against dismissal, information and consultation of workers, collective 
representation and defence of workers and employers’ interests, and the conditions of 
employment for non-EU nationals, requires unanimity in the Council (Article 153 (2) TFEU).  
The lack of EU level legislative authority is not compensated by EU level collective la-
bour agreements. Autonomous collective bargaining is the exception: although Article 
154 (3) and 155 TFEU allow for the conclusion of EU level collective agreements independently 
from EU legislation,255 management and labour at EU level respect the prerogative of national 
social partners. So far, they have only chosen the form of framework agreement for 
autonomous implementation. There are instances of collective bargaining in multinational 
corporations within the EU;256 as well as instances of coordination of collective bargaining at 
EU levels.257 Mainly, negotiations between management and labour at the EU level take 
the form of social dialogue under the Treaties (Articles 153, 154, 155 TFEU). Under 
Article 154, the Commission is under an obligation to consult specifically, in a two stage 
process, with the social partners on social policy legislation, namely the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC), the Confederation of European Businesses (UNICE), and the European 
Centre for Enterprise with Public Participation (CEEP). The social partners may start to 
negotiate for agreements at EU level (Article 154 (3), and 155 TFEU) in response to a 
                                           
250  Summary of the annual report for 2014 (Swedish National Mediation Office, 2015). 
251 The Swedish ‘labour inspectorate’ (the Work Environment Authority) only monitors and enforces the legislation on 
health and safety at work. 
252 To add some background to the Laval case, it should be noted that the Building Workers’ Union (Byggnads) have a 
tradition of closely monitoring employers, and intensified these controls for posted workers from 2004 (Thörnquist, 
2013, pp. 9-10).  
253 An application agreement is an agreement by which the employer undertakes to apply a certain collective agree-
ment, usually the central agreement for the sector in question. 
254  Around 70 per cent of the workers are union members according to the National Mediation Office (2015). 
255 (Jacobs & Ojeda-Aviles, 1999; Schiek, 2012b). 
256 (Sciarra, 2013; Leonardi, 2012). 
257 (Hoffmann & Hoffmann, 2009; Keune & Marginson, 2013; Schiek, 2012b). 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
 
 60 PE 563.457 
consultation launched by the European Commission. Any resulting agreements can be 
translated into Directives, which may require transposition through national legislation or 
national collective agreements (Article 155 (2) TFEU). Overall this is a highly legalistic in-
dustrial relations model, in which agreements between the EU level social partners hardly 
become legally binding by themselves. 
In practice, EU-level industrial relations are characterised by heterogeneity, frequently 
reflecting differences between Member States of different regions (e.g. East/West or 
North/South), and by increasingly complex interactions between actors operating at the 
different levels of a transnational enviroment.258 EU industrial relations constitute a ‘mul-
ti-level system’. The main regulatory competences remain at national levels, but are 
conditioned by EU Treaty law as interpreted by the Court of Justice as well as by EU level 
regulation and collective bargaining.259 In addition to the EU and national institutions of 
governments, trade unions and employer associations, other social and policy actors play an 
increasingly important role in defending or lobbying for Internal Market law and/or social and 
labour rights of free movers and posted workers. These include Brussels-based not-for-profit 
organisations as well as lawyers providing legal advice on mobility rights and access to social 
service in different Member States on a voluntary basis.260  
3.2.6. Expectations for the evidence by expert interviews  
The diversity across the EU level and the Member States led us to expect diverse perceptions 
of, and reactions to, the tensions between social and labour rights and EU Internal Market law.  
In Sweden and Ireland, due to their voluntary tradition of labour relations and a relatively 
strong economy, we expected a greater exposure to the influx of posted workers as 
well as free movers. In so far as EU legislation protecting posted workers presupposes 
state legislation, we expected pressure on industrial relation systems based on 
collective agreement instead of legislation. Also, the restrictive approach of the European 
judiciary to collective labour rights renders voluntary systems more vulnerable. 
In Spain and Poland we expected less inward migration and more outward movement, 
and that the dominance of the statutory protection of employment rights would make 
the conditions of national employment less vulnerable to pressures emerging from 
the freedom to provide services. In particular in Poland, where the collective bargaining 
system is focussed on company level agreements, we expected less impact of the Laval line 
of case law.261 We would also expect that any deregulatory effects of Internal Market law 
would be overshadowed by economic governance and by reactions to the economic crisis in 
Spain.  
For the EU level we expected that any reflection on the suitability of existing EU legislation or 
proposals to strengthen EU level since the EU level regulation would be coloured by the Court’s 
restrictive case law. 
The chapter now turns to the synthesis of expert interviews, structured by the tensions 
identified as most prevalent by the interviewees. This structure differs from chapter 2, 
which elaborates systematically how the three clusters of EU social and labour rights covered 
by this study have been challenged by Internal Market law before the Court. Not all these 
tensions are equally relevant to our interviewees, partly reflecting the differences outlined 
above. The chapter starts with freedom to provide services and posting of workers, 
since this is the policy issue which came up most frequently in the interviews, covering  the 
                                           
258 (Keune & Marginson, 2013). 
259 (Bercusson, 2009, pp. 11-24). 
260 We provide further detail on the EU context for understanding specific tensions in Annex 4 in this report. This Annex 
draws on some of the interview data with EU actors.   
261  Case C-341/05, see footnote 63 above. 
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general situation of posted workers, fair working conditions, collective bargaining rights, 
posting combined with agency work, issues of enforcement and social security and social 
assistance. Next, the synthesis covers the second most apparent emanation of the tensions 
between the freedom to provide services and social and labour rights: public procurement. A 
short section summarises responses highlighting potential abuses of freedom of establishment. 
This is followed by tensions between the freedom to provide services and social and labour 
rights and reports on tensions between EU competition law and social and labour 
rights. Finally, we look at the free movement of workers, which has been assumed as a 
factor supporting social and labour rights via the principle of equal treatment. We find that 
this principle is challenged by re-defining the notion of ‘worker’ and national reservations on 
treating free moving workers equally in the fields of social security and social assistance. 
3.3. Posted workers  
Postings of workers emerged as the point most widely covered in the responses at all levels, 
and by all respondents, giving rise to a wide range of practical problems as well as providing a 
rich illustration of the perception of and responses to the tensions between economic freedoms 
– here the freedom to provide services – and social and labour rights.  
3.3.1. Posting: dependent migration; precarious, low-waged employment 
The responses also revealed that posting, in particular the posting of agency work, has devel-
oped into a form of conditioned migration which offers employers the opportunity to access 
low wage labour. Interestingly, Polish and Swedish respondents discussed the situation of lorry 
drivers when asked about posting, referring to the provision of services by low-paid driv-
ers under cabotage rules as well as the “normal” transport through a neighbouring country 
in this context.262 While the Swedish respondents stressed the wage-depressing effects of 
those activities, Polish employers and public servants submitted that applying the German 
minimum wage to drivers abroad comes close to “blocking freedom of services”. Spanish re-
spondents discussed the establishment of supply chains involving low-wage countries 
such as Romania and Bulgaria in the same context. Practices such as using cabotage services, 
foreign transport firms or establishing supply chains in low-wage countries do not seem to 
have much in common with posting legally. From an economic perspective all these practices 
appear as functional equivalents because they utilise wage differentials between different 
countries in order to compress the cost of production or service provision through us-
ing low wage labour. Accordingly, it is not surprising that interviewees from both manage-
ment and labour refer to these practices when asked about posting. Posting emerges as a 
marginal form of employment, which warrants special protection measures for posted workers.  
At the EU level, the trade unions viewed the difficulties experienced by posted workers 
as a reflection of the inferior position of social and labour rights in comparison to EU 
Internal Market law. This inferiority was perceived as entrenched in the Treaties, for which 
reason the ETUC interviewee considered a Social Progress protocol as condition sine qua non 
for any positive change:   
‘what we say is that if there is a conflict between fundamental social rights and eco-
nomic freedoms, then fundamental rights should take precedent, and we want this 
protocol to be annexed to the Treaty so it would be at the highest level. Because we 
cannot address all these issues only through a Directive, I mean we have tried and 
that’s why we want the revision of the posted workers’ Directive, but we are fully 
aware that even if a Directive could help, it still cannot overrule the rulings of the 
ECJ.’ (Interview, ETUC) 
                                           
262 For an explanation of these practices see above sub 2.3.5. 
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The priority of the Social Progress protocol was supported by Irish trade union respondents 
and explicitly contradicted by the Polish trade union interviewees, who considered changes to 
Directive 96/71 (Posted Workers’ Directive) as a more realistic goal as well as more targeted 
to overcome the perceived problems. These Polish interviewees also considered that demand-
ing the prioritisation of social and labour rights over economic freedoms did not go far enough: 
(…) Social rights are human rights (…) and there is no discussion that they must be 
respected absolutely and in all circumstances. (…) (M)arket freedoms are just legal 
provisions (…) shaped by the legislator who must always take into account the charter 
of fundamental rights (…) The ETUC wants to put it explicitly in the statement that 
social rights prevail, so they disagree with us.”  
These trade union representatives also demanded a revision of the Court of Justice’s ap-
proach to the proportionality test, making explicit reference to the Schmidberger case.263 
3.3.2. Fair working conditions for posted workers 
Problems relating to fair working conditions for posted workers were the most prevalent, 
though these were articulated with more urgency in Sweden and Ireland than in Spain and in 
Poland.  
Respondents from trade unions and labour inspectorates from all Member States ex-
pressed concern that posted workers were paid significantly lower wages than other 
workers in the host states. This concern was shared by employers interviewed in Spain and 
Sweden. The Spanish employer stressed that different wage levels should be respected in sup-
ply chains (and public procurement), but expressed a different view in relation to posting. A 
Polish interviewee from the NGO LMIA, which lobbies for maximum use of free movement 
rights, held a contrasting view, stressing that when it comes to Polish entrepreneurs providing 
services abroad “there is no social dumping”, since “posted worker do not take away no-
body’s job because he is meant by definition to come back”. Two respondents, both from em-
ployers’ umbrella associations at EU level, stressed that posting was of limited relevance sta-
tistically.264  
Directive 96/71 was not generally seen as offering sufficient protection for posted 
workers’ substantive employment conditions. In contrast to this, the two respondents from 
EU level employers’ associations considered the directive a good compromise between social 
and labour rights and Internal Market principles, and opposed any revision. Trade union re-
spondents at EU level and from Poland stressed that a clearer definition of posting is 
needed, a view shared by a Spanish public sector interviewee. Further, employer representa-
tives and trade union respondents from Sweden missed a clearer definition of what consti-
tuted the basic requirements under Article 3 (1) Directive 96/71. 
There were different responses to these problems. In Spain, full implementation of Directive 
96/71 was considered as sufficient, while Irish legislation ensured full equal treatment of 
posted workers in relation to statutory employment rights. The latter option was por-
trayed as over-implementation of the Directive. However, this option is arguably covered by 
Article 3 (10) Directive 96/71, given the fact that in Ireland most employment rights are 
generated in the voluntary industrial relations system. 
Most respondents agreed that posted workers as precarious workers experiencing a lan-
guage barrier in the place of work need targeted information about their rights. In 
the temporary works agency sector, the employer association EuroCIETT and the cross-
sectoral EU level trade union UNI or agency workers of all sectors have agreed on a sectoral 
                                           
263 On this issue see above footnote 87. 
264 See on statistical information of the relevance of posting below 5.2.3. 
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platform promoting knowledge of employment rights in countries where agency workers would 
be posted.265 The ETUC provided training for its members, and briefed them on updates and 
developments around posting. An NGO working with migrants in Spain engages in providing 
workers posted from Spain to other EU Member States with information about their entitle-
ments in the host countries. The same organisation regretted that trade unions frequently do 
not represent incoming and outgoing posted workers effectively. Swedish trade unions, on the 
other hand, strive to recruit posted workers as members, especially those posted on long-term 
projects.  
Suggested responses, which are not yet prevalent, included naming and shaming strategies 
implemented by trade unions, up to consumer boycotts targeting multinational companies ex-
ploiting posted workers. Also, a Spanish NGO working with posted workers suggested that a 
register of posted workers would be helpful in supporting this vulnerable group.  
3.3.3. Posted workers and collective bargaining 
These responses already indicate that collective bargaining coverage and trade union rep-
resentation can improve the employment conditions of posted workers.  
Spanish employer respondents related that posting was prevalent in weakly unionised sec-
tors, and the labour inspectorates reported that posted agricultural workers frequently were 
reluctant to become unionised, which again limited their practical protection from exploitation. 
Trade union respondents suggested that action aimed at naming and shaming multinational 
companies engaged in unethical employment practices involving posting would be best staged 
at the EU level.  
Respondents from Poland stressed that workers posted to other countries would fre-
quently not be covered by collective agreements in their home country, with the excep-
tion of the some workers in the construction sector. Absence of coverage would be typical for 
the care sector, from which a large proportion of workers are posted. The NGO lobbying for 
free movement rights stated that Polish employers struggled to adapt to pay levels required by 
collective agreements concluded in the Nordic countries, whether these agreements were gen-
erally applicable (as in Norway and Finland) or not.266 Respondents from the Polish ministry 
explained that Polish employers would often join Swedish or Danish employers’ associations 
and pay in line with Swedish collective agreements initially. In the medium term this would 
force them out of business, since they were unable to influence collective negotiations suffi-
ciently to secure terms and conditions suitable for their specific situation.  
As expected, tensions between the freedom to provide the service of posting workers and col-
lective labour rights were mainly felt in Sweden and Ireland, where collective bargaining 
still has a discernible impact on employment conditions. Trade union respondents from Ire-
land expressed concern that posted workers could not be included in the special pen-
sion scheme for construction workers, which is a collectively agreed institution. Swedish 
trade unions consistently strive to improve the working conditions of posted workers by in-
ducing employers from other Member States to adhere to Swedish collective agree-
ments. This strategy is supported by some employers in the construction industry. Large 
construction companies will require that their subcontractors conclude an adhesion 
agreement with a Swedish trade union, and apply Swedish collective agreements. This was 
                                           
265 ‘Agreement between UNI Europa and EuroCIETT to set up a European Observatory on cross-border activities within 
the Temporary Agency Work sector’ [online] available at:  
http://www.eurociett.eu/fileadmin/templates/eurociett/docs/Cross_Border_Activities/Joint_agreement_Eurociett_U
NI_on_setting_up_Observatory.pdf [accessed 26/03/2015]. The data on the observatory is accessible under 
http://www.eurociett.eu/index.php?id=172 [accessed 26/03/2015]. 
266 The then pending case C-396/13   Sähköalojen ammattiliitto ry (SA ry) (above, footnote 33) was quoted as an ex-
ample, as Polish employers were not used to differentiated wage structures and the requirement to provide bonus-
es for meals, accommodation and the general demands of being posted away from home.  
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seen as a sign of quality of the subcontractor. At the same time the main contractor avoided 
any liability as a consequence of categorising an employee as posted although they were enti-
tled to Swedish employment conditions. The trade union respondents reported that it was fre-
quently difficult to ensure that all these collective agreements are actually applied. 
In both countries, traditional industrial relations models came under strain.  
Ireland presents an interesting case study because the former system of Registered 
Employment Agreements and Employment Regulation Orders has first been abol-
ished by Court order, and is now in the process of being replaced by a more state cen-
tered system. The interviewees report that the system prior to 2013 provided a stable level 
of employment conditions above the (low) statutory guarantees, which mirrored the level of 
trade union density in the different sectors. In the construction sector, the most representative 
trade unions and employer associations had concluded sectoral collective agreements, which 
had become legally binding as Registered Employment Agreement (REA). The REAs not only 
provided for pay levels above the minimum wage, but also established a sector-wide monitor-
ing body, the Construction Industry Monitoring Agency (CIMA) and dispute resolution proce-
dures. Further, the labour inspectorate (National Employment Rating Agency – NERA) had 
statutory powers to enforce REA and to recover outstanding wages for posted workers.  After 
the REA system became dysfunctional, interviewees from the employer association for con-
struction observed:  
Employers just decided that, even if they were hiring migrant workers as opposed to 
posted workers, they would just put them onto a rate (lower) than the REA rate. 
Some trade unions undertook to enforce the payment of REA rates through industrial 
action, with some success, according to the CIF interviewee. It seems worthy of note that 
for the construction sector, respondents from the employer and trade union sides agreed that 
binding sectoral collective agreements would offer the best national response to the dilemmas 
of posting, while the cross-industry employers’ association IBEC is reluctant to accept exten-
sion of sectoral collective agreements.267  
Since the REA system presupposes sector level collective bargaining, it never protected posted 
workers beyond the construction sector. A comparable level of protection would be offered by 
Employment Regulation Orders (EROs), which were in place in sectors such as retail, ca-
tering and hostelry. These sectors frequently used agency workers, who consisted of mi-
grants to a large extent and might also be posted. The ERO’s were perceived as a necessary 
complement of REAS by interviewees from both sides of industry, as well as from an NGO sup-
porting migrants (MRCI).  
 
  
                                           
267  The phenomenon that trade union and employer associations in the construction sector demonstrate a congruence 
of interest when it comes to combat competition on the basis of very low wages has also been confirmed by an 
empirical study of employer strategies in Austria, Ireland and Switzerland (Afonso, 2011). 
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Box 3: From REA’s and ERO’s to ministerial extension of collective agreements - Ireland 
Registered Employment Agreements (REA) and Employment Regulation Orders (ERO) 
under the Irish Industrial Relations Act complemented the voluntary Irish industrial rela-
tion system until they were invalidated by a series of Supreme Court rulings.  
The legislation accorded a central role to the Irish Labour Court as an arbitration institu-
tion, while maintaining as much autonomy for management and labour as possible. Re-
quiring the registration by parties which are representative of management and labour, 
the legislation ensured legitimacy of the statutory extension of REAs in reliance on indus-
trial relation categories. In the construction industry, REAs were created by Joint Indus-
trial Councils in practice. Also, the Joint Labour Committees (JLCs), which created EROs 
in sectors with low levels of union membership, consisted of representatives of manage-
ment and labour. After an REA or ERO was in place, the Labour Court could also be 
seized to review the established labour standards. This system ensured that pay was not 
regulated by state intervention, although it was based on legislation.  
The Supreme Court rulings rested on the argument that the arbitration institution and 
management and labour had achieved uncontrolled regulatory powers, which contradict-
ed the democratic principle that it must be possible to trace back legislation to parlia-
mentary authority. The Court thus did not acknowledge the idea that industrial relations 
also rest on democratic principles, as long as there is freedom of association and an as-
sessment of representativeness.  
The draft follow up legislation abandons the industrial relations model behind the REA 
and EROs, replacing it with ministerial orders for extending collective bargaining agree-
ments throughout a sector (Sectoral Employment Order). At the same time, the legisla-
tion establishes the normative effect of registered employment agreements for the par-
ties covered by them. The Labour Court will maintain a role in the registration of agree-
ments, in particular in assessing whether the parties which applied for a REA are sub-
stantively representative of management and labour. The Labour Court should only rec-
ommend a Sectoral Employment Order if necessary to promote harmonious employment 
relations and avoid industrial unrest as well as to promote high levels of training and eq-
uitable employment conditions in a sector. Accordingly, the proposed new model moves 
closer to a corporatist system of employment orders, while also achieving the normative 
effect of collective labour agreements.    
In Sweden, the Laval ruling and the subsequent Labour Court ruling268 was experienced 
as outlawing the autonomous industrial relation system as a basis to secure the basic 
employment rights of posted workers, let alone their equal treatment with Swedish workers in 
the relevant sector. While the respondents gave the impression that such equal treatment is 
still aspired in some parts, the aftermath of the Laval case has led to a decline in collec-
tive bargaining activities relating to posted workers. The Swedish legislator, after heated 
political debate, adopted the so called “Lex Laval” (SFS 2010:228) in an attempt to implement 
Directive 96/71 in a way more agreeable to the Court of Justice.269 The perception amongst 
many of the Swedish respondents was that Lex Laval does not adequately protect the so-
cial and labour rights of posted workers, and discourages trade unions from engaging in 
industrial action in order to protect them. The coverage of posted workers by collective agree-
ments has decreased drastically, particularly in construction (as noted by a union representa-
                                           
268 AD 2009 no. 89, summarised by (Rönnmar, 2010) 
269 For a more detailed record of the ‘reimplementation’ of the Directive, see (Ahlberg, 2013). 
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tive: Interview, LO-TCO Rättsskydd AB) at a time when the number of postings to Sweden has 
increased considerably.270 
Box 4: “Lex Laval” in Sweden 
“Lex Laval” (SFS 2010:228) amended the Posting of Workers Act and the Codetermina-
tion Act. There are no statutory obligations for foreign employers posting workers to 
Sweden as regards pay or other terms and employment conditions. Instead, the act is 
based on the assumption that, as a rule, foreign employers will be bound by collective 
agreements with Swedish trade unions, either through temporary affiliation to a Swedish 
employers’ association or as signatories to an ‘application agreement’. The novelty intro-
duced by Lex Laval is that it restricted the trade unions’ right to take industrial action in 
order to bring the foreign service provider to sign a collective agreement if it does not do 
so voluntarily. These restrictions refer partly to the content of demands which trade un-
ions can make when staging collective industrial action against employers who wish to 
avail themselves of the economic advantages of posting, and partly they establish pre-
conditions on when collective industrial action is admissible at all. The new legislation 
regulates the content of demands that a trade union may underpin by industrial action in 
favour of covering posted workers through a collective agreement. The demanded em-
ployment conditions: 
 Must correspond to those of a collective agreement that is applied throughout 
Sweden to corresponding workers within the relevant sector (cf Article 3(8) of Di-
rective 96/71). 
 Must refer solely to minimum rates of pay or other minimum conditions included 
in the perceived hard nucleus of the Directive. 
 Must be more favourable for the workers than those following from Swedish legis-
lation. 
 Must require that the employer is unable to demonstrate that posted workers are 
already guaranteed employment conditions at least as favourable as those de-
manded by the trade union. 
The fourth condition is most controversial, since it does not require that the equally fa-
vourable conditions are laid down in a collective agreement, or that management and 
labour in Sweden can enforce those conditions in any way. Since the Swedish labour in-
spectorate does not monitor employment conditions beyond health and safety concerns, 
this leaves posted workers unprotected from employers presenting employment condi-
tions on paper which are not applied in practice.271 
 
Interviewees agree that there are severe shortcomings of “Lex Laval” in practice. The guaran-
teed minimum level of protection for posted workers depends on the trade unions’ motivation 
and resources to monitor and control conditions. Employer associations, as well as some 
trade union interviewees, indicate that there may be scope for a revision of the legis-
lation, though it is difficult to find a model that is compliant with the Swedish indus-
trial relations model and the Court’s case law. One interviewee stated that this dilemma 
could only be overcome if and when the CJEU refrains from viewing industrial action and provi-
sions protecting workers as unjustified restrictions (Interview, LO-TCO Rättsskydd AB). 
                                           
270 Oväntat många utstationerade i Sverige, Europaportalen.se http://www.europaportalen.se/2014/02/ovantat-
manga-utstationerade-i-sverige  
271 (Ahlberg, 2013, p. 315; Rönnmar, 2014). 
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Presently two public inquiries are exploring prospective further amendments. A parliamentary 
inquiry, initiated in 2012272 and provided with an expanded mandate in 2014,273 is investigat-
ing how the Swedish industrial relation model will have to be adapted to the requirements of 
EU law in order to allow effective protection of the position of collective agreements for posted 
workers. A second inquiry is tasked with a proposal to implement the Directive on the en-
forcement of the Posting Directive in Sweden.274 A key point to be considered here is to find 
ways of making collectively agreed minimum terms and conditions applied throughout a sector 
accessible for foreign service providers and posted workers.275 As mentioned above276, the pre-
sent compromise has attracted critique by the CEAR. Trade unions have been reluctant to 
comply with the legislation, as this would compromise their stance in collective bargaining. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties of transposing national solutions in collective labour law from 
one country to another, it may well be the case that a public register of all collective agree-
ments as in the planned Irish legislation may add to the proposals under consideration.  
3.3.4. Hiring out of workers (agency work) and posting 
A number of respondents submitted that the marginal quality of posted employment is 
exacerbated if agency workers are posted, particularly where this results in a concentration 
of posted agency workers in specific sectors. Respondents from Ireland in particular 
stressed that posting agency workers is frequently used, and abused, in order to avoid paying 
high wages or social security contributions. An interesting observation was made by the CIF 
representative (construction sector employer association) in relation to the now obsolete REA 
system: as long as posted workers had to be paid in line with those generally applicable collec-
tive agreements, agency workers posted from other countries were an attractive alternative.  
‘In the past couple of years we've seen a re-emergence of a lot of these agencies, Irish 
agencies and workers, construction workers working for agencies at rates that our mem-
bers couldn't compete with. When you are faced with a situation when you have your 
own direct employees and you’re paying them whatever rate and you've got agency 
workers working for other contractors at a much lower rate, what do you do?’ 
However, since directly posted construction workers could only claim the minimum wage, 
agency workers are (once again) used only in cases of unexpected staff shortages, and not in 
order to circumvent protections for posted workers.  
Other interviewees observed that a comparatively high number of temporary works agencies 
established in Ireland, due to the low thresholds for establishing companies here and the fa-
vourable tax regime. These agencies would then post migrant workers from within and beyond 
the EU to countries other than Ireland, and many of the posted agency workers had never 
been in Ireland before working in some other Member State. The mutual information system 
agreed between EuroCIETT and UNI, mentioned above,277 was spurred by the specific situation 
of posted agency workers.  
3.3.5. Abuse of posting and enforcing the Posted Workers’ Directive 
There was wide agreement that compliance with the conditions required by the PWD directive 
was not perfect, and that posting was frequently abused.  
                                           
272  Dir. 2012:92 Utstationering på svensk arbetsmarknad 
273  Dir. 2014:149 Tilläggsdirektiv till Utstationeringskommittén 
274 Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement of Di-
rective 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System ( 
‘the IMI Regulation’ ). 
275 Dir. 2014:150 Tilläggsdirektiv till Utredningen om nya utstationeringsregler. 
276 Footnote 92 
277 See footnote 265. 
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Even those who did not find fault with Directive 96/71 conceded this point. Many respondents 
found that the Enforcement Directive might improve the situation. Spanish respondents, 
trade unions, labour inspectorates and the judiciary, all pointed to Article 6 Directive 
2014/67 as demanding Member States’ administrations to provide detailed statistics 
of outgoing and incoming posted workers.  
In Ireland, the NERA representative pointed to Article 4 of the Directive (identification of a 
genuine posting and prevention of abuse and circumvention) and the provisions on cross-
border administrative fines and penalties collection. They also stressed the necessity of 
providing information in multiple languages, detailing that they had information materials 
in 26 languages at one point. Language issues are also raised by the Polish labour inspec-
torate, who detailed that German companies posting workers to Poland would only provide in-
formation in German, and stressed the advantage of enhanced administrative cooperation.  
Nevertheless, Directive 2014/67 (the Enforcement Directive) will not solve all the problems, in 
particular due to insufficient resources in many Member States and at the EU level, as high-
lighted by an EU level respondent:  
‘The resources that are dedicated to those at the European level and at the national 
level, to enforce the rules, are insufficient. So that there’s a lot of abuse’ (Interview, 
EU Rights Clinic) 
Polish respondents raised the issue of discriminatory practices of enforcing the directive, 
stating that at times only Polish posted workers were subject to controls in other Member 
States, even on building sites with posted workers from several countries. Further, the inter-
viewee from the Polish ministry of labour expressed concern over the potential abuse of 
the joint liability clause, and the open-ended list of efficient control measures in Directive 
2014/67. The NGO lobbying for effective free movement rights was sceptical of effective en-
forcement at a more fundamental level: 
“Increasing control mechanisms leads to the situation when these companies that 
employ legally and are on the spotlights and are easy to control (…). Instead of civilis-
ing and legalising these relations it will go deeper into the grey zone. (…) Some com-
panies will not resign from sending the workers. (…) They will continue to do that but 
without revealing their activity to control institutions and without declaring workers to 
social security etc. There were many posting companies “until 1st control” then they 
closed one company and opened another sometimes in a different country recruiting 
different workers.” 
Swedish and Irish respondents stressed the decisive role of trade union representation 
at the place of posting for enforcing posted workers’ rights.  
3.3.6. Social security for posted workers 
The social security situation of posted workers emerged as a specifically problematic point. The 
practicality of the EU regulations coordinating social security278 has been questioned by most 
respondents from all states, and by EU level non-governmental organisations providing advice 
for migrant workers using posting. 
Mainly, these difficulties are due to frictions between regulation 883/2004 and Directive 
96/71 and the relevant case law. Posting under the regulation is limited for a maximum 
of 24 months, and posting from employers who have no business activity in the state 
from where they post does not bring the posted worker under the social security law of 
the state of their employers’ formal establishment. Accordingly, posted workers may not obtain 
the A1 form which is required to exempt them from social security payments in the host state. 
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Polish and Swedish respondents reported this same difficulty from different ends: the Swedish 
respondents noted that posted workers frequently have to pay social security contributions, 
although this may not result in them being able to claim benefits due to the non-expiry of 
waiting times. The Polish respondents noted that if posted workers could not obtain an A1 cer-
tificate, they would frequently not be insured in the host state either, resulting in interruptions 
of their social security coverage. Further, respondents from both countries mentioned discrep-
ancies in national law between tax authorities and social security authorities. The Polish social 
security authorities will not accept posting if the employer does not have sufficient revenue, 
which does not seem to be reflected in EU law.  
Irish and Swedish trade union respondents highlighted insecurities regarding collectively 
agreed schemes. Irish trade union respondents would prefer to apply the Construction Work-
ers’ Pension Scheme, which is a social partner institution, to posted workers. Swedish trade 
union respondents felt that at least the insurance against work place accidents should be ap-
plied to posted workers, while the government is reluctant to change the relevant legislation 
for fear of non-compliance with the Laval judgment.279 
3.4. Public procurement  
Public procurement contracts were seen by respondents as an area where tensions between 
social and labour rights and freedoms to provide services could be clearly observed. 
Oversight processes by public contracting authorities were sometimes weak, and as a result 
social and labour rights were often difficult to enforce. In Ireland, a number of union respond-
ents noted that this situation could be improved by a robust transposition of the new pub-
lic procurement directives (2014/23-25). Better information sharing was also called for by 
respondents in Ireland, particularly in tendering processes for public works contracts. The ICTU 
representative in Ireland was in favour of part of the payment for public works contracts to be 
withheld (placed in a ‘holding’ account) pending final checks for compliance with employment 
standards. However, the IBEC representative in Ireland felt it would be disproportionate for an 
organisation to be precluded from tendering for public contracts, as a result of minor breaches.   
Some trade unions in Ireland had sought to include social objectives through public procure-
ment, promoting collective agreements as an appropriate tool for specifying social criteria to 
select service providers. Judges in Ireland have also ruled in favour of including clauses 
guaranteeing social rights. These clauses are well-suited to guarantee protection against 
professional accidents but it is crucial to reinforce the sanctions process and to improve 
collaboration with labour inspectorates. In Poland however, it was noted by employer 
representatives that such social clauses in public procurement were set mainly to ensure con-
tract compliance rather than to promote social and labour rights. Trade unions pointed out 
that public procurement by its nature had to fulfil certain social goals so the social 
clauses may not be seen as inhibiting contractual freedom or economic freedoms. 
Sweden presents a further interesting case in relation to public procurement. Many Swedish 
law experts have interpreted different types of qualitative criteria as unjustified restrictions to 
the cross-border provision of services or sales of goods. One of the most heated debates in 
this area concerns the extent to which procuring entities can dictate pay and other 
working conditions for workers who will perform the contract. While it is generally ac-
cepted by Swedish social partners that suppliers of goods manufactured abroad need to 
respect national labour law and ILO core conventions, there is debate over whether it is 
appropriate to require the contractor to pay wages in accordance with current collec-
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tive agreements when work under the contract is performed in Sweden.280 Far reaching and 
misleading interpretations of the Rüffert case – which deals with posting, not with procurement 
– were taken as a pretext for the conclusion that this could never be done unless collective 
agreements were universally applicable. 
After adoption of the 2014 public procurement directives,281 actors favouring less scope for so-
cial criteria in public procurement have revived these arguments. Article 18(2) Directive 
2014/24 is cited as not applicable in Sweden, because there is no mechanism in Sweden to 
achieve a ministerial declaration of universal application for collective agreements. This may 
explain why few procuring authorities have included such clauses in their contracts. However, 
these restrictive approaches are increasingly criticised, in particular by those who defend the 
Swedish collective agreements system. It is in this context that the ‘Vita jobb’ model may be a 
particularly important development, since this offers one mechanism for the promotion of so-
cial and labour rights through socially responsible procurement.  
Box 5: 'Vita jobb' and Public Procurement in Sweden 
In 2012, Sweden’s second largest city Malmö decided to apply the ‘Vita jobb’ model 
(‘White Jobs’) that aims at preventing both ‘social dumping’ and undeclared work. Pro-
curing authorities apply contract conditions which prevent undeclared labour and require 
the supplier to give its workers pay and other minimum terms and conditions according 
to the applicable collective agreement. Trade unions provide the authorities with relevant 
information about the terms and conditions in the sector in question. If a local authority 
does not have the ability or the will to carry out the control of the contract conditions 
itself, it can hire a person from the trade union to do so. In such a case, he or she does 
not act in his/her capacity as trade union representative, but as a consultant commis-
sioned by the local authority. As such, he/she will be subject to the same rules on secre-
cy as a public employee. At present, the municipality of Stockholm is preparing the in-
troduction of the same model, and an increasing number of local authorities adopt other 
policies for socially responsible procurement. 
Government policies around procurement are also changing in Sweden. Early in 2014, 
the Swedish Competition Authority, which monitors the proper application of the Act on Public 
Procurement, was given an extended mission, including a mandate to draw up a guide on how 
to include labour clauses in public contracts. The new government also plans to ratify ILO 
Convention No 94, and has set up a public inquiry on how this can be made compliant with 
the new EU Directives.282 Expert panels consisting of representatives from the social partners 
and academia, linked to the Competition Authority’s project as well as to the public inquiry, 
may well produce contradictory advice. Thus, arriving at a comprehensive legislative proposal 
will be a difficult task.283 The inquiry is to present its proposals on 1 September 2015 at the 
latest, yet, as seen from this discussion above, it will be a significant achievement if it manag-
es to reconcile the tension between procurement law and workers’ rights.  
                                           
280 Sweden has not ratified ILO Convention No 94 on labour clauses in public contracts, because the European Com-
mission had warned the Government in a 1998 non-paper that this would result in infringement of EU law on public 
procurement and posting of workers. During negotiations of the 2004 Public Procurement Directives, the then So-
cial Democratic Swedish government achieved the inclusion of a recital stating that these Directives would not pre-
vent Member States from ratifying the Convention. (Ahlberg & Bruun, 2014), also with a more detailed record of 
the whole debate in Sweden.  
281  Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement and repealing; Directive 2014/25/EU on procurement by entities op-
erating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, see footnote 74. 
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3.5. Freedom of establishment 
There were some clear tensions reported between the fundamental freedom of the ‘freedom of es-
tablishment’ and the promotion of social and labour rights. Imbalances in employment and social 
security regimes, in terms of costs to employers, across the Member States can be problematic. 
One respondent noted that ‘the employer does the sums’ and chooses the best Member 
State in which to establish to minimise costs (ICTU respondent, Ireland). Whilst employers 
are free to establish where the most favourable legal order exists, this inevitably results in ten-
sions:  
‘for many other European countries it's cheaper to create a company in Ireland and to post 
your workers through Ireland…there's some significant abuses of that in terms of agency 
work so people are employed by agencies who are based in Ireland but have never been to 
Ireland and know nothing about Ireland, but they are employed through Ireland…that is not 
evidencing in Ireland itself but in other European countries.  But I am aware from colleagues 
that the ease that you can open a company in Ireland is creating something of a problem for 
them’ (Irish Congress of Trade Union- ICTU- representative).  
In Ireland, the NERA representative pointed out that interviewing workers is often the best 
way to determine the genuine ethos of the employer. However, the employees may collude 
in their own exploitation in order to secure employment, as was also recognised at EU level. The 
ETUC respondent noted that they are about to start a fact-finding project aimed at mapping the 
key facts in relation to this phenomenon, which is still largely unexplored. Information gathering 
appears crucial here to the specific abuses in the case of letterbox companies, not just in terms of 
working conditions but also social security, taxation and other complex areas of fair treatment for 
workers. 
Spanish respondents reported new developments in this area. While Spain had been a tar-
get for letter box companies for a while, nowadays Spanish companies develop an interest in 
establishing letter box companies in other countries. Trade union respondents regretted that 
collective bargaining and industrial action does not constitute a barrier to this, since 
consultation rights of works councils are frequently neglected before changing the corpo-
rate domicile of a company. Subcontractor companies in Romania and Bulgaria in particular 
offer advantages in terms of taxes and wage levels.  
3.6. Collective bargaining and EU competition law 
Tensions here were mostly experienced in Ireland and Spain. In Ireland, specific tensions in this 
area related to self-employed and freelance workers. The Irish Competition Authority has taken 
the view that attempts by freelancers to negotiate collectively amounts to ‘cartel’ action, 
as such these workers should be classified as self-employed and thus they should qualify as ‘un-
dertakings’. The Irish Congress of Trade Unions has consistently lobbied for an amendment to 
competition legislation to clarify that this is not the case. In 2013, the Authority initiated proceed-
ings against the Irish Medical Organisation (IMO) following the IMO’s refusal to rescind a decision 
of its General Practitioner (GP) Committee to withdraw certain patient services in protest at pro-
posed Government cuts to fees paid to GPs under public contracts. The case was settled before 
trial in summer 2014 with both sides claiming vindication. Currently, there is a long-running dis-
pute between the Irish Hospital Consultants’ Association (IHCA) and the Government concerning 
agreeing rates of pay for consultants (self-employed persons) that provide their services in public 
hospitals. The ICTU also raised this issue with the ‘Troika’ of the ECB, IMF and European Commis-
sion, as the Irish Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) stipulated that there could be no change 
to Irish competition law during the course of the funding programme. The ICTU has claimed 
that the decision in the FNV Kunsten284 has ‘dramatically altered the landscape’ in that 
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‘it has unequivocally held that it is wrong to define workers as undertakings under competition 
law simply on the basis that they are “self-employed”’. The Irish Competition Authority has not yet 
responded to the call from the ICTU to reverse its 2004 decision.  
The Spanish Competition Authority has investigated some clauses of collective agree-
ments specifically. One of those is the impact of rules on working time in collective agreements 
on the possibility of Sunday openings in retail. The Court for the Defence of the Competence of the 
Basque Country (Spain) has opened an investigation about this matter. In the Resolution of the 
13th of May 2008, the Court asserted that the right to collective bargaining and industrial action is 
not an absolute right because the trade unions are obligated under the Competition Law in the 
same way as companies are. By contrast, in the Resolution of the 31st of January 2011, the Court 
says that it is necessary to achieve the correct equilibrium between the right to collective agree-
ment and competition law. Collective agreements have their own place and play an important 
function of defending workers’ interests which is perfectly compatible with competition laws.  
The Spanish Labour Inspectorate highlights that it would be technically possible to include specific 
clauses in collective agreements triggering competition rules, especially in times of crisis. For ex-
ample, agreements about freezing prices might be admitted in times of economic restructuring 
processes. On the other hand, provisions about shopping time tables, opening hours of shops or 
sales periods - that are negotiated with the representatives’ bodies - should not be seen as con-
flicting with competition rules. 
3.7. Equal treatment of free movers 
Free movement of workers should reinforce social and labour rights through equal treatment rights 
in the host state of free movers, as well as by strengthening workers’ market position by giving 
them access to more posts. The interviews illustrate numerous challenges to ensuring the 
factual equal treatment, which are experienced by EU free movers and migrant workers from 
beyond the EU. Further, the coordination of social security systems, as an important tool to pro-
mote free movement, is far from perfect. Finally, equal treatment in the field of social assistance is 
affected by increasing reluctance of national governments to maintain these principles. In this con-
text restrictive interpretation of the notion of ‘worker’ may frustrate free movement rights.  
3.7.1. Ensuring factual equal treatment, facilitating free movement  
EU level employer associations seeking to promote free movement of workers highlighted bar-
riers resulting from lack of adequate information and supported sector specific portals for 
spreading information about available posts. This would in their view address skills shortag-
es. EU level trade unions in their support of free movement of workers are more focused 
on equal treatment at the place of work, which they consider a central element of fairness.285  
Respondents at national level illustrated the consequences of the vulnerable position of 
migrant workers, whether from the EU or non-EU countries. Most did not report any direct dis-
crimination of EEA workers. However, multiple examples of disadvantageous situations of 
EEA workers were observed which did not qualify as direct discrimination.  
In Ireland, the IBEC representative noted that an employment rights floor had to be set at some 
level; an inevitable consequence of free movement and globalisation was that workers would move 
to ‘higher wage’ countries and work under conditions that might not be accepted by the nationals 
of these countries.  
‘The question is: is there some kind of legal mechanism that should be utilised to prevent 
this from happening? I don't think that there should; it would infringe on the principle of 
free movement of workers, free movement of establishment. I hear some people saying 
those principles should be rolled back...I don't know how you can go about that now. At 
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the moment, I think that the balance from the legal point of view is very good. I think it 
is a very strong floor...minimum wage, holiday pay, paid leave and all the rest...perhaps 
a better education around those rights would be useful’ (IBEC representative).  
The point that EU free movement law causes migration which ultimately leads to lower salaries in 
the host country was also underlined by Spanish trade union. The NGO supporting migrants 
and the trade unions also observed that there is also differentiation between EU free movers: 
those from core Member States enjoy better working conditions than those from Eastern 
Member States, and migrants from Romania and Bulgaria were often in the same detri-
mental position as migrants from non-EU Member States. The interviewees from the Spanish NGO 
working with migrants expressed particular concern about the situation of agricultural and domes-
tic workers from Bulgaria and Romania. 
Polish respondents pointed to research providing evidence for factual discrimination of migrant 
workers in several respects. 286 At times, a less advantageous position was achieved by of-
fering a civil law contract instead of an employment contract. The NGO representative un-
derlined the particularly vulnerable situation of non EU migrants:  
‘Usually the foreigners are not directly discriminated, it’s just that their working condi-
tions are different. These differences are difficult to prove because they work illegally. 
They also work in such sectors where illegal employment generally is widespread’  
These migrant are inhibited by employer specific work permits and the renewed mandate of the 
labour inspectorate to penalise employees and employers for illegal occupation.  
In all states, EU migrants and migrants from beyond the EU may be at high risk of being exploited 
in certain types of work, and by detrimental contractual forms, such as agency work, civil law con-
tract work or other marginal work. These risks may culminate in certain sectors, for example, do-
mestic work and cleaning in Ireland, agricultural work in Spain and Poland, and domestic services 
in Sweden.  
As a regulatory instrument for specific sectors, Irish Joint Labour Committees and EROs 
can be highlighted as a past example of good practice, whose future is uncertain.   
Box 6: Ireland: from Joint Labour Committees to ministerial orders 
Joint Labour Committees (JLCs) were sectoral standard-setting bodies comprised by man-
agement and labour and State representatives, which set terms and conditions by Employ-
ment Regulation Orders (EROs) for sectors where collective bargaining practice could not be 
established. These EROs were particularly important in retail, catering and hotels. EROs 
were deemed to be included in employment contracts in these sectors, which are character-
ised by a high proportion of migrant workers, both from within and beyond the EU.  
The planned new system does not propose the re-establishment of JLCs. Instead, the minis-
terial employment orders can only be established upon recommendation of the Labour Court 
based on an application of a trade union, and employer organisation or both. Thus, the tri-
partite structure is replaced by the recommendation of an arbitration institution, and minis-
terial decision. If the ministerial orders are re-established in place of former EROs they 
might again become a best-practice example of ensuring sector-specific minimum wages.  
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3.7.2. Social security coordination  
As regards social security of free moving workers, the area of non-contributory benefits 
emerged as a problem in most Member States. The observation of INCA, an Italian organisa-
tion active throughout the EU, mirrors widespread problems: 
A second category… was about people who can enjoy non-contributory benefits…You 
know that the history of the regulation of coordination of social security systems is di-
rectly linked to the history of free circulation of workers-the idea to remove obstacles to 
free circulation at that time in the 1950s emerged from the central will to create a free 
Common Market - it did not originate from the intention to promote social rights in favour 
of workers but as economic measures finalised to the creation of the Common Market. 
And already then it was clear that workers would not be incentivised to move to another 
country if (that would imply that) they had lost rights to social assistance (Interview, IN-
CA). 
The challenges of applying Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 due to its complexity were 
also widely perceived. For example, Spanish respondents reported that difficulties in adminis-
trative cooperation may result in frustrating the rights of migrants under Regulation 883/2004. 
For example, approving a retirement pension involving this regulation elicits waiting 
times of up to six months, while under domestic regulation only a week is needed for the 
concession of a retirement benefit. The only country with a good administrative cooperation is 
Germany, and the reason could because of the fact that Spanish and German social security 
institutions share an administrative database.  
In Sweden, similarly, difficulties emanated from the complex interrelation between 
state funded and collectively agreed benefits and the lack of reflection of these systems 
in Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. Two particular issues are highlighted below.  
Firstly, the Swedish unemployment insurance system combines a basic insurance and a vol-
untary income-related insurance. In order to qualify for voluntary income-related insurance a 
worker has to join one of the 28 independent unemployment insurance funds. To become a 
member one must have been employed for at a minimum of at least one month. After one 
year of uninterrupted membership, the worker is entitled to receive an earnings-related daily 
allowance. The problem for migrant workers is that this criterion can be difficult to fulfil. Ac-
cording to Sweden’s application of the Regulation there must not be a gap between affiliation 
to the unemployment insurance of another Member State and voluntary membership in a reg-
istered unemployment insurance fund. Since migrants need time to understand the system, 
they frequently do not fulfil that condition. 
Secondly, in Sweden collectively agreed occupational social security systems are wide-
spread. Even employers who are not bound by collective agreements are able to voluntarily 
insure their workers under the collectively agreed insurance policies, and in fact many of them 
do so. As a consequence, around 90 per cent of all employees in Sweden are covered.287 Again, 
there are frictions in the system of coverage not only for posted workers, but also for 
marginal and self-employed workers.  
3.7.3. Equal treatment in the field of social assistance 
Beyond the employment relationship, free moving workers’ life is made difficult by the increasingly 
restrictive approach of Member States in relation to social advantages. The potential spill-
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over effect of case law concerning persons who are no longer or not yet workers on the position of 
marginal workers288 was confirmed by the respondent from the EU rights:  
“in Brey they are saying that Member States can impose ‘lawful residence’ as a condition, 
or giving access to social assistance to EU migrants (…)  there is some creeping erosion 
of the hitherto sanctified position of workers, if you can call it that, the privi-
leged status that workers used to enjoy, that is definitely being eroded in fact. 
And we see it not only because Member States are basically unilaterally adopting guide-
lines to limit who benefits from worker status under European law (…) taking advantage 
of the fact that the European Court says that the final analysis of whether you get to be a 
worker or not is for the national courts to make. So as a result, the national authorities 
are able to exploit that by basically adopting the guidelines and then the courts are (…) 
giving deference to the national authorities about that subjective assessment, whether 
someone is or is not a worker.” (Interview, EU Rights Clinic) 
Similar views were voiced by the EU-level participant from INCA, who stressed an emerging trend 
whereby national governments and courts tend to restrict the notion of who is worker for 
the purpose of EU migrants’ free movement rights. The changes brought about by the ongo-
ing fragmentation of employment relations and the growth of non-standard forms of work 
make the definition of who is a worker fuzzier and the use of social entitlements for EU migrant 
workers more difficult 
…the crisis has opened up a series of problems- the national states are trying to carve 
out from within the EU rules margins of discretion to restrict the freedom to free circula-
tion. This is achieved in two ways: one is acting on the level of national law and its grey 
areas, especially for example the definition of the notion of the worker. And (another way 
is that) others such as Belgium, Germany (…) they are doing things that indirectly violate 
EU law. The paradox now is that they use the demagogic discourse about the need to re-
duce abuse (on the social security system) by free movers, but in fact what we are see-
ing is that it is the MSs who are abusing EU law … (Interview INCA). 
In Ireland, the migrants rights NGO highlighted how EEA workers can allegedly lose worker 
status by being absent from Ireland for shorter periods. While the loss of worker status 
offers access to the Supplementary Welfare Allowance, receipt of such allowances may then be 
used to find that the person is no longer habitually resident in Ireland, blocking access to other so-
cial advantages, as the DSP representative pointed out. Finally, NGO representatives in Ireland 
expressed concern that work records in the migrants’ home state (or some other EEA state) 
were not always taken into account in determining entitlement to contributory benefits, fre-
quently because the applicants were not made aware of the relevance of this information. The DSP 
representatives pointed out that the introduction of a more advanced, EU-wide electronic infor-
mation system would reduce those difficulties.  
In Ireland there are also problems with frontier workers. In July 2014 the European Commis-
sion has issued a reasoned opinion as Ireland is withholding carer’s allowance from UK citizens 
residing in Northern Ireland.289 This arose from a very interesting example of a situation involving 
a number of aspects of free movement: 
‘A family (from another EU state) that had been living in Ireland with a disabled child were 
getting child benefit, disabled child allowance and carer's allowance. They moved North of 
the border (to the UK) because I think that they thought the services for a child would be 
better up there... The husband continued to work here, which made him still eligible for ben-
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efits, but only for the child benefit. He stopped getting the carer's allowance. The family 
made a complaint to the European Commission.  
Another variety of the habitual residence test is applied in Sweden, where a potential recipi-
ent of benefits has to prove temporary or permanent residence in Sweden. The main difficulty for 
migrant workers or economically active persons relates to the definition of these categories. It 
seems to be difficult for social assistance agencies to judge whether an economic activity is suffi-
cient to qualify a person as a worker entitled to full access to equal treatment. The same goes for 
the definition of a job seeker under the Free Movement of Citizens Directive (2004/38/EC) and its 
implementation in the Swedish Aliens act. As a consequence marginal migrant workers from 
other EU countries frequently experience difficulties in accessing special non-
contributory benefits. As a good practice example, a specific project giving legal advice is high-
lighted below. 
Box 7: Faktumjuristerna - legal advice clinic catering for marginal workers 
Faktumjuristerna is a non-profit student project where law school students from the Univer-
sity of Gothenburg work with providing free legal advice for vendors of the street magazine 
Faktum. The vendors are individuals living in homelessness, and many of Faktum’s vendors 
are homeless EU-citizens, mainly from eastern European countries such as Romania and 
Bulgaria. Faktumjuristerna work with these individuals on a weekly basis.   
A respondent from Faktumjuristerna noted that the main issue they encounter relates to the 
requirements for right of residence for EU citizen, and how Swedish and EU law is interpret-
ed by local authorities. The “key” to access to social assistance in Sweden for EU citizens is 
meeting the requirements for the right of residence, which is particularly difficult for the 
homeless. They also experience difficulties in recording their details with the Swedish popu-
lation register maintained by the Swedish Tax Agency, which requires proof of having met 
the requirements for the right of residence for at least a year. Being able to claim child 
benefits and housing benefits presupposes having a record on the population register. For 
the vendors of Faktum, this tension between accessing social rights and the freedom of 
movement (right of residence) has proven particularly challenging (Interview, Faktumjuris-
terna). Even though selling the magazine is a job and the requirements for being viewed as 
an employee or self-employed are set fairly low, Swedish authorities tend not to see the sell-
ing of Faktum as ground for right of residence. 
According to the respondent from Faktumjuristerna, courts in the UK have considered ven-
dors of the street magazine Big Issue as self-employed, which means that they meet the 
requirements for right of residence, according to Directive 2004/38/EC. The vendors of Fak-
tum in Sweden work in the same way and according to the same rules as those who sell the 
Big Issue, thus it was felt that the same interpretation should be made in Sweden.  
3.8. Conclusions 
The perception of tensions between EU social and labour rights and EU Internal Market law dif-
fers between Member States as well as between national and EU levels. EU law, established by 
Treaties, case law and EU legislation, is frequently experienced as a barrier in attempts to en-
sure respect for and promotion of social and labour rights. This is felt in particular around 
posted workers.  
Adequate protection of posted workers, it seems, is only achieved with state centred industrial 
relations systems. The Irish case demonstrates how an abolition of a state-imposed extension 
of collective agreements has rendered the Posting of Workers Directive ineffective. The Swe-
dish case too, demonstrates how rules that do not conform with national level industrial rela-
tions systems can have unanticipated consequences, which are detrimental to ensuring that 
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workers benefit from social and labour rights. Frictions between Directive 96/71 and Regula-
tion 883/2004 result in limited social security for posted workers. Their participation in collec-
tively agreed social security systems is further inhibited by the restrictions placed on any col-
lective bargaining in their favour by the Laval case. Abuses of posted workers’ rights are com-
monplace, in particular if posting of agency workers is used and sometimes abused to combine 
low wages, low taxes and limited social security protection with employing posted agency 
workers in high wage countries. Clearer, more encompassing, definitions of posted workers are 
also needed, alongside better mechanisms for enforcing existing social and labour rights, and 
better information provision.   
Frustration of social and labour rights can emerge from the use of freedom of establishment, 
frequently with long subcontractor chains. Tensions also occur occasionally between competi-
tion law and social and labour rights. Though these were not reported frequently, they link to 
collectively agreed occupational social security systems. This suggests that these tensions 
should be addressed. Equal treatment rights of workers, even if they move freely, are weak-
ened by recent restrictive case law, and Member States’ increasing reluctance to extend social 
security and social assistance fully to EU free movers.   
Responses to these tensions were varied, and shaped by a range of institutional and structural 
factors in individual Member States. Many of the participants view the key problem as that of 
enforcement of existing models, particularly in the case of posting of workers.  However, oth-
ers felt revisiting the substance of existing provisions was necessary. A range of ‘practical’ so-
lutions at national and EU level related to better information-sharing, and the development of 
good practice toolkits for actors.  
Overall the responses confirm that tensions between EU social and labour rights and Internal 
Market law are a problem of practical relevance, which cannot be addressed without tackling 
the conceptual frictions underlying the Court’s case law. Addressing these frictions is the sub-
ject of the next chapter.  
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4. A CONSTITUTIONALLY CONDITIONED INTERNAL MARKET 
- A NEW NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK  
 
KEY FINDINGS 
Based on prevalent interpretations of EU Internal Market law, EU social and labour rights 
and the Internal Market are perceived as irreconcilable antonyms, which again demands 
that either the Internal Market or social and labour rights must enjoy priority. The legally 
binding force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights for the European Union renders such 
perceptions inadequate: the Charter guarantees social and labour rights, and it is of equal 
value with Internal Market law contained in the Treaty. Accordingly, it demands a coherent 
framework for an Internal Market based on (instead of juxtaposed to) social and labour 
rights. This constitutionally conditioned Internal Market requires new standards. On the one 
hand, these must comply with the hierarchy the Charter establishes among the rights it 
guarantees. On the other hand, a method is needed to align equally positioned rights and 
freedoms with each other if and when they clash. The constitutionally conditioned Internal 
Market offers new perspectives on the limitations of collective bargaining and collective in-
dustrial action by reference to economic freedoms and EU competition law, as well as the 
promotion of free movement of workers and self-employed persons under the condition of 
equality 
4.1. Introduction 
The perception of the Internal Market and social and labour rights seems to suggest an im-
passe between fundamentally juxtaposed bodies of law. While Internal Market law promotes a 
downward spiral of working conditions through enabling businesses to compete on the basis of 
choosing low-wage regions as governing their operations in high wage countries, EU social and 
labour rights support fair working conditions as well as equal rights of all workers to social se-
curity and to social assistance. They also demand respect for and the promotion of the free-
dom of association of workers in trade unions, collective bargaining, collective agreements and 
collective industrial action.  
This chapter sets out to develop the constitutionally conditioned Internal Market as a 
normative frame for the activities of EU institutions (including the Court of Justice) and EU lev-
el and national policy makers. This includes a guide on how EU Internal Market Law (including 
EU competition law) has to be interpreted differently in order to do justice to the Charter’s le-
gally binding effect, and the hierarchy of values and rights expressed therein. While the de-
tailed analysis will only address the social and labour rights chosen for this study, the general 
frame will also be useful for assessing the impact of EU Internal Market law on other social and 
labour rights.  
The next subsection develops the concept of a constitutionally conditioned Internal Market, ex-
ploring the concepts of conflict solution for clashing rights envisaged by the Charter. Next, the 
chapter will expand on how this new normative frame changes the relationship between EU 
social and labour rights and EU Internal Market Law.  
The chapter’s conclusion will draw the achievements of this chapter together into a framework 
which can be used to assess potential legal challenges for regulatory initiatives by EU level and 
national policy makers which aim at respecting, protecting or promoting social and labour 
rights. 
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4.2. A constitutionally conditioned Internal Market  
4.2.1. The general concept  
Relating constitutional arguments to the EU’s Internal Market is not fundamentally new. After 
all, the constitutionalisation of economic integration is one of the specific characteristics of the 
EU. However, some of the traditional accounts of “constitutionalising a market”290 proceed on 
the assumption that all market activity is to be protected per se. In this traditional view, mar-
kets are based on egotism and unconditional freedom to trade and compete. Viewed from this 
perspective, social and labour rights can only be perceived as a challenge and must be con-
strained as much as possible. 
The model of a constitutionally conditioned market, by contrast, suggests that markets 
do not necessarily have to be a paradise for untamed anti-social behaviour. Such mar-
kets would risk endangering society which again is the basis for markets. This model draws on 
the idea that markets are socially embedded,291 a Polanyian notion which has commanded 
some academic attention recently.292 Polanyi293 observed that markets provide a fertile ground 
for a certain set of motivations evolving around competitiveness and self-interest. He submit-
ted that for a society to survive other motivations for actions are also necessary, such as co-
operation and trust. From this he derived the idea that markets must remain embedded in so-
ciety if these dynamics should not destroy society, which at the same time is the basis for 
markets.  
Today, business administration literature frequently stresses that cooperation and trust are 
actually preconditions for market success.294 Polanyi observed tensions in a specific form of 
capitalism prevalent in 19th and 20th century Britain, which are no longer exclusively determi-
native in current market-based economies. Nevertheless, the basic idea that markets are 
only one part of society, on which they depend, remains current. Moreover, not only 
are markets connected to society, they also constitute spheres where persons interact. Euro-
pean integration was from its inception based on the hope that cooperation on markets 
will gradually bring the people of Europe closer together, and engender cooperation in 
other spheres as well.295 If this concept is to remain sustainable, markets need to be embed-
ded in a frame which secures continued interaction in a sustainable way. Human rights re-
gimes constitute such a frame. The European Union has long acknowledged this,296 and the 
legally binding Charter for Fundamental Rights in the European Union is one of the incorpora-
tions of this acknowledgement.  
Article 6 TEU states that the Charter has the same status as the Treaty. This could be read as 
establishing a principle of co-originality of economic freedoms and human rights. Under 
such a principle, economic freedoms and fundamental (human) rights would be offered the 
same level of protection. However, the purpose of human rights protection is to provide 
a meta-layer of rights, which enjoy priority over other law.297 This demands priority of 
the CFREU over Internal Market law. The CFREU itself endorses the absolute priority of 
human dignity in its Article 1. This demands that human rights protection enjoys priority over 
                                           
290 E.g. (Hatje, 2010; Petersmann, 2008; Poaires Maduro, 1998). 
291 On this concept see in more detail (Schiek, 2011; 2012a). 
292 See for example (Caporaso & Tarrow, 2009; Joerges & Falke, 2010). 
293 (Polanyi, 1957 (1944)). 
294 See for example (Bachmann, 2001; Dietz, 2004; Gould-Williams, 2003; Tzafrir, 2005). 
295 This is the basic idea behind the Schuman declaration which set the tone for European integration based on the 
idea of instrumentalism; for a literature review on this see (Kurt, 2009). 
296 It could be argued that the CFREU is only the last stone in an edifice whose construction began in 1957 with the 
Treaty of Rome. This Treaty already guaranteed a nucleus of social and labour rights, most notably equal pay for 
women and men, paid annual leave and equal treatment for free moving workers. Early case law characterised 
both equal pay and free movement of workers as fundamental rights - see Case 43/75 Defrenne [1976] E.C.R. 456 
on equal pay, and Case C-152/73 Sotgiu [1974] E.C.R. 154 on free movement. 
297  This view is supported by (Jääskinen, 2014, p. 1713; Lazarus, et al., 2011, p. 62). 
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mere economic policies. However, within EU scholarship the view is defended that Internal 
Market law is at the same level as human rights law.298 The Court’s case law, as we shall see, 
at times even supports the priority of Internal Market law over human rights.  
This chapter maintains that the main purpose of a human rights catalogue is to create a 
fundamental layer for any legal order, which has priority over other law. However, given 
the strong convictions behind a constitutionalised dimension of the Internal Market itself, it al-
so specifies what respecting, protecting and promoting EU social and labour rights implies if 
these are only of equal rank with Internal Market law. Both positions require a fundamentally 
new perspective on tensions between social and labour rights and rights derived from the In-
ternal Market, and a change in the Court’s case law in many of the matters highlighted in 
chapters 1-3.  
4.2.2. Adieu to traditional divisions in human rights protection  
The CFREU has been perceived as a game changer for human rights protection in the European 
Union, because it proceeds beyond traditional views of human rights of human rights protec-
tion. Two aspects are worthy of being highlighted within the constraints of this study.299 
First, the Charter is characterised by going beyond traditional compartmentalisations of 
civil, political and socio-economic rights.300 This is mirrored in the fact that the CFREU does 
not place social and labour rights in a specific section dedicated to softer, less legally 
binding or otherwise de-qualified socio-economic rights. Instead, social and labour 
rights are scattered across the Charter. For example, Article 5 CFREU prohibits slavery and 
forced labour, Article 8 guarantees data protection and may be interpreted as covering data 
processing by employers, Article 12 guarantees the right to join a trade union, and Article 15 
guarantees the right to engage in work. These provisions are found in the chapter headed 
“freedoms”, entailing traditional rights to liberty which could be used fruitfully to constitution-
alise the labour market. Similarly, rights to equality and non-discrimination contained in chap-
ter III are not usually qualified as socio-economic rights deserving a weaker level of enforce-
ment. These human rights, traditionally wielded against state intervention, play an important 
role in labour law. In addition, social and labour rights are also located in chapter IV, headed 
“solidarity”. This heading has incited some authors to assume that all articles of this chapter 
only contain “mere principles” without further argument.301 Such an easy categorisation does 
not do justice to the more complex approach of the Charter. It is also incongruent with the 
wording of some of the provisions contained in chapter IV. For example, Article 32 states a 
clear cut prohibition of child labour.  
Second, the Charter pursues a modern concept of human rights, in that it not only requires 
the EU institutions and Member States to respect fundamental rights, but at the same time 
demands that these rights are protected and promoted. This is already mirrored in Arti-
cle 1, according to which human dignity must not only be respected, but also protected. Since 
human dignity can be viewed as the root of all human rights,302 the duty to respect hu-
man rights is also seen as prioritising liberal over social rights as well. The principle that hu-
man rights oblige states to respect, protect and promote human rights is also congruent with 
European human rights development from other sectors, in particular by the European Court of 
                                           
298  (Oliver & Roth, 2004), de Vries has taken a similar approach recently, stressing that the economic freedoms must 
be considered just as fundamental as human rights in the EU after the Treaty of Lisbon (Vries, 2013, pp. 83-87). 
299  The European Parliament has recognised that a study on human rights requires much more resources than those 
allocated to this project, by funding a more voluminous study on the subject of human rights principles in the EU 
(Lazarus, et al., 2011). 
300  (Kenner, 2003, p. 4; Lazarus, et al., 2011, pp. 60-62). 
301  See for example, (Reynolds, 2015). 
302  This is reflected in the second paragraph of the Charter’s preamble which states that the values of dignity, free-
dom, equality and solidarity are indivisible, and also mirrors the common traditions of national constitutions (see 
(Dupré, 2014, pp. 7-8 with further references). 
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Human Rights (ECtHR) in its interpretation of the European Convention on Fundamental Rights 
(ECHR).303  
For the interrelation of social and labour rights with Internal Market law this implies that there 
is no fixed hierarchy between social and labour rights on the one hand and human 
rights aligned with the Internal Market on the other hand.304 Instead, social and labour 
rights as well as other human rights require the EU’s and Member States’ passive respect, as 
well as active protection (e.g. in markets and other horizontal situations) and promotion (e.g. 
through legislation and other measures).  
4.2.3. Social and Labour Rights in the Charter 
The numerous social rights protected by the Charter include the rights to collective bargaining 
and industrial action, which can be derived from Articles 12 and 28 CFREU, and are under-
pinned by Article 11 ECHR. The European Court of Human Rights has in 2008 and 2009 re-
spectively held that Article 11 contains as essential elements the right to bargain collectively305 
and the right to take collective action, at least for trade union members.306 In accordance with 
Article 52 (3) CFREU, Article 12 CFREU, which corresponds to Article 11 ECHR, must hence-
forth be read to include the right to collective bargaining. Article 28 only constitutes a specifi-
cation of that right.307  
Article 31, headed fair and just working conditions, accords workers a right to working 
conditions respecting health, safety and dignity (paragraph one), as well limits to working 
hours, weekly rest periods and paid annual leave. While the Court of Justice has referred to 
Article 31 mainly in the context of annual leave,308 the reference to dignity gives the provision 
a potentially unlimited reach. It has been referred to as a basis for fair wages,309 and could 
also be seen as a base for a working environment respecting employees’ privacy and free-
dom of harassment. It has even been taken to underpin the right to protection against dis-
missal and a right to adequate voluntary redundancy schemes.310 Article 31 is complemented 
by Article 15 (3) CFREU, which guarantees non-EU nationals who have leave to work in one of 
the Member States working conditions equivalent to nationals of the host state.  
Article 34, in demanding that the EU respects entitlements to social security benefits and 
social and housing assistance, as well as entitlements to social security benefits and social 
advantages of those moving within the EU, is specifically characterized as a principle in the ex-
planatory notes to the Charter. This means in accordance with Article 52 (5) that these rights 
are only “judicially cognizable” in so far as they are implemented by legislative and executive 
acts by the EU institutions. Given the vast array of EU legislation on the field of social security 
benefits and access of those moving between Member States to social assistance, there is 
quite a wide array of materials which allow for judicial protection in this field.  
4.2.4. Rights underpinning Internal Market law in the Charter  
Next to social and labour rights, the CFREU also guarantees rights for economic actors, in-
cluding owners of businesses who are employers. These rights are also scattered 
                                           
303  For more detail on this see (Lazarus, et al., 2011, pp. 34-37). 
304 (Vries, 2013). 
305  Demir and Baykara v Turkey (2008) (App. No. 34503/97) paragraph 154. 
306  Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v Turkey (2009) (Application No. 68959/01). 
307 In a similar direction, though not quite as decisive, see (Barnard, 2014a), implied at marginal note 12, and 
(Dorssemont, 2014), who suggests at marginal note 14 that “the right to take collective action is less stringent un-
der the Charter” than under the ECHR. 
308 E.g. Cases C-155/10 Williams [2011] E.C.R. I-8409; Case C-214/10 KHS G [2011] E.C.R. I-ii757; Case C-337/10 
Neidel ECLI:EU:C:363; Case C-282/10 Dominguez ECLI:EU:C:33. 
309 Reference question in case C-264/12 Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins v Fidelidade Mundial 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2036, which was rejected as inadmissible. 
310  (Bogg, 2014, p. 856). 
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throughout the Charter. For example, the right to a private life (now: Article 7 CFREU) has 
been relied on by business to ward off the European Commission’s activities in enforcing com-
petition law,311 the freedom to conduct a business (Article 16 CFREU) has been relied up-
on in order to defend employers against the consequences of national legislation implementing 
the directive on transfer of undertakings.312 Further, the employers’ right to property (Arti-
cle 17 CFREU) can be interpreted as being restricted by certain forms of industrial action, by 
national tax collection and by requirements emanating from health and safety legislation: all 
these constitute rules that impact on the undisturbed use of one’s property.  
Finally, Article 15 CFREU guarantees rights which underpin the TFEU economic freedoms: 
while paragraph one guarantees the right to engage in work and to pursue a freely chosen 
and accepted occupation, paragraph 2 codifies as a fundamental right the right of every 
citizen of the Union to seek employment, work, exercise the right of establishment 
and provide services in any Member State. This means that the free movement of work-
ers, freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services are also established as fun-
damental rights. In contrast to the economic freedoms, those fundamental rights under Article 
15 are only granted to citizens, i.e. to natural persons, while economic freedoms can also be 
relied on by legal persons (e.g. companies). The Charter thus strengthens the free 
movement rights of natural persons, since only those are underpinned by a funda-
mental rights guarantee, but not the economic freedoms of corporations.  
4.2.5. Tensions within the Charter 
All this indicates that when we speak about tensions between social and labour rights 
and Internal Market law, we do not only refer to Charter rights versus Treaty rights. In-
stead, we also refer to tensions between different Charter rights. The question of 
whether there is a hierarchy between economic freedoms as guaranteed in the Treaties and 
social and labour rights as guaranteed in the Charter remains relevant. However, it is also 
transformed into a question of whether there is an equivalent hierarchy, or any other 
conflict resolution mechanism within the Charter.313 This is the question to which we turn 
next.  
The Charter itself seems to provide for a complex matrix in relation to the different articles. On 
the one hand, there is the distinction between rights and principles. On the other hand, the 
Charter contains two different rules for aligning conflicting rights: under Article 52 (1) all rights 
may be limited if this is necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of others. On the other 
hand, certain rights are inherently limited in that they are only guaranteed for example in ac-
cordance with Union law. 
                                           
311  Case C-92/00 Roquette Frères SA [2002] E.C.R. I-09011, paragraphs 22-24. 
312  Case C-426/11 Alemo Herron ECLI:EU:C2013:521. 
313  (Jääskinen, 2014, p. 1713). 
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Figure 4: Diversity of Charter Rights 
 
4.2.6. Rights and Principles 
Article 52 (5) of the Charter codifies a difference between rights and principles, and limits the 
extent to which principles are “judicially cognisable”, i.e. legally enforceable before courts. It 
states that principles “may be implemented” by legislation or executive acts. While this might 
suggest that there is no obligation to implement the principles, Article 51 (1) clarifies that 
when implementing EU law, the EU institutions as well as Member States must observe the 
principles and promote the application thereof. Accordingly, principles cannot just be ig-
nored. Even if the principles are not judicially cognisable in that legal claims cannot be based 
on them, they can still be relevant in interpreting EU Treaty Law as well as secondary law. The 
Court of Justice is included as one of the institutions required to observe and promote princi-
ples. 
For the subject of this study – the question as to whether social and labour rights can place 
limits on Internal Market Law – the difference between rights and principles matters. Rights 
can only be limited if this is provided for by law, and the limitations are proportion-
ate and respect the essence of the rights. Principles, since they are in need of im-
plementation, seem beyond the concept of limitation. There is also no explicit protection 
of their essence.  
Although the difference matters, the Charter does not clarify which of its provisions con-
tains rights and which contain principles. In so far as the explanations have legal value, 
the wording of the Charter itself does not seem decisive. The explanations categorise Arti-
cles 25, 26 and 37 as principles, although the headings of the first two articles contain the 
term “right”. The explanations also state that articles may contain rights and principles 
alongside each other, and mention Article 34 as an example.  
Whether a CFREU provision guarantees a right or a principle depends on its content of the pro-
vision. Does it have a justiciable content? In this case, it is a right. Is it clearly a demand to 
improve a situation to achieve a certain goal? In that case, it is a principle. For the social and 
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Box 8: Articles 12, 28, 31 and 34 CFREU – rights or principles? 
The right to collective bargaining underpinned by credible threats of industrial action rests 
on Articles 12 and 28 CFREU simultaneously, which complicates its classification. Article 12 
is clearly a right, and is rooted in Article 11 ECHR. Article 28 CFREU is phrased as a right in 
its heading. The content also includes factual activities, such as negotiating and taking col-
lective action, which can be guaranteed as rights. The conclusion of collective agreements 
may also require a legal frame adding a level of principle. 
Article 31 uses the language of rights but seems a mixed provision: the guarantee of fair 
and just working conditions does need to be implemented by employment law provisions. 
The Charter states one of those – the right to annual leave – but does not specify its con-
tent. Accordingly, this is a mixed provision as well. 
Article 34, relating to social security and social assistance, is only a principle in so far as no 
specific level of social security and social assistance is guaranteed. The provision qualifies 
the right of workers to equal treatment (Articles 15 and 21 CFREU). Also, a minimum 
standard of social protection could be derived from the guarantee of human dignity in 
combination with this provision. The Explanations qualify Article 34 as a provision contain-
ing rights and principles next to each other. This indicates that the EU embraces the con-
cept of a rights-based social state instead of welfare states granting discretionary benefits 
which can be withdrawn at any time. 
 
4.2.7. Different quality of rights and conflict solutions 
As regards conflicts between rights, the Charter itself indicates a two level solution. First, Arti-
cle 52 (1) states that rights may be limited if this is proportionate and justified by the need to 
protect the Charter rights and freedoms. This indicates that all the Charter rights are related to 
each other, and that there is no principal priority given to any of them. This constitutes the 
general rule. 
Further some Charter rights are conceptualised with an inherent restriction. For example, 
the freedom to conduct a business (Article 16) and the entitlement to social security and social 
assistance (Article 34) are only guaranteed “in accordance with Union law and national law and 
practices”, and the right to property “may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the 
general interest”. Adding these inherent limitations into the text of the articles, the Charter in-
dicates that these rights are subject to more limitations than others. There are thus more 
options to limit those rights, not only in favour of other Charter rights, but also in favour of 
maintaining national law and practice or the general interest.  
As regards the social and labour rights and rights of businesses which are the subject of this 
study, this allows a first interim conclusion. The rights to conduct a business (Article 16 
CFREU) is only guaranteed with an inherent restriction, while right to seek employment, work, 
establish and provide services individually (Article 15 CFREU) is recognised without that inher-
ent restriction. Thus, economic freedoms exercised in the form of a corporate business 
and not individually are subject to more limitations than those economic freedoms 
exercised by a natural person. Further, the right to fair and just working conditions (Article 
31 CFREU) is unlimited. The right to collective bargaining and industrial action is guaran-
teed in contradictory ways. While Article 28 CFREU states that the right to collective bargaining 
and collective industrial action is only guaranteed in accordance with Union law, Article 12 
CFREU guarantees freedom of association unconditionally. In the light of the ECtHR’s case law, 
and in line with Article 52 (3) CFREU, Article 12 must be read to also embody rights to collec-
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tive bargaining and collective industrial action.314 Accordingly, the CJEU case law limiting rights 
to collective bargaining and industrial action in favour of employers’ rights to conduct their 
business across borders does not comply with the Charters’ complex system of aligning 
rights to one another. This is a first indication that the solution found in the “Laval quar-
tet” is indeed no longer feasible after the CFREU attained legally binding force.  
4.2.8. Conflicts between Charter rights of equal rank  
The Charter also guarantees a number of equally ranked rights, such as the individual right to 
seek work across borders, or to provide services individually across borders (both in Article 
15). Further, the qualification of collective bargaining and industrial action as a subsection of 
Article 12 rights is not yet universally accepted. For example, the Court of Justice only refers to 
Article 28 CFREU.315  
Accordingly, there is the need to consider how conflicts between equally ranked rights 
should be resolved. The resolution of such conflicts is the bread and butter of constitu-
tional courts all over the world, and has occupied constitutional lawyers accordingly. Thus, 
there are a number of principles which constitutional courts can rely on in order to mitigate 
such conflicts.  
The starting point must be that the constitutional rights guaranteed are of equal rank. Thus, 
even if they conflict, it is necessary to find a solution which limits each of them as little as pos-
sible. This suggests that rights can be guaranteed, protected and promoted to different 
degrees. Alexy’s suggestion to consider rights as “optimisation principles”316 captures this 
idea which has been codified in the Charter. It suggests that courts and policy makers are un-
der a positive duty to optimise rights as far as possible. The doctrine of “praktische Konkor-
danz” entails the same principle,317 and essentially means that if rights of equal value 
clash, both rights have to be realised to the degree that on balance neither is limited 
more than necessary to allow maximisation of the countervailing right. Article 52 
CFREU complements this principle of mutual maximisation with the guarantee that no right 
will be deprived of its essence. This addition safeguards against the specific danger of full 
justiciability of human rights, which is particularly acute in relation to the right of collec-
tive bargaining, collective agreements and collective industrial action: it demands that 
social actors are given normative space in which to balance their competing interests.318 The 
essence of the right to collective bargaining and collective industrial action lies in the purpose 
of providing workers with an effective procedure to freely negotiate working conditions. As 
discussed above,319 this purpose is frustrated if each and every demand made in the course of 
collective bargaining is subjected to a full proportionality test, or if the trade unions and em-
ployers’ associations have no freedom to decide when to take collective industrial action. They 
have to be granted an appropriate margin of appreciation as regards the demands they wish to 
pursue and the conditions under which they take collective industrial action.  
The principle of proportionality applied in the correct way would contribute much to 
achieving this balance. As Article 52 CFREU specifies, proportionality is a requirement of the 
legitimate limitation of any human right guaranteed therein. The limitation must be made to 
achieve another legitimate aim. The specific limitation must be suitable to achieve that aim. 
Even if it is suitable, it must not go over and above what is necessary to achieve that aim - 
any less restrictive alternative is to be preferred. A limitation will also be disproportionate if on 
                                           
314  See with more detail on this (Veldman, 2013). 
315 These are the cases COM v Germany (occupational pensions), UNIS, AKT and Säjköalojen ammattilitto, discussed 
under 2.2.2  
316 (Alexy, 2002). 
317 (Schladebach, 2014). 
318 (Fischer-Lescano, 2008; Kittner & Schiek, 2001). 
319  At pp 18, 34 to 35. 
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balance that specific limitation is disproportionate. A case in point is a limitation which deprives 
the human right of its essence. Further, a very serious limitation of a human right in favour of 
a minor aim, such as convenience for persons working in administration, will not satisfy this 
final threshold.  
In balancing two rights of equal value, proportionality must be applied both ways.320 Lim-
iting the right to conduct a business in favour of the right of privacy by legislation protecting 
the data of employees is an example. Such legislation will frequently demand that employers 
do not retain data for longer than the employment relationship lasts. Employers would thus not 
be able to rely on past information when re-hiring someone, or in their dealings with a busi-
ness where the former employee now works. In balancing the two rights, Courts must ask 
whether the limitation of the employers’ rights is necessary to achieve the aim of employee 
privacy. Conversely, they must also ask whether a limitation of employee privacy is really nec-
essary in order to achieve the aim of business freedoms. Mainly, this demands that the Court’s 
famous proportionality test has to be applied both ways, while to date the Court only uses one 
direction.  
4.2.9. Interim conclusion on a constitutionally conditioned Internal Market 
The principle of a constitutionally conditioned Internal Market allows a re-appreciation of the 
Court’s case law, which interprets Internal Market law in such a way that it is in tension with 
EU social and labour rights. This perception of tension is not very innovative, or indeed 
current, if we consider the EU’s value base and the legally binding Charter of Funda-
mental Rights. Embedding the Internal Market, which has existed before the expanded value 
base of the TEU and the legally binding Charter, with those younger layers of principles sup-
ports the concept that the rights of economic actors, derived from Internal Market law, pre-
suppose respect for and promotion of social and labour rights.  
If Internal Market law and social and labour rights appear to be in conflict in specific situations, 
on a principled position the human rights based rights should prevail over those not so based. 
This does not give social and labour rights absolute priority, since the CFREU also guarantees 
some rights for business, such as the right to property and the right to conduct a business, 
alongside free movement rights. The Charter does provide guidance in cases of conflict. Nota-
bly, the right to conduct a business is only guaranteed in line with Union law – i.e. the Charter 
specifies that it is not at a higher level than Treaty law. This also applies to Article 28 CFREU. 
However, the guarantee of freedom of association under Article 12 CFREU must be interpreted 
in line with the correspondent right in the ECHR, Article 11. This right has been interpreted by 
the ECtHR to include the right to bargain collectively, conclude collective agreements and take 
collective industrial action. Article 12 CFREU must be interpreted accordingly. Article 12 
CFREU guarantees freedom of association as a free standing right, and not only in ac-
cordance with Union law. As stated above, freedom of association includes collective la-
bour rights. Accordingly, EU primary law places collective labour rights at a higher 
level than Treaty law, including the law of the Internal Market. Similarly, rights to fair and 
just working conditions are not limited by respect to European Union law (Article 31 CFREU), 
while Article 34 CFREU guarantees rights to social security and social assistance in accordance 
with the rules laid down in Union law. If the rights guaranteed by Articles 12 and 31 CFREU 
would clash with the right to business and the right to property, the Court would be required to 
have the latter rights cede to the former, should mutual maximisation be impossible. From a 
human rights perspective, mere economic interests can never trump human rights.  
Many scholars disagree with the proposition that collective labour rights or any other human 
rights can possibly constitute fundamental values in the EU, which are in principle at a level 
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higher than other Treaty law. Even from the perspective of this human-rights-sceptical position 
the CJEU case law would have to change. So far, the CJEU does not locate Internal Mar-
ket law and social and labour rights at the same level. Instead, it prioritises Internal 
Market law. This prioritisation is a consequence of the one-sided application of the princi-
ple of proportionality: the Court only requires the limitation of Internal Market law to be jus-
tified by reference to proportionality. It never questions the legitimacy of limiting human 
rights, including social and labour rights, in order to maximise Internal Market law. This would 
have to change. The Court would have to consider whether the limitations it imposes on a hu-
man right in the name of protecting an economic freedom is proportionate. The limitation of a 
human rights in favour of an economic freedom could only be accepted if there is no less intru-
sive way of protecting that economic freedom.  
Only the perspective defended here, which embraces human rights as first-order princi-
ples, allows a decision in cases where human rights protection and economic freedoms clash. 
In this case, the economic freedoms would have to cede to human rights if the pur-
pose of human rights is frustrated by the protection of economic freedoms.  
4.3. Some practical consequences  
This section develops examples of adequate responses to conflicts between social and labour 
rights and rights underpinning Internal Market law. Each of the three subsections will first con-
sider an alternative to the traditional reasoning of the Court of Justice and then continue to 
develop the arguments for justifying regulatory activities at EU, national and regional levels. It 
will indicate if the human rights sceptical and the human rights embracing position result in 
different levels of protection.  
4.3.1. Collective labour rights and economic freedoms 
Under the Court’s present case law, workers’ rights to collective bargaining, under-
pinned by a credible threat with efficient collective industrial action, are limited in favour of 
the freedom to provide services across a border as well as in favour of moving a compa-
ny across a border (freedom of establishment). The Court resolves any tension in favour of 
the economic freedoms. The Court argues that the economic freedoms are restricted by effi-
cient collective industrial action and collective bargaining agreements with a cross-border ef-
fect. Examples include collective action in favour of the equal treatment of posted workers, and 
collective action aimed at maintaining collective agreement coverage after moving the registra-
tion of a business to another Member State. The Court states that such restrictions can 
only be justified on the basis of the general interest to protect jobs (but not working 
conditions) or the general interest to provide reasonable social protection to workers, 
especially in the construction industry.321 For that justification, the collective industrial action 
and the demands raised in that context, as well as collective bargaining agreements, 
must be transparent. In the Laval case this meant that the limit of what the trade union 
wishes to achieve must be disclosed before starting any negotiations. The Court does not dis-
cuss whether the resulting restriction of workers’ rights is proportionate to the aim pursued 
has to be employed.  
Under the principles of a constitutionally conditioned market this line of argument is 
untenable. In discussing how this reasoning must change, we will first pursue the argument 
that human rights should be considered as being of a higher order than economic freedoms, 
and then submit as an auxiliary line of argument how the cases should have been resolved if 
economic freedoms and human rights were of equal value.  
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 If human rights constitute are of higher order than economic freedoms 
Assuming that the CFREU rights enjoy priority over Internal Market law does not mean that 
there is no conflict in these cases, since the CFREU itself guarantees social and labour 
rights alongside rights for business. However, as developed above, the limitations of indi-
vidual Charter rights differ, resulting in a more stringent protection of collective labour 
rights than business rights.  
To resume: the rights of freedom of association (Article 12 CFREU) and to collective bargaining 
and collective industrial action (Article 28 CFREU) are inextricably linked. This is particularly 
well established by the ECtHR case law on Article 11 ECHR, which clarifies that a guarantee of 
freedom of association for trade unions includes constitutional protection of collective bargain-
ing and collective industrial action. In order to maintain congruence of the ECHR and CFREU, 
the stronger right is the decisive one. Article 12 CFREU is guaranteed without specific re-
strictions as a liberal right, and in particular is not only guaranteed within the 
framework of EU law, as Article 28 CFREU. Accordingly, Article 12 is decisive. Neverthe-
less, in line with Article 52 (1) CFREU, the rights to collective bargaining and industrial action 
can be limited in order to protect the general interest as well as competing rights. However, 
any such limitation must not deprive the rights to collective bargaining and collective industrial 
action of their essence.  
The economic freedoms of corporations can be underpinned by Article 16 CFREU, and 
are thus only guaranteed in accordance with Union law. Since Charter Rights are part of 
Union law, Article 16 CFREU rights are only guaranteed in line with Article 12 CFREU rights. 
Accordingly, business in the EU must expect to be subjected to industrial action and 
bound by collective bargaining agreements. The case law would have to change in so far 
as the Court would have to assume that a strike and related action is nothing unusual. Ac-
cordingly, such activity would not in itself establish a restriction of economic freedoms 
– just as the existence of national employment protection law must not be considered a re-
striction of economic freedoms.322 If a Swedish business which wants to conduct business in 
Sweden without being bound to a collective labour agreement with a certain trade union would 
have to expect to be subjected to collective industrial action, a Latvian business not wanting to 
conduct business in Sweden without being bound to a collective labour agreement would have 
to expect collective action as well. There is no specific detriment.  
There are limited sets of circumstances under which industrial action or collective bar-
gaining might be considered as a restriction of economic freedoms. First, if a natural 
person conducts a business [instead of a company], she is protected by the guarantee for nat-
ural persons to move or trade across borders (Article 15 CFREU). Collective industrial action 
aimed at preventing free movement as such, instead of only influencing the conditions 
under which it takes place, could be qualified as restriction of economic freedoms without 
violating the Charter. Such a restriction could still be justified. However, any resulting limi-
tation of collective industrial action is unjustified if it impinges upon the essence of the 
constitutional rights to freedom of association, collective bargaining and industrial action. Mak-
ing collective industrial action fully calculable would not satisfy that condition: collective indus-
trial action must maintain an element of credible threat by causing economic harm. Also, since 
it underpins collective bargaining, bargaining as an open-ended process must be maintained. 
This excludes any obligation of trade unions to disclose their last line of compromise before the 
negotiations are concluded, and requires that both parties maintain a margin of appreciation 
on when to take collective industrial action. Other restrictions of collective bargaining in the 
name of economic freedoms must not go beyond what is necessary to protect business rights 
of natural persons (two-way proportionality, see below). Though companies are less protected 
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under Article 16 CFREU than natural persons, they are not unprotected. Accordingly, collective 
industrial action aiming at destroying a company would constitute a first-order conflict of con-
stitutional rights. 
In all the other cases, a limitation of collective labour rights would only be admissible on the 
basis of legislation. Since the EU has no competence to legislate around collective industrial 
action (Article 153 TFEU), this legislation would either be national legislation, or EU level col-
lective agreements.  
 If economic freedoms are at the same level as human rights 
Even if we accept for a moment the idea that the Treaties guarantee an uncivilised market, 
and award the economic freedoms in themselves the same status as human rights, the CJEU 
case law would have to change. Under this assumption, collective labour rights have to 
be exercised in line with Internal Market Law and economic freedoms have to be ex-
ercised in line with collective labour rights as well. If there is a conflict between those 
rights, mutual optimisation of those rights will have to be achieved.  
This requires that, upon finding a restriction of an economic freedom through collective indus-
trial action or collective bargaining, the Court applies the proportionality test in two direc-
tions. On the one hand, the Court may ask (as it regularly does) whether the restriction of 
economic freedoms through the exercise of collective labour rights can be justified. On the 
other hand, the Court must ask (which it has never done so far) whether the re-
striction of collective labour rights in the name of economic freedoms can be justi-
fied. This is the only way to safeguard the mutual optimisation of collective labour rights and 
economic freedoms instead of prioritising economic freedoms.  
Thus, for example, the question of whether collective agreements can be required to be under-
pinned by a credible threat of collective action in order to achieve equal treatment of posted 
workers must be answered differently than in the Laval case. In the Laval case the Court held 
that the mere fact that an employer does not know what the results of a collective bargaining 
process will be renders the collective industrial action disproportionate. However, it is the na-
ture of any bargaining process that both sides are not clear up front about the limits of their 
demand. Thus, demanding that the trade union disclose to the foreign employer its 
last line of defence, before the employer has even started negotiating, means ren-
dering the bargaining process meaningless. The Court would thus continue its delibera-
tions after stating that it is indeed inconvenient for an employer to be pressurised into a nego-
tiation. It would have to ask whether the constitutional right to pressurise employers 
into bargaining collectively by industrial action can still be exercised if the trade un-
ion has to disclose its lowest possible compromise before starting industrial action. 
The answer to this question would probably be in the negative.  
The Court would then have to ask whether there is a less restrictive method to safeguard 
the employers’ right to provide services across a border. That method could be found in allow-
ing scope for cross-border service provision in the practical exercise of collective 
bargaining. As the responses reported in chapter 3 demonstrate, the Swedish system does 
leave scope for the practical exercise of service provision across a border. For example, Polish 
employers frequently sign adhesion contracts, and Swedish construction companies conclude 
subcontracts with companies from other Member States which adhere to Swedish collective 
agreements.323 Recently, trade unions in Nordic countries have started cooperating across bor-
ders in order to ensure that interests of posted workers are considered in collective bargain-
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ing.324 There is nothing which indicates that such cooperation is not suitable for employers and 
their associations.  
 To sum up 
These factual arguments are to a certain degree speculative, and also the national court 
would be best placed to consider them, should a case similar to Laval ever be referred to the 
Court of Justice. Nevertheless, the outline should demonstrate that Laval, Viking and 
any upcoming similar cases would have to be decided differently because the CFREU 
is legally binding. If Charter Rights are at a higher level than economic freedoms, collective 
labour rights may still conflict directly with the rights of entrepreneurs as natural persons mov-
ing or trading across borders, though they might only conflict with corporate business rights if 
aiming to eliminate the corporation. Even if Charter Rights are only protected at the same level 
as economic rights, the Court would still have to conduct a two way proportionality test, which 
would result in a more stringent protection of collective labour rights than provided under the 
old case law.  
4.3.2. Collective labour rights and competition rules  
Similar considerations apply to the tension between EU competition law and collective labour 
rights, as developed by the Court of Justice (above under 2.2.4). Competition rules are not 
underpinned directly by Charter rights. Whilst there is a certain connection between some 
competition rules and the freedom to conduct business, the prohibition of cartels as well as the 
prohibition to abuse a dominant market position limit freedoms to conduct business. Thus, the 
competition rules themselves, in a fundamental rights perspective, balance the freedom to 
conduct business of different market participants. Accordingly, under the perspective of 
the constitutionally embedded Internal Market there is no case for defending the ex-
pansion of competition rules to collective bargaining agreements. The classification of 
collective agreements as cartels would lead to a very specific content control by the national 
competition authorities. This would restrict the freedom to determine the content of those 
agreements to such a degree that the essence of the right to collective bargaining would be 
lost. The right to collective bargaining guarantees a process in which trade unions and employ-
er associations can establish employment conditions. This process is trusted to be fairer than 
just the individual employment contract. This higher degree of fairness depends on the func-
tioning of the process. The trade unions and employer associations need to have a sufficient 
degree of autonomy over the content they demand to be implemented in their agreements, as 
well as autonomy on when to initiate collective industrial action. Restricting these freedoms in 
the name of competition law is not necessary, as the deliberations in chapter 2.2.4 have 
demonstrated.  
However, if we assume that Internal Market law is at the same level as human rights protected 
by the CFREU, the competition rules are at the same level as collective labour rights guaran-
teed by Articles 12, 28 CFREU. Again, these collective labour rights are not conditioned upon 
compliance with competition rules – Article 12 CFREU prevents this. This would support to 
truly reconcile competition rules and collective labour rights as proposed above: the 
only option open to the Courts is to accept that collective agreements are a necessary outcome 
of the exercise of collective labour rights, and that the agreement of several employers to the 
same collective agreement is necessary as well. Accordingly, a collective labour agreement will 
not constitute a cartel or an abuse of a dominant market position.325 Only false collective 
agreements can constitute cartels. Such agreements may emerge where business collude with 
a trade union (possibly one founded for this purpose) in order to circumvent EU competition 
law.  
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4.3.3. Rights to conduct a business and equal treatment of workers 
A number of conflicts evolve around the position of workers moving to another EU Member 
State for work. If these workers are posted, current EU case law and EU level legislation stipu-
late that they lose any right to equal treatment under host state rules.326 This is based on the 
employers’ freedom to provide services. Under the principles of a constitutionally conditioned 
Internal Market, this solution cannot be upheld, because the Charter does not differentiate 
between posted workers and other employees.  
Rights of business to provide services across a border are not wholly unprotected under the 
Charter. Rights to conduct a corporate business are, according to Article 16 CFREU, 
only guaranteed in line with Union law. All workers can rely on Article 15 CFREU in their 
rights to move freely, and on Article 21 (2) CFREU in their right to be treated equally irrespec-
tive of nationality. Further, Article 15 (3) CFREU, stating that non-EU nationals are entitled to 
equivalent working conditions as EU nationals if they are authorised to work in the EU, indi-
cates that free movement rights under Article 15 to have an equality dimension. As men-
tioned, the Charter does not differentiate between employees on the basis of their 
status. Rights to free movement and equal treatment under Article 15 and 21 apply 
to posted workers just as to other workers with a less precarious status. Further, 
workers have a right to fair and just working conditions under Article 31 CFREU. The practical 
relevance of Article 31 is reduced if business can avail themselves of constructions such as 
posting in order to avoid high-wage collective agreements or legislation guaranteeing favoura-
ble employment conditions.  
Present case law and legislation deprive posted workers from their right to be treated equally 
in the host state. Since Article 21 (2) – using the same wording as Article 18 TFEU – proscribes 
discrimination on grounds of nationality without prejudice to special provisions in the Treaties, 
those defending the status quo might argue that freedom to provide services constitutes such 
a specific provision. Such argumentation would lead to a conflict between equal treatment 
rights and economic freedoms. Accordingly, the equal treatment rights of posted workers could 
only be limited as far as this is justified because freedom to provide services cannot be exer-
cised without such unequal treatment. This line of argument will be very difficult to sustain.  
Creating legislation, or other types of EU level regulation to achieve equal treatment of work-
ers in sectors where posting and hiring out of work across borders has become entrenched, 
would be a legitimate activity to combat abuse and to re-introduce free movement of workers 
under the condition of equal treatment as a principle of the Internal Market. Any challenge re-
lying on established notions of protecting freedom to provide services could be countered with 
argumentation relying on the human right guarantees underpinning free movement of all 
workers, which were not in existence when the posted workers case law emerged.  
4.3.4. Equal treatment of free movers versus national prerogatives (social security and 
social assistance) 
The politically sensitive issues of limiting free movement rights, an agenda being pursued by 
some Member State governments, is not a problematic one under the Charter. States do not 
command over human rights. They may act in order to balance conflicting human rights. In 
so far as they implement EU law in this process by availing themselves of exceptions from free 
movement rights, they have to safeguard the CFREU rights as well. In particular, Member 
States are under an obligation to respect and promote the rights to social assistance 
and social security guaranteed in Article 34 CFREU, along with the constitutional guar-
antee of free movement rights for natural persons (Article 15 TFEU). The populist ar-
gument that social assistance systems will collapse if equal treatment is provided will in all 
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likelihood not survive stringent human rights scrutiny. The free moving worker at least, who is 
at the heart of this study, is not a specific risk for social security and social assistance systems, 
as has been established by voluminous studies (see also below chapter 5.)  
4.4. The role of legislation and collective regulation at EU and national levels  
So far, we have only established that social and labour rights as well as rights deriving from 
Internal Market law are both underpinned by Charter rights, and must be balanced if they con-
flict. We have also established that there are different levels of managing the conflicts provided 
by the Charter itself. We have not yet considered how the different levels of govern-
ance in the European Union interact in respecting, protecting and promoting both 
classes of Charter rights. In the Court’s practice, which is frequently the main focus of at-
tention,327 such conflicts occur if EU Treaties and EU legislation underpin the Internal Market 
while national law or social practice protect and promote social and labour rights.  
However, such a strict division of labour would not seem in line with a constitutionally condi-
tioned Internal Market at all: instead of developing strategies to align social and labour rights 
with the Internal Market, this strategy perpetuates the perceived tensions. The constitutionally 
conditioned Internal Market requires that social and labour rights are promoted at the same 
level as the Internal Market. This cannot be achieved through case law alone. It necessitates 
general responses through regulation at EU and national levels, issued by the EU or its Member 
States and their regions as well as by socio-economic actors, again at the most adequate level. 
Accordingly, we must ask the question how the constitutionally conditioned Internal Market 
determines regulatory activities at different levels. 
From the perspective of the Internal Market itself, which aims at abolishing restrictions 
for free movement of goods, persons, services and capital across borders, regulation estab-
lished at European level is more advantageous than national or subnational regula-
tion. Lower level regulation for the promotion of social and labour rights at national levels will 
frequently create divergent legislation, which again can become the source of distortions of the 
Internal Market. EU level legislation or EU level collective agreement are more suitable to cre-
ate a common floor of rights, or even uniform regulation, if this is necessary to avoid such dis-
tortions. Accordingly, the tensions with rights underpinning the Internal Market, as specified in 
Article 15 Charter, are less prevalent in the case of EU level regulation.  
However, national and sub-national traditions in social and labour rights are very diverse and 
specific, which may warrant EU level legislation difficult to achieve, or even undesirable. Thus, 
the promotion of social and labour rights requires regulation at different levels. Equally, the 
practical implementation of rights underpinning the Internal Market is still determined by the 
regulatory environment at national and regional levels. Accordingly, activities promoting those 
rights should also be taken at those levels, this is not the prerogative of the EU level alone.  
Further, thinking of regulation and other actions at EU, national and regional levels, we must 
not only consider public actors such as states, municipalities and the EU institutions. In the 
employment field, collective agreements are an established form of non-state regula-
tion in many Member States. As demonstrated in chapter 3, these are used to varying de-
grees in different Member States, corresponding to different industrial relations models.328 
There is also scope for EU level collective agreements, though these are not yet common.329 
4.5. Chapter conclusion 
The protection of social and labour rights in the Charter for Fundamental Rights for the Euro-
pean Union (CFREU) does not establish a carte blanche for the prioritisation of social and la-
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bour rights over Internal Market law. After all, rights of business derived from Internal Market 
law is also protected by the Charter. However, any one-sided preference for those business 
rights is limited by the elaborate system of balancing conflicting human rights against each 
other, established by Article 52 Charter as well as by the specifications of limitations in the 
Charter rights themselves. In relation to the tensions discussed in chapter two, this implies the 
necessity of changes in the Court’s case law, as well as innovative approaches to regulation at 
EU levels, both by the EU legislator and EU level representatives of management and labour.  
This study does not aim at identifying any “correct” level of regulation.330 More humbly it de-
velops arguments for regulators at national and EU levels wishing to promote social and labour 
rights while also respecting the Internal Market. Chapter five provides such argumentation in 
relation to the main tensions identified in chapter one, as far as they have been confirmed as 
relevant in the investigation of four Member States and the EU level.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
KEY FINDINGS 
Restoring social and labour rights to their rightful place as irrevocable principles, demands 
that they condition the Internal Market, rather than being conditioned by the demands of 
the Internal Market. This is the conclusion of chapter four in one sentence. Achieving this 
paradigmatic change will not be easy. It presupposes new orientations for EU legislation 
and policy as well as a change in direction by the Court of Justice. The restrictive case law 
on freedom to provide services and competition law and collective labour rights, which has 
been identified as a source of disruption for national social models in chapter three, inter-
acts with EU legislation and policy by way of mutual reinforcement. This implies an inte-
grated approach to changes. Therefore, the report recommends three types of activities:  
(1) Activities that promote the concept of a constitutionally embedded Internal Market. 
(2) Legislative activities at EU levels that correct such legislation that responded to case 
law based on the old concept of tensions between Internal Market law and social 
and labour rights. 
(3) Activities by social actors, notably trade unions and employer associations, to speci-
fy EU level regulation for certain particularly vulnerable sectors, and to combine 
forces transnationally to effectively enforce these and other rules. 
The activities suggested are exemplary, since an exhaustive report on required changes 
would go beyond any individual study. These examples focus on ensuring equal treatment 
for people who move to work, including posted workers and posted agency workers and on 
restoring collective bargaining in the Internal Market.  
5.1. Introduction 
The chapters 2 – 3 have confirmed that EU legislation and CJEU case law have in the past of-
ten been based on the assumption that social and labour rights and the Internal Market are 
juxtaposed to each other. In many instances this has led to restricting social and labour rights 
if they are perceived as interfering with economic freedoms and competition law. Such a path 
had been adopted long before the Laval and Viking cases were decided, which came to symbol-
ise the insoluble antagonism between social and labour rights and the Internal Market. Chapter 
4 has developed the model of a constitutionally conditioned Internal Market, which moves be-
yond this antagonism: it demands that the Internal Market is infused by social and labour 
rights instead of being juxtaposed to them. Reversing the path taken in fields such as equal 
treatment of all workers by employers and social security providers, protecting fair and just 
employment conditions and dealing with collective bargaining and industrial action in an Inter-
nal Market might be achieved through a range of activities.  
A new concept such as the constitutionally embedded Internal Market will require some activi-
ties to promote the concept, and to build a knowledge base on the potential implications of a 
new approach. Such activities may also potentially convince members of the EU and the na-
tional judiciary to better protect constitutional rights, including social and labour rights, when 
applying EU Internal Market law. 
A change in perspective also requires legislative activities. Much EU legislation is conditioned 
by past case law which was less embracing of social and labour rights, and partly did not allow 
actors at national levels to fully utilise the potential of labour rights.  
Further, the responses synthesized in chapter 3 have reconfirmed the pivotal role of collective 
representation. Collective representation can complement EU legislation as well as secure ben-
efits of formal guarantees of social and labour rights in the Charter and in legislation.  
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In concluding on a constructive note, this chapter focuses on those fields which have emerged 
as most relevant in the expert interviews conducted for this study. This report’s limited remit 
means that, beyond these specific findings, it does not set out to propose a full revision of Eu-
ropean labour and social security law. Instead, the proposals are developed as examples of 
how to move towards an Internal Market conditioned by social and labour rights.  
The order of presentation will not follow chapters 2 and 4, but instead prioritise the main con-
cerns which emerged from the interviews. From these, consequences of excessive protection of 
freedom to provide services have emerged as main concern. Posting of workers, and in par-
ticular abuse of the freedom to post agency workers across borders, emerged as even more 
urgent as assumed on the basis of current literature. The responses to our interviews suggest 
that posting of workers has emerged as another form of precarious work, which employers 
may use in order to avoid full exposure to employment law at the place of work. The empirical 
findings also underline the relevance of trade union representation (and potentially new and 
different industrial relations strategies) for safeguarding even the limited rights the EU guaran-
tees for posted workers. Further, the empirical findings have demonstrated that the tensions 
between competition law and social and labour rights are experienced in a number of Member 
States, in particular in relation to collective representation and collective bargaining, as well as 
in relation to social security institutions.  
5.2. Workers moving in the Internal Market 
5.2.1. Factual relevance of labour mobility throughout the EU 
In recent times the extent to which workers move freely has been the subject of public atten-
tion. On the one hand the relatively low levels of free movement are being criticised because 
enhanced movement of workers could act as an economic buffer in the current crisis. On the 
other hand, it is observed that the proportion of persons using their free movement rights as 
EU citizens has increased from 2004, when the joining of post-socialist states increased the 
wage drift in the EU. The percentage of EU citizens making use of their free movement 
rights increased from below 2 % to just below 3 %. Since Ireland, Sweden and the UK 
opened their labour markets to inward migration immediately after 2004, one might assume 
that these countries have higher levels of EU free movement from that point in time than other 
Member States. While this is not the case in the UK and Sweden, Ireland is one of the Member 
States with the highest percentage of EU free movers after 2004. It is also not true that there 
is no free movement to those post-2004 Member States. Even after the economic crisis in 
2007, in most of them (with the exception of Poland and Hungary) the percentage of non-
national EU residents increased. Some of them are also home to a considerable percentage of 
non-EU citizens.331 The statistics on free movers do not include workers who move on the basis 
of posting. While some interviewees suggested that these numbers are negligible on the basis 
of a study assessing that 1 % of the EU workforce consists of posted workers,332 this assess-
ment is contestable. If posted and free moving workers together constitute 4 % of the work-
force, one in four EU workers who move is posted. This is not insignificant.  
This increased movement, although still of little significance overall, has stimulated 
negative perceptions of EU free movers in some Member States. These fears, often 
fuelled by the media and populist parties, are contradictory. On the one hand, the resident 
population fears a decline in wages and other employment standard, on the other hand, 
national politicians increasingly wish to refuse benefits to EU migrants, which would 
push them into any employment, including substandard. As the expert interviews confirm, free 
movers might initially accept lower standards because these still appear advantageous to 
                                           
331 Annex 1 contains some graphs established on the basis of Eurostat, as well as some references underpinning this 
paragraph. For a labour lawyer’s perspective see also (Neal, 2013). 
332  (IDEA CONSULT, 2011). 
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them. However, equal treatment in employment, social insurance and benefits leads to adapta-
tion to standards in their host country. This reduces the risk of wage-depression caused by in-
flux of migrants. The equal treatment principle emerges as precondition of free move-
ment without causing social frictions in the receiving economies. 333 Nevertheless, 
equal treatment of migrants remains contested. Even the European Commission’s work pro-
gramme334 envisages “supporting labour mobility” while also “supporting the role of national 
authorities in fighting abuse or fraudulent claims”,335 suggesting that there is a sizeable pro-
portion of free movers making fraudulent claims. It thus will become necessary to stress the 
pivotal role of labour mobility under the condition of equal treatment, if the EU socio-economic 
model and indeed its economic success should have any future. The myth of the undeserving 
and non-contributing migrant seems to stand in the way of a more realistic assessment.  
 While no amount of evidence will completely dispel this myth, existing studies on non-
economically active migrants336 could be complemented by analysis of migrants 
moving for work (including employed, self-employed and marginal workers).  
5.2.2. Equal employment conditions for posted workers 
Equal treatment in employment conditions should be the basis on which workers move in the 
Internal Market (Article 45 TFEU). However, the empirical findings illustrate once again that 
reality is far from congruent with this principle.  
Above all, EU legislation on equal treatment of free movers is contradictory. While 
workers under Article 45 TFEU and Regulation 492/2011 are legally guaranteed equal treat-
ment, workers posted by their employers are not (Directive 96/71, reacting to case law by the 
Court of Justice). Independently from workers’ choice, the presence of a sizeable percent-
age of posted workers on effectively lower wages will undermine local working con-
ditions. These effects will be felt more severely in sectors where employment constitutes a 
large portion of costs and where temporary employment is prevalent. Sectors such as con-
struction, domestic services to the long-term ill and agriculture were mentioned in our inter-
views.  
The past years have seen a plethora of studies, including those funded by the European insti-
tutions, exploring the situation of posted workers.337 These have proposed numerous im-
provements of the legal protection of posted workers which shall not be repeated here.338 Nev-
ertheless, the proposition that posted workers should have a claim to equal treatment at 
the place of work has not been put forward. This is defended with the argument that under 
conflicts of law (international private law) principles the employment law applying to a worker 
is that of her habitual place to work, which is deemed to be the place of where her employer is 
established. Employees in the state of the employer’s corporate domicile should thus be the 
ones with whom posted workers are treated equally.  
                                           
333  See above chapter 1.4.3., p. 22 
334  European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Europe-
an Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions: Commission Work Programme 2015: A 
New Start (COM (2014) 910 final). 
335  Ibidem p. 7. 
336 (Juravle, et al., 2013). 
337  See for example (Hoek & Houwerzijl, 2011; Evju, 2013). 
338 (Evju, 2013; Hoek & Houwerzijl, 2011). The minimum for legal clarity is a clearer definition of posting, demanding 
that the posting enterprise delivers a substantive economic activity in the state whose labour law they wish to ap-
ply, the exclusion of temporary agencies from the class of employers who can avail themselves of posting, the ex-
clusion of multinational corporation from intercompany posting, including a serious contribution of employers who 
post to costs of accommodation, catering and travel for family visits in the criteria for definition of posting, a legis-
lative clarification that Member States may demand equal treatment of posted worker in line with Article 3 (10), 
which would legalise the Irish and UK implementation of the Directive, a clearer definition of the core employment 
conditions for which Member States have to demand equal treatment in Article 3 (1). 
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EU regulation on a similar issue, in relation to workers hired out to another employer, is less 
timid: Directive 2008/104 requires that agency workers are treated equally in relation to core 
employment rules, not only to minimum rules. This is a compromise limiting equal treatment 
of workers in favour of their two employers, the works agency and the user firm. In relation to 
other precarious forms of work, such as part time work and fixed term work,339 the equal 
treatment principle is more encompassing. Arguably, equal treatment cannot be fully realised if 
the employer position is divided between two employers, as in the case of agency workers, but 
also posted workers. However, refusing any equal treatment to posted workers is not justifia-
ble other than with reference to conflict of law principles, which do not have constitutional sta-
tus.  
In the first instance, posted workers’ rights to equal treatment in the host state (de-
rived from free movement rights) should not be curtailed in favour of their employ-
ers’ freedom to provide services. Consequently, as a default position, posted workers 
should be entitled to equal treatment with workers in the place of work (host state). Excep-
tions might be justified for very short periods, as both Directive 96/71 and Directive 2008/104 
acknowledge. Directive 96/71 provides for exceptions for 8 days (Article 3 (2)) or a month (Ar-
ticle 3 (3), (4)). It is important to provide specific rules to prevent abuse: especially for 
workers with few formal qualifications, the employer may be tempted to dismiss them at the 
end of the 8 day or 4 week period in order to replace them with another posted worker. Such 
abuse can be prevented by requiring that a posted worker covered by an exception must not 
replace another worker, and by calculating the duration of the posting not on a personal level. 
Both directives provide that exceptions from equal treatment can be made on the basis of 
collective agreements. Again, a safeguard against abuse is required, in particular prevent-
ing the use of employer-funded trade unions for those collective agreements. Further, 
transnational collective bargaining structures would be necessary to make such exceptions via-
ble for transnational activities such as posting (see below 5.5). 
 Equal treatment of workers at the place of work should be the rule, irrespec-
tive of whether they work as posted worker, agency worker, and free moving 
worker or have never moved at all. The revision of Directive 96/71 is a good place 
for starting to implement this principle. As for other forms of precarious work, such as 
part time, fixed term contract and agency work, the principle of equal treatment should 
be the basis of any secondary law regulating posting.  
 Beyond equal treatment of posted workers and agency workers, a second regulato-
ry principle comes to mind: both phenomena are high-risk employment practices 
which warrant specific consideration for employees. Specific arrangements re-
warding the heightened flexibility demonstrated by posted workers and agency workers 
should also be considered. EU activity could initiate projects to develop best practice 
examples in this field, which may be suitable for collective agreement as well as legisla-
tion at national and EU levels. 
5.2.3. Moving workers and social security  
EU citizens who move to another Member State for work should have access to social securi-
ty in the host state under the principle of equal treatment (Article 4 Regulation 883/2004). 
Defending this principle is an important corollary to defending equal treatment in em-
ployment. As expanded upon in more detail above,340 only a robust defence of equal treat-
ment in both spheres ensures that non-nationals can anticipate an accumulated level of 
                                           
339  Addressed by Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the framework agreement on part time 
work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and ETUC [1998] OJ L14/9 and Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 
concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP [1999] OJ L175/43. 
340  On the socio-economic relevance of linking free movement to equal treatment see chapter 1.4.3 (pp 22 - 26), on 
the development of the Court’s case law see chapter 2.4.5 (pp. 56-58). 
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income which does not compromise living standards in their host country. Motivated 
by the myth that free moving workers are a disproportionate burden on national social sys-
tems, there is a rising disinclination amongst Member States to maintain equal treatment of EU 
free movers. Member States are more focused on those benefits funded from the general tax. 
Due to the oscillating spheres of overlap between social security and social assis-
tance,341 a reduction of state-funded benefits will in the medium term affect both systems.  
In the field of social security, equal treatment is not sufficient to ensure that workers 
who move do not suffer disadvantage in substance, especially in comparison to those 
who do not move. The EU’s response to this problem has been the coordination of national 
social security systems (Regulations 883/2004 and 987/2009)342. The findings of the expert 
interviews conducted for this study suggest that this coordination does not fully achieve 
the aim of avoiding disadvantage in substance.  
In part, this relates to the rules relating to posted workers, which differ from EU legisla-
tion on the employment of posted workers. Directive 96/71/EC contains fewer restrictions on 
employers to profit from the advantages of posting than the social security regulations. Under 
the social security regulations (Article 12 Regulation 883/2004, Article 14 Regulation 
987/2009), posting must be limited to 24 months, the employer must have a genuine business 
activity at the place where her business is registered, and must have the intention to recall the 
employee after the posting ends. While these stricter rules have been recommended as a 
model for the employment-related rules,343 Article 12 Regulation 883/2004 still constitutes an 
exception from the principle of equal treatment. Equal treatment would require that the 
worker is governed by the social security system at the place of work.  
The exceptions from the equal treatment principle were established in order to respond to em-
ployers’ interests without violating the principle that only one national social security system 
applies to each worker. Nevertheless, employees who are posted might also view these 
exceptions as advantageous. Persons who only work in another Member State for a short 
time may not be interested in changing into that social security system. Depending on the 
quality of the social security system in the home state, employees may resist being moved to 
the host state system even after 24 months. While EU employees do have a choice in some 
circumstances (Article 15 Regulation 883/2004/EC), posted workers do not have an indi-
vidual choice.344 This lack of choice may induce employees to opt or even ask for a posting 
arrangement in order to avoid a change into an unfamiliar social security system, notwith-
standing the potential disadvantage of suffering unequal treatment in employment.  
The expert interviews revealed some instances of insufficient accessibility of national 
social security systems for workers who move, especially for short periods or in marginal 
employment. In Sweden, workers who move may fail to acquire seamless membership in 
unemployment funds, which means that they may not acquire access to unemployment cov-
erage before completing a new waiting period. In Ireland, periods of employment com-
pleted abroad were often disregarded for entitlements to some contributory benefits.345 
Benefit entitlements requiring a period of prior employment are typically related to the risks of 
unemployment.346 In this field, Regulation 883/2004 does not support the entrepreneurial 
unemployed person, who moves abroad while unemployed in order to find work: this group 
of persons needs to register with two unemployment institutions, and in any case can only 
                                           
341  See above page 20. 
342  See above chapter 2.4.  
343  (Evju, 2013; Hoek & Houwerzijl, 2011). 
344 Article 16 Regulation 883/2004 allows Member States to agree exceptions from Articles 11-15, which would also 
allow more flexibility in favour of posted workers. However, those exceptions cannot be chosen by posted workers, 
or collectively agreed upon by their trade unions and employers. Any concession depends on state approval.  
345  See above chapter 3.7.2, p. 80 seq. 
346  (Eichenhofer, 2013, pp. 159-184) 
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draw unemployment benefits for a very limited period.347 These limits are related to the preva-
lence of a nationally conditioned frame for unemployment benefits.  
 Presently, there is some discussion about a general European unemployment insurance 
system. However, what emerges from our reports is the need to create some social 
security benefit for marginal mobile workers, i.e. those who move frequently 
or only once in order to escape unemployment or underemployment. While the 
competence base for a general EU level unemployment insurance is contested, it would 
be worthwhile investigating the scope of creating a regulation for an EU level 
benefit scheme for this type of person under Article 48 TFEU.  
5.2.4. Enforcing rights of workers who move 
Directive 2014/54 complements Regulation 492/2011, in enhancing the options for workers 
who do move freely to raise individual complaints, and establishes the obligation of Member 
States to provide some support by public equality bodies for rights enforcement. Any proactive 
policies such as dialogue with social partners and non-governmental organisation or the en-
couragement of equality plans are at best a recommendation. The Directive thus reproduces 
the approach taken by the EU anti-discrimination law acquis, which is subject to criticism for 
its lack of proactive measures ensuring equality. Nevertheless, the directive will certainly con-
tribute to enforcing348 equal treatment rights of workers who move. In our study it emerged 
that posted workers and posted agency workers are even more at risk of being deprived of 
their social and labour rights than other workers who move.  
 Supporting mechanisms such as those instigated by Directive 2014/54 should 
be made available to all citizens moving for work, including posted workers.  
 The supporting mechanisms should encompass claims to social security and social as-
sistance as well as claims in relation to employers and employment agencies, whether 
public or private. 
5.3. Public procurement and fair working conditions 
In the past, the Court of Justice has viewed the use of public procurement for the purpose of 
promoting fair employment conditions with scepticism. 349 In line with ILO convention 94, pub-
lic procurement can be used to “buy social justice” by imposing social conditions on contractual 
partners. The requirement that those providing services or delivering goods for a public con-
tractor provide employment condition in line with local usage is of particular interest. Depend-
ing on where the services are provided or the goods produced, the reference point may be lo-
cal conditions in the Member State where the public contract is concluded, or the local condi-
tions in another Member State. 
Directive 2014/24 and Directive 2014/23 allow for procuring entities to insist on making the 
local remuneration at the place of work a condition of fulfilling contractual obligations with a 
public entity. Practical implementation of these principles is likely to result in challenges before 
national courts, which may be heard before the European Court of Justice following a refer-
ence. 
 Instead of just waiting for reactions of the Member States and litigation strategies aim-
ing to compromise the full effect of these provisions, pilot projects for developing 
socially responsible public procurement could be developed during the implemen-
tation phase of this directive.  
                                           
347  Articles 61-65 Regulation 883/2004, see also Article 56 Regulation 987/2009 
348  The proposals recommended by another report for the European Parliament for enforcement shall not be repeated 
(Canetta, et al., 2012).  
349  On this see above section 2.3.4, pp. 48 seq. 
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5.4. Collective bargaining in the Internal Market 
Our interviewees have confirmed that in there is a role for collective bargaining structures in 
the Internal Market. Many of the problems which emerged from the national reports require 
information of workers, for which trade unions are indispensable. Other problems 
would warrant regulation specific to a sector or even a certain group of businesses, which 
can be achieved through collective bargaining. Even the problems of posted, temped and free 
moving workers to obtain adequate social security could be tackled by collective 
agreement: in the construction industry, social partners in many Member States have devel-
oped models of ensuring annual leave claims of workers who frequently change their employ-
er. These are secured through sector specific institutions established through collective bar-
gaining.  
While it is correct that collective bargaining is on the decline not only in Europe, but globally, 
this is no reason to give up on the advisory function of trade unions, which proved so crucial in 
the Sähköalojen ammattilitto case. There is certainly scope to develop that function further for 
the transnational level.  
5.4.1. The EU needs to mature to adapt to transnational industrial conflict 
Ultimately, the adequate working conditions under which the Internal Market is constitutionally 
conditioned will only emerge if and when trade unions retain the right to exert pressure not 
only within national borders, but also transnationally. As elaborated in chapter 2, the Court of 
Justice has in the past restricted transnational trade union activity in order to protect economic 
freedoms of employers.350 The expert interviews have confirmed that there is a practical 
relevance for collective bargaining in favour of posted workers and in relation to respond 
to cross-border moves of companies.351 In this field, the EU is unable to regulate for lack of 
legislative competence (Article 153 paragraph 5 TFEU). Without convincing the EU judiciary 
that collective bargaining underpinned by effective industrial action is a normal ele-
ment of labour markets in democratic societies, there seems little prospect of achieving 
progress in this regard.  
 By way of awareness rising, the EU level actors can support such development by of-
fering not only research opportunities, but also opportunities for exchange between 
researchers and practicing lawyers including judges. There is also the option of devel-
oping reasoned opinions and other instruments that may build a knowledge base for 
those interested in developing options for trans-border collective bargaining and collec-
tive action.  
5.4.2. Competition law as sword of Damocles?  
As mentioned in chapter 2, the Court of Justice has pursued a relatively restrictive course in 
relation to collective labour agreements and competition law,352 although there remain in-
stances in which national actors feel that collective bargaining and collective indus-
trial action should be possible in the fields targeted by the Court of Justice (including bar-
gaining for self-employed workers and bargaining around important economic parameters such 
as working time). While a constitutional perspective on this aspect of European labour law 
suggests that collective bargaining agreements are beyond the scope of application of 
Article 101 TFEU as well as Article 102 TFEU. While the Court has made some concessions 
in relation to Article 101, it has applied Article 102 TFEU to collective agreements which it had 
exempted from Article 101.353 In both cases, this was related to the declaration of universal 
                                           
350  Above sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, pp. 33- 40. 
351  See above sections 3.3.3., pp. 69 seq. and 3.5, pp. 77 seq.  
352  See above section 2.2.4, p. 40 
353  CJEU Albany above footnote 131, CJEU AG2R Prévoyance, above footnote 133. 
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applicability by the state authorities, which established a monopoly of the health insurers con-
cerned. The Court did not find Article 102 to be violated so far. However, as the Court’s case 
law currently stands, those concluding sectoral collective agreements on occupational social 
security with cross-border application would act under the risk to be subjected to competition 
authorities’ control.  
 In the field of awareness building, a research and publicity activity on collective bar-
gaining and the more practical aspects of cross border social security might be a way to 
achieve a wider interest in these fields than an activity which just focuses on industrial 
action.  
 In this field, the EU commands over legislative competence. The Commission could 
use its powers under Article 105 TFEU to issue guidelines on the relation of competi-
tion law and collective agreements. The Council could amend Regulation 1/2004 to 
specify how competition authorities, including the European Commission, should 
refrain from investigating collective labour agreements, except in cases where 
there is a clear indication that collective agreements are utilised to circumvent competi-
tion law.  
5.4.3. Collective bargaining and social security 
A number of responses indicated that there are still elements of social security which are gov-
erned by collective agreements. This is particularly relevant in the field of occupational social 
security, i.e. systems complementing basic coverage by statutory social insurance. The Swe-
dish respondents mentioned that there is still wide scope for occupational social security 
systems, which again are habitually agreed between trade unions and employers, in 
relation to unemployment. Similarly, for sectors where accidents are especially severe or fre-
quent, the Swedish respondents mentioned collectively agreed solutions. The Irish respond-
ents mentioned occupational pension schemes for the construction sector, which are 
based on collective agreement.  
Specifically, in the field of posted workers and workers who are hired out, there are specific 
needs to ensure full coverage in social security systems. On a practical level, there are numer-
ous questions raised by the prospect to expand social security schemes, perhaps initially for 
certain sectors, by collective agreement. These options will thus not be used without further 
knowledge building activities. 
As mentioned there are some specific competition law issues relating to occupational so-
cial security.354 While the increasing relevance of occupational social security is incrementally 
acknowledged in legislation supporting labour mobility,355 the role of collective bargaining for 
creating institutions suitable for mobile workers is underexplored. The opportunities related to 
collectively agreed occupational social security with trans-border potential would deserve spe-
cific attention in such an exploration. 
 There is scope for exploration of options to include in the planned labour mobility pack-
age scope for collectively agreed transnational institutions for occupational so-
cial security. 
5.4.4. Enforcing workers’ rights and collective representation 
As far as the employment relationship is concerned, social and labour rights of workers 
who move will only be enforced effectively if they profit from strong collective repre-
sentation. Migrant workers’ representation in national trade unions is not yet perfect: lan-
                                           
354  See above section 2.4.2, pp. 52-53. 
355  Directive 2014/50 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 April 2014 on minimum requirements for en-
hancing worker mobility between Member States by improving the acquisition and preservation of supplementary 
pension rights, O.J. 2014 L 128/1. 
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guage and cultural barriers as well as a specific set of interests resulting from the 
experience of migration pose a challenge for trade unions. These difficulties are aggra-
vated by the fact that free movement is not always a one-off activity, resulting in permanent 
settlement in the host state. The free mover has a wider perspective and may move away to 
yet another Member State. Traditional work place based representation will need to be ex-
panded by other means of communication, as well as transnational trade union structures, un-
derpinned by transnational cooperation of trade unions, labour inspectorates and non-
governmental organisations working with migrants. This is not a matter where the EU legisla-
tor can and should be in the drivers’ seat.  
 In complementing the individual rights approach of Directive 2014/54, active encour-
agement of rights clinics such as the one highlighted in section 3.7.3 (Box 7) 
should be considered.   
 The implementation period of this directive could be utilised to support projects ex-
perimenting with collective and proactive methods to prevent that migrant work-
ers find themselves on a path entrenching their unequal treatment in the host state. 
The European Parliament could take the initiative to launch a pilot project in this re-
gard.  
5.4.5. Specific opportunities of collective bargaining for posted workers 
Collective bargaining may offer specific opportunities to overcome the conundrum around the 
position of posted workers.  
First, the vulnerable position of posted workers seems to indicate that they may in particular 
profit from collective representation through collective bargaining. Secondly, the sectors where 
posting prevails, are characterised by highly specific demands on workers, such as seasonal 
nature of activities in construction and agriculture, irregular working hours in the transport, 
agricultural and care sector, to name but a few. Our respondents reported a number of exam-
ples where these specific demands are addressed through sectoral collective agreements. 
It is worthy of note that several respondents from the construction industry displayed a posi-
tive attitude to providing a level playing field through sectoral collective bargaining agree-
ments.356 Such agreement of respondents of employers’ organisations and trade unions was 
not apparent beyond this specific sector. The option of agreeing on sectoral rules is one of the 
advantages of collective bargaining as a regulatory instrument.  
Our interviewees raised a number of practical issues in relation to posting which seem 
best addressed by collective bargaining, as long as representativeness and independence 
of the concluding trade unions is safeguarded. For example, the expansion of collectively 
agreed pension arrangements (Ireland) and of collectively agreed insurance against ac-
cidents and workplace (Sweden) were seen as a valuable addition to the protection of con-
struction workers posted abroad. 
Presently, Directive 96/71 seems to exclude the conclusion of sectoral agreements specifically 
taking the position of posted workers into account. Article 3 (8), in the interpretation given by 
the Court of Justice, does not accommodate the variety of collective bargaining systems in the 
European Union. This means that workers posted to those countries where collective bargain-
ing is based on autonomous negotiations are less well protected under EU law, although strong 
industrial relations may provide other advantages.  
 Adapting Article 3 (8) of Directive 96/71 in order to accommodate voluntary 
industrial relations systems as well as emerging transnational collective bar-
gaining structures would create space for resolving problems for posted work-
ers.  
                                           
356  See above section 3.3.3, pp. 70 and 72, see also (Afonso, 2011). 
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5.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined a few practical consequences of overcoming the perception of ten-
sions between Internal Market law and EU social and labour rights, moving towards a constitu-
tionally conditioned Internal Market where respect for and promotion of social and labour 
rights is seen as precondition for sustainable economic success.  
Actions proposed suggest a programme mixing research studies and pilot projects, cooperation 
with social actors and legislative proposals.  
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ANNEX 1: FREE MOVEMENT IN THE EU – SOME DATA  
As a background to the often-expressed fears of social actors at different levels relating to the 
extent to EU free movement, some information on the factual relevance of this phenomenon is 
helpful. The information comprised below has been obtained from Eurostat, using statistics on 
population by sex, age group and citizenship, up to August 2015 under 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_pop1ctz&lang=en.  
If assessing social reality, absolute numbers of free movers are less relevant than the propor-
tion of free movers accommodated in different Member States in relation to their own popula-
tion. Even a short glimpse into the statistics reveals a nuanced practice which defies any sim-
ple categorisation, and in particular the popular assumption that “rich” Northern and Western 
Member States have to absorb a higher proportion of free movers than some poorer and even 
some Eastern Member States (Benton & Petrovic, 2013; Potpcheva, 2014; Fuller & Ward, 
2013)   
For the purpose of this report it seems sufficient to consider free movement from 2007, when 
the first ripples of the global crisis were felt. Of course Luxembourg always tops the table with 
a proportion of EU citizens from other Member States (free movers) between 35% in 2007 and 
39% in 2014. But beyond that, and in contrast to perceived wisdom, Member States such as 
Germany and the UK are home to a modest proportion of EU free movers – 3.82% and 4.08 % 
respectively in 2014, starting from 2.99% and 2.39 % respectively in 2007. Ireland has a con-
siderably higher proportion of now 8.10% after a peak of 9.22 % in 2009, starting with 7.96% 
in 2007. Germany, the UK and France, which are usually referenced as the countries hosting 
most inner-EU migrants (or free movers), lag relatively far behind with less than 4.1 % EU mi-
grants in their absolute population. The highest increase during the global economic crisis is to 
be found in Austria (3.17 – 6.05%) and the UK (2.39%-4.08%), followed by Belgium, Germa-
ny and Spain respectively.  
 
 
And while Member States which acceded to the EU from 2004 have relatively low proportions 
of EU migrants on the whole, some of them are home to a relatively high proportion of non-EU 
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citizens. This means that they integrate, in spite of weak economic performance, a high pro-
portion of migrants – as do pre-2004 Member States, in all of which the proportion of non-EU 
migrants in the population is higher than that of free movers.  
 
 
Even the hypothesis that the global economic crises from 2007 will lead to a decline in the EU’s 
population and free movement into those countries suffering economic decline is not correct: 
the population of all EU Member State has increased between 2007 and 2013, and in most 
states –with the exception of Hungary and Poland – the proportion of EU free movers within 
the total population has increased as well.  
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Overall, it may well be the case that citizens of Member States with high unemployment move 
more frequently to Member States with thriving economies than citizens of Member States with 
thriving economies move to Member States with high unemployment. This does not seem prob-
lematic in principle. Instead, it is in line with the original idea behind including free movement of 
persons into the Common Market: people should be enabled to profit from the Common Market 
as much as business by being enabled to move freely under the condition of equal treatment. 
While the Spaak report of 1956 still foresaw numerous exceptions to free movement of labour, it 
was clear in the principle that free movement of labour should enable workers to take advantage 
of the Internal Market. The citizens who make use of free movement rights overwhelmingly con-
tribute more to their host countries than they receive in local benefits. Accordingly, there is little 
evidence that benefit claims by non-economically active EU foreigners have a palpable effect in 
countries such as the UK and Germany. And while there is less movement of working-age popu-
lation from the North to the South and the West to the East than vice versa, there is a sizeable 
movement of old-age pensioners from the North to the South. This population claims ample 
benefits and causes high costs in the local health services. Interestingly, the dimension of the 
detriment caused to their host countries is under-researched (Juravle, et al., 2013). 
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ANNEX 2: METHODOLOGY 
For the primary research conducted for this project, 44 interviews in total were conducted 
across four Member States and at EU level. The methodology adopted was inductive in nature. 
A list of potential tensions was identified and this was discussed and refined through discus-
sions amongst the project team, including a face-to-face project meeting. From this, an inter-
view schedule was developed. This was designed to be a ‘generic’ schedule, covering all possi-
ble tensions, but with the possibility for the schedule to be adapted and refined to fit the ten-
sions that were of particular interest and importance within individual Member States and for 
EU actors. The generic interview schedule can be found in Annex 2. In practice, the topics cov-
ered, and the amount of time devoted to covering each tension varied from respondent to re-
spondent, and the team were able to benefit from the flexible and adaptable nature of semi-
structured interview schedules, to allow important issues to emerge. Nonetheless, the generic 
schedule provided a common framework of understanding, to ensure some comparability and 
common understanding of issues across quite different Member State contexts.  
A list of interviewees can be found in Annex 4. In some cases, individuals agreed to be named, 
in other cases, interviewees agreed only for their organisation to be named. For consistency, 
we have reported only organisation names. In each Member State and at EU level, evidence 
was gathered from employer associations and trade unions as well as public bodies, including 
labour inspectorates, ministerial departments and judges. Specific actors in individual countries 
and at EU level should allow adding different perspectives. Of particular interest is the perspec-
tive on the migrant’s experience, for example through organisations offering advice or support 
for migrants in the European Union at national or EU level. Other specific actors could comprise 
organisation specifically engaged with promoting free movement rights.  However, at EU level 
the evidence on current policy initiatives was very limited due to the recent change-over at the 
helm of all the central EU institutions. It was thus impossible to conduct interviews with the 
European Commission in particular, and the evaluation of its working programme was neces-
sarily limited by its present vagueness. The coverage of interviewees is thus quite broad, and 
the chapter reporting the empirical findings is able to summarise views on tensions and re-
sponses from a range of perspectives. Interviews were conducted through a variety of means, 
including face-to-face interviews, telephone and Skype. In some cases, interviews were rec-
orded and transcribed in full. In other cases, notes were taken and written up after the inter-
view. Interviewees were provided with details about the project, and informed consent proto-
cols, in line with good practice at the University of Leeds, where ethical approval for the pro-
ject was secured. 
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ANNEX 3: SUMMARY INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR THE PRI-
MARY RESEARCH IN CHAPTER 3 
Collective bargaining and industrial action / freedom to provide services 
 What is the Degree of protection by collectively agreed employment rights for workers? 
 Have there been any issues in xxx national or xxx sector context in extending these 
protections to posted workers?  
 What is your understanding of a tension between collective rights and freedom to pro-
vide services (EU Internal Market law)?  
o How has this played out within xxx national context and or xxx sector context?  
 Prompt use of or opposition to collective action  
 How does this tension affect your organisation / the individuals or interests you repre-
sent?  
 How have you/your organisation responded to such tensions? 
 What issues have you/your organisation encountered in responding to this tension?  
 How do you/your organisation think that the tension should best be resolved? 
o Prompt – ideas about best practices 
 Are you aware the use of public procurement to achieve social objectives within xxx na-
tional context? 
 Have there been any issues in xxx national or xxx sector context in using collective 
agreements to select a service provider on certain social grounds?  
 What is your understanding of a tension between collective rights and freedom to pro-
vide services (EU Internal Market law)?  
o How has this played out within xxx national context and or xxx sector context?  
 Prompt promotion of / opposition to meeting social objectives through 
public procurement 
  
 How does this tension affect your organisation / the individuals or interests you repre-
sent?  
 How have you/your organisation responded to such tensions? 
 What issues have you/your organisation encountered in responding to this tension?  
 How do you/your organisation think that the tension should best be resolved? 
o Prompt – ideas about best practices 
Collective bargaining and industrial action / freedom of establishment 
 Are you aware of any issues associated with the movement of companies within the EU 
and efforts to maintain labour standards? 
 Have there been any instances in xxx national or xxx sector context of using collective 
action in response to planned movement of companies?  
 What is your understanding of a tension between collective rights and freedom of es-
tablishment (EU Internal Market law)?  
o How has this played out within xxx national context and or xxx sector context?  
 Prompt promotion of / opposition to the movement of companies to other 
Member State 
 How does this tension affect your organisation / the individuals or interests you repre-
sent?  
 How have you/your organisation responded to such tensions? 
 What issues have you/your organisation encountered in responding to this tension?  
 How do you/your organisation think that the tension should best be resolved? 
o Prompt – ideas about best practices 
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Collective bargaining and industrial action / EU competition law 
 Are you aware of any issues associated with collective agreements triggering competi-
tion rules? 
 Have there been any instances in xxx national or xxx sector context of using collective 
agreements within the context of a ‘crisis cartel’?  
 What is your understanding of a tension between collective rights and competition law)?  
o How have these played out within xxx national context and or xxx sector con-
text?  
 Prompt promotion of / opposition to the movement of companies to other 
Member State 
  
 How does this tension affect your organisation / the individuals or interests you repre-
sent?  
 How have you/your organisation responded to such tensions? 
 How do you/your organisation think that the tension should best be resolved? 
 How do you/your organisation think that the tension should best be resolved? 
o Prompt – ideas about best practices 
Fair and just working conditions / free movement of workers 
 Could you tell me about the degree of protection by collective and statutory employ-
ment rights for national and migrating workers [incoming and outgoing] 
 Are you aware of any differential treatment between national workers and workers from 
another member state [here the focus is on individual movers rather than posted work-
ers]  
 Could you tell me about the degree of protection by statutory social rights, e.g. access 
to unemployment benefits, any bridging benefits, health care and complementary social 
assistance for national and migrating workers [incoming and outgoing] 
 Are you aware of any differential treatment between national workers and workers from 
another member state [here the focus is on individual movers rather than posted work-
ers]  
 What is your understanding of the relationship between the free movement of workers 
within the EU and working conditions / social security provision within xxxcountry? 
 How does this affect your organisation / the individuals or interests you represent?  
 How have you/your organisation responded to such this? 
 What issues have you/your organisation encountered in responding to this?  
 How do you/your organisation think that the issue should best be resolved? 
o Prompt – ideas about best practices 
Fair and just working conditions / freedom to provide services 
 Could you tell me about the degree of protection by collective and statutory employ-
ment rights for national and posted workers? 
 What is your understanding of a tension between freedom to provide services and fair 
and just working conditions in the context of posting.  
o How has this played out within xxx national context and or xxx sector context?  
 How does this tension affect your organisation / the individuals or interests you repre-
sent?  
 How have you/your organisation responded to such tensions? 
 What issues have you/your organisation encountered in responding to this tension?  
 How do you/your organisation think that the tension should best be resolved? 
o Prompt – ideas about best practices 
 Are you aware the use of public procurement to achieve social objectives within xxx na-
tional context? 
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 Have there been any issues in xxx national or xxx sector context in which service providers 
are selected within procurement processes on certain social grounds?  
 What is your understanding of a tension between fair and just working conditions and free-
dom to provide services within the context of public procurement processes?  
o How has this played out within xxx national context and or xxx sector context?  
 Prompt promotion of / opposition to meeting social objectives through public 
procurement 
 How does this tension affect your organisation / the individuals or interests you represent?  
 How have you/your organisation responded to such tensions? 
 What issues have you/your organisation encountered in responding to this tension?  
 How do you/your organisation think that the tension should best be resolved? 
o Prompt – ideas about best practices 
Social security and social assistance / Competition rules 
 Are you aware of social security situations where providers have been considered ‘un-
dertakings’ within the meaning of EU completion law and thus subject to scrutiny as po-
tential cartels or abusers of dominant market positions? 
 What is your understanding of a tension between social security and social assistance 
and EU competition rules?   
o How has this played out within xxx national context and or xxx sector context?  
 How does this tension affect your organisation / the individuals or interests you repre-
sent?  
 How have you/your organisation responded to such tensions? 
 What issues have you/your organisation encountered in responding to this tension?  
 How do you/your organisation think that the tension should best be resolved? 
o Prompt – ideas about best practices 
Social security and social assistance / freedom to provide services 
 Are you aware of social security situations where the provision of a service by a particu-
lar provider has been challenged as in conflict with the freedom to provide services?  
 What is your understanding of a tension between social security and social assistance 
and freedom to provide services? 
o How has this played out within xxx national context and or xxx sector context?  
 How does this tension affect your organisation / the individuals or interests you repre-
sent?  
 How have you/your organisation responded to such tensions? 
 What issues have you/your organisation encountered in responding to this tension?  
 How do you/your organisation think that the tension should best be resolved? 
o Prompt – ideas about best practices 
Social security and social assistance / freedom of movement 
 Could you tell me about the degree of protection by statutory social rights, e.g. access 
to unemployment benefits, any bridging benefits, health care and complementary social 
assistance for national and migrating workers [incoming and outgoing]? 
 Could you tell me about the degree of protection by collectively agreed social rights 
(e.g. occupational pension or health schemes) for national and migrant workers [incom-
ing and outgoing]? 
 Are you aware of any differential treatment between national workers and workers from 
another member state [here the focus is on individual movers rather than posted work-
ers]?  
 What is your understanding of the relationship between the social security and social 
assistance and the free movement of workers within the EU within xxx country? 
 How does this affect your organisation / the individuals or interests you represent?  
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 How have you/your organisation responded to such this? 
 What issues have you/your organisation encountered in responding to this?  
 How do you/your organisation think that the issue should best be resolved? 
o Prompt – ideas about best practices? 
 
 We have been talking about the relationship / tensions between Internal Market law 
and social and labour rights. Is there anything that you think we have missed that 
might be relevant to this issue? Are there some tensions that are relevant to the work 
of you/ your organisation that haven’t been raised?  Could you tell us more about 
them?  
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ANNEX 4: LIST OF INTERVIEW PARTNERS 
Note: not all interview partners agree to being disclosed. Accordingly, only organisation names 
have been used.  
Interviews: EU level 
1.  UNIONS: European Trade Union Congress  
2. UNION/NGOs: INCA and European Observatory of Social Rights Brussels  
3. EMPLOYERS: Social affairs department Business Europe  
4. EMPLOYERS: EUROCIETT   
5. EMPLOYERS: European Chemical Employers Group  
6. NGOs: Legal supervisor EU Rights Clinic   
7. STATE: Commission no interview available, secondary sources used to set out position.   
Interviews: Ireland 
8. UNIONS: Irish Congress of Trade Union (ICTU) 
9. UNIONS:  Technical, Electrical, Engineering Unin (TEEU) 
10. UNIONS: Unite  
11. EMPLOYERS: Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC)? 
12. EMPLOYERS: Construction Industry Federation (CIF) 
13. NGOs: Migrant Rights Centre Ireland (MRCI) 
14. NGOs: Crosscare Migrant Project  
15. STATE: National Employment Rights Authority (NERA; Labour Inspectorate)* 
16. STATE: Department of Jobs, Enterprise & Innovation (DJEI)* 
17. STATE: Department of Social Protection (DSP)‡ 
*one interview 
‡two interviewees from this organisation   
Interviews: Spain 
18. UNIONS: Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT), one of the two major labour unions in 
Spain.   
19. EMPLOYERS: BASI, SA Member of the CEOE (Spanish Confederation of Employers’ Or-
ganisation).  
20. NGOs: Foundation Maria Aurelia Capmany 
21. NGOs: Migraestudio. 
22. SUPREME COURT: Judge of Supreme Court of Spain. 
23. STATE: Labor Inspectorate. Labor Inspectorate in Catalonia (Spain) 
24. STATE: Legal Service of the INSS (National Institute of Social Security) 
25. STATE: Retirement Pensions Department of the INSS (National Institute of Social Secu-
rity) 
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Interviews: Poland 
26. LABOUR INSPECTORATE: Departament Legalności Zatrudnienia Główny Inspektorat 
Pracy (Legality of employment Department; Head Labour Inspectorate)  
27. NGO: Labour Mobility Initiative Association (Stowarzyszenie Inicjatywa mobilności Pra-
cy) ;  
28. NGO:  Stowarzyszenie Interwencji Prawnej 
29. TRADE UNIONS:  Intarnational Department at NSZZ “Solidarność trade union 
30. TRADE UNIONS: Expert Department at NSZZ “Solidarność trade union 
31. TRADE UNIONS: legal expert at NSZZ “Solidarność trade union 
32. EMPLOYERS’ ORGANISATION: Pracodawcy Pomorza – employers’ organization in Po-
morskie Region 
33. GOVERNMENT:  International Labour Law Unit  of Labour Law Department  in the Min-
istry of Labour and Social Policy  
34. GOVERNMENT: Ministry of Economy, Deputy Director of European Affairs Department  
35. GOVERNMENT: Ministry of Economy, Head of Unit at the Ministry of Economy 
36. GOVERNMENT: Ministry of Economy Expert in the European Affairs Department 
Interviews: Sweden 
37. UNIONS: Head of LO-TCO Rättsskydd AB 
38. UNIONS: Swedish Transport Workers Union 
39. EMPLOYERS:  Confederation of Swedish Enterprise 
40. EMPLOYERS: Road Transport Employers' Association 
41. EMPLOYERS: Skanska Sverige AB 
42. STATE: Official at the Government Offices combined with published documents ex-
pressing the position of the Government 
43. NGOs: Lawyer at Faktumjuristerna 
44. OTHER: Sydsvenska hälsogruppen AB  
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ANNEX 5: CONTEXT FOR UNDERSTANDING TENSIONS BE-
TWEEN SOCIAL AND LABOUR RIGHTS AND IN-
TERNAL MARKET LAW AT EU LEVEL 
Chapter 3 looked at specific tensions between social and labour rights and internal la-
bour market law. Here we make some observations from the EU level interviews, about the 
context in which these tensions should be understood. The first issue is that of subsidiarity and 
the levels at which responses to the tensions occurred. EU level actors/stakeholders pointed to 
the relatively limited direct role that they had in responding to these tensions.  This reflected 
the different forms that the organisations took and the level at which they operate. Many 
pointed to the importance of their affiliates operating at the national level in developing prac-
tical solutions and thus the overriding significance of national responses to the tensions 
highlighted. Indeed, for employer associations in particular, there was a strong preference for 
national level solutions to any EU-level tensions and issues around social and labour rights and 
internal labour market laws.   
The second point to highlight is the importance of the recent economic and political cli-
mate in which the various stakeholders interviewed operate. It was noted in section 4.2 that 
the economic recession had impacted on individual Member State in different ways. The politi-
cal, economic and social climate, and the implications of this climate for stakeholders at EU 
and national level, is critically important to understanding how these stakeholders interpret 
and respond to tensions, and the constraints that shape their actions. At EU level, the ETUC 
participant used the example of the right to strike to highlight what she perceived as hostility 
towards social rights within the broader global climate and cited a deadlock in the supervisory 
system of the International Labour Organisation on the issue of the right to strike to show that 
global trends and pressures shape experiences of and responses to EU level tensions.   At EU 
level the EU Rights Clinic also placed EU issues into a broader global context. The participant 
noted the lack of attention that is given by many migrants rights NGOs to EU migrant workers. 
Mobility within the EU is often not considered to be ‘migration’ by some NGOs, and yet, within 
current political discourses immigration and EU mobility are increasingly conflated. Such politi-
cal discourses may be starting to have implications for the manner in which Member States 
interpret, implement and enforce EU law with the potential for new vulnerabilities for EU mi-
grant workers. According to the Migrant Rights Clinic respondent, the fact that these are two 
distinctive areas where different rules and instruments apply is put into question by the prac-
tices of some Member States.  Definitional ‘shifts’ and underlying tensions therefore relate to 
the way in which such organisations see each other under a changing global political 
climate.  
Related to this, interviewees also pointed to the challenges of seeking to promote and ensure 
an equal footing for EU social and labour rights, alongside Internal Market freedoms, in 
the context of austerity measures across Europe. Here the development of political solutions to 
the global economic crisis outside of the legal frame of the Treaties raised questions about 
the significance of some of the constitutional developments in the area EU social rights to 
the experiences of EU citizens ‘on the ground’. This raises questions about the application 
and enforcement of EU law rather than its substance, a point highlighted by an EU level re-
spondent.          
‘But I think the problem is that the social … or social rights are simply overlooked to-
day in the current political context with the crisis and everything. If you look at some 
of the austerity measures implemented in EU countries, they do not respect the char-
ter of fundamental rights, it’s just not respected and a number …have not respected 
the treaties, yet this is what is happening.  (Interview, ETUC).   
The third point to highlight is that the overall status of social and labour rights compared 
to internal labour market freedoms (in other words, the very notion of tensions between the 
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two) was viewed very differently by respondents – at both national and EU level. For some re-
spondents (often employee representatives) the interrelation between these spheres was de-
scribed as ‘conflict’ whereas for others (often employer representative) the label synergy 
better represented a view of the Internal Market as framework that contributes to social devel-
opment (through growth) others still were comfortable with the term tension.   
For those who saw the relationship between social rights and the Internal Market as a conflict, 
the importance of maintaining the social dimension of the EU as a priority policy issue was 
stressed. The sense here, both at a national and EU level, was that the correct balance has 
not yet been struck. For the ETUC, for example, the ultimate solution lies in further treaty 
change so that greater weight for fundamental social rights is written into the overarching 
framework of EU law. There was recognition that there had been an alteration in the footing on 
which social and labour rights stand within the framework of EU law, with the changing status 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2009 with the Lisbon Treaty, so that it is also part of 
Primary Law. However, some actors felt that in reality, this had not been sufficient to en-
sure, or even strengthen, the application of these fundamental rights on the ground. 
Under this viewpoint, the potential of the Charter as a means to ensure that social and labour 
rights were on an equal footing to internal labour market laws was recognised, but this was 
seen as a potential mechanism, rather than one that was currently being realised. Further-
more, respondents recognised the limitations of the Charter for the achievement of a balance 
between social and labour rights and economic freedoms:   
‘I think the Charter is far too weak, because it doesn’t really help very much in prac-
tice. That doesn’t mean there aren’t things that can’t be done, and maybe we haven’t 
been successful enough to use it, but I think there is sadly not enough, and we should 
also look at a revision of the Treaty to strengthen it, but there again if the Treaty is 
not respected by those who are supposed to be the guarantee, or the guardian of the 
Treaties, then what can you do?’ (Interview, ETUC).  
Union representative organisations saw the clear potential in seeking to change the norma-
tive position of existing legislation to address the conflict and proportionality between so-
cial/labour rights on the one hand and economic freedoms on the other. In particular, a social 
progress protocol which would be annexed to the Treaty, was seen as a measure which could 
resolve the tensions. The ETUC, and some individual unions at a national level, were actively 
lobbying on a number of fronts to try and forward this agenda.  
For other respondents, the tensions between social and labour rights on the one hand and 
internal labour market law on the other were seen as less problematic. Employer representa-
tives at EU level, for example, argued that existing laws and legislation (at a national level 
as well as EU level) provided the means through which tensions could be resolved. Further-
more, employer representatives sought to highlight how social and labour market rights, along 
with internal labour market law could together promote to the goals of the European Un-
ion:  
“I think what we would emphasise quite strongly is that it’s synergies rather than ten-
sions. So we always see the Internal Market as a tool and as a framework that con-
tributes to social development because it does contribute to growth and growth con-
tributes to employment and employment contributes to prosperity and social devel-
opment in fact……we have seen a lot of improvement in social standards, in living 
standards in the EU, especially in the countries that joined EU recently. So in Central 
and Eastern Europe, so we see a lot of developments there and we see also in general 
in Europe, we see development, also thanks to the single market…..we also have to 
keep in mind that… there is a lot of added value of single market for social develop-
ment and for living standards” (Interview, Business Europe).  
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Recent EU level policies, such as the Agency Working Directive and the Posted Workers En-
forcement Directive, were seen by EU level employer representative groups as evidence that 
that tensions between social and labour rights and internal labour market law did exist, and 
that these could be addressed effectively through appropriate EU directives, transposed and 
implemented at national level to fit the particular circumstances of individual Member State. 
The sense from employers’ associations was that the balance was about right:   
 ‘That [Agency working] directive is in essence based on that dual dimension, on 
this tension. One the one hand you have a provision… that allow(s) the industry to 
better provide its services and to better serve the needs of companies and workers. 
On the other hand you have provisions on equal treatment, equal pay, which in es-
sence touch on the social and employment rights of the workers…So indeed this di-
mension is at the centre of what we are campaigning for and we are not saying it 
should be this extreme of a single market……we see the need for balanced and appro-
priate regulation. No unjust restrictions but also an appropriate protection of workers’ 
rights (Interview, EuroCIETT) 
Whilst several participants, at EU and national level, viewed the national level as the appropri-
ate level to respond to or resolve the tensions a couple of participants noted that these levels 
are also embedded within the tension itself. They therefore highlight the dynamic of national 
level interests in shaping both the substance and the enforcement of EU law and policy. One of 
the respondents at EU level (the EU Rights Clinic) saw the tensions we identified as expressed 
through Member State taking action to restrict free movement rights. For this stakeholder 
(working to assist those making use of free movement rights) the notion of tension incorpo-
rated not only the substance but also the enforcement of EU law and the extent to which 
issues of enforcement allowed Member States to restrict the rights of EU migrants. Moreover 
the participant from Business Europe articulated a tension in terms of the competing needs of 
employers and employees from very different national contexts. This highlights the point that 
substance of EU measures cannot be understood as a product of a tension between the inter-
nal labour market and the social but also between the interests of stakeholders at national lev-
el.  
‘Well ……… it’s not only about Internal Market and social rights. It’s too simple to say 
it this way…..it’s the rule that will somehow make it possible to also create an atmos-
phere of fair competition between countries that have very different levels of devel-
opment and different competitive advantages and very diverse countries. So it’s not 
as simple as saying this is a balance between social rights and Internal Market be-
cause these two are not contradicting each other. We had to find a rule that would 
make it possible for companies from very different countries and for workers from 
very different countries to work with each other in a commonly accepted way.  That is 
the balance …….but I wouldn't emphasise that it’s a balance between the two (social 
and labour rights and economic freedoms). (Interview, Business Europe).  
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